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ARTS

SECTION I ENGLISH

Allahabad University Studies

Vol. VIII]

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[No. 8

THE NEWCASTLE "NOAH'S ARK"

BY

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The Newcastle *Noah's Ark* has up to now been printed six times. In 1736 it was included in Henry Bourne's *History of Newcastle-upon-Tyne*. In 1789 and 1825 what are practically reprints of Bourne's version appeared in John Brand's *History and Antiquities of the Town and Country of the Town of Newcastle-upon-Tyne*, Vol II, and Thomas Sharp's *Dissertation on the Pageants or Dramatic Mysteries anciently performed at Coventry* (where it figures as part of an extract from Brand's history). Of critical editions of the play, the first to appear was Holthausen's in the third volume (1897) of *Goteborgs Högskolas Arsskrift*. As no MS. copy of the play survives, Holthausen had to base his emended text (as all editors of the play have to do) on Bourne's corrupt version, which he collated with Brand's, but not with Sharp's, which was not available. In *Anglia*, XXI, Brotanek once more presented Middle English scholars with a critical edition. He not only printed Sharp's text entire and indicated its divergences from that of Bourne and Brand, but also offered a reconstruction of the original Northern text of the play. Then, in 1909, came Waterhouse's edition in his *Non-Cycle Mystery Plays*. Though printed for the Early

English Text Society this edition is far from satisfactory: it professes to be a reproduction of Bourne's version with a minimum amount of correction and emendation, but its divergences from that version are more numerous than the footnotes would indicate, and, altogether, it abounds in errors both of omission and commission (See my notes in *Modern Language Notes*, XLIII, pp. 252—5.)

In preparing the present edition I have based my text on Bourne's, keeping his modernised spelling and not attempting to restore dialectal forms, except where the rimes demanded such restoration. But I have neither adopted nor noticed Bourne's use of capitals for all nouns or his punctuation. All other divergences—and, as I have attempted to emend Bourne's corrupt text rather freely, they are not a few—have been duly noted in the variants and are distinguished by being placed within square brackets, [], in the text. Disagreements with all other editions are also indicated in the footnotes, but of course, neither the editorial stage-directions, stanza-divisions and the like of Holthausen, Brotanek, and Waterhouse, nor Brotanek's dialectal and orthographical forms, as such, have been considered. In the variants, B = Bourne, Bd = Brand, S = Sharp, H = Holthausen, Bk = Brotanek, W = Waterhouse, Hb = Holthausen's emendations in *Beiblatt zur Anglia*, XXXI, pp. 90ff, and D my suggestions in *Modern Language Review*, XXI, pp. 429ff.

In the Notes that I append to the text, I have sought to do three things: to justify the readings or emendations that I adopt; to illustrate by reference to other Middle English poetical texts the conventional character of our author's phraseology; and, thirdly, to indicate (as no previous editor has done) how, in the details of its handling of the story of Noah, our play compares with other early English writings narrative and dramatic that dwell on the legend.

NOAH'S ARK; OR THE SHIPWRIGHTS' ANCIENT

PLAY, OR DIRGE

(P. 139)

[SCENE 1 HEAVEN]

Deus incipit[t].

1. [F] re was this world that I have wrought.
 No marvel [is] if I do [slo]
 Their folk in earth I made of nought :
 Now are they fully my foe 4
- 2 Vengeance now will I [ta]
 Of them that have grieved me ill. (P 140)
 Great floods shall over them [ga]
 And run over hoope and hill. 8
- 3 All mankind dead shall be
 With storms both [steer and stiff],
 All but Noah, my darling free,
 His children and their wi[fi]s;
 Ever-more yet they trow'd in me.
 Save therefore I will their li[fi]s 14

Hdg Shipwrights') Shipwrights B H, Shipwright's S.
incipit) so Bk, *incipitur* B Bd S H W. 1 Ere) Ere B Bd
 S 2 is) it is B Bd S H. *omat* Bk W do slo) so Hb, do
 sla D, do show B Bd S, dos how H, it destroy Bk W (destroy Bk).
 4 Now are they) Hb *suggests* That non they are or For now are
 they. my foe) grown my foe Bk W, my foe I know H (*There*
is no division into stanzas in B Bd S). 5. ta) so Bk, do
 B Bd S H W. 6 grieved) grieved Bd 8 hoope)
 hoothe W. 10 both steer and stiff) so H, both stiff and
 steer B Bd S W D, pat stere and stiff is Bk. 11 All) *omat*
 H. 12 wifis) wives B Bd S H, wives dere W D (wifis D).
 13 Ever-more) *two words in* B Bd S. *one word. unhyphenated. in*
 Bk W vet) *omat* H trow d) trowid Bk 14 will) *omat*
 D lhis) lves B Bd S H W lhis in fere D

- 9 Hence forth my angel free
 Tell him this for certain;
 My blessing with thee be
 While that thou come again! 38

[SCENE 2. NOAH'S HOUSE.]

Angelus dicat:

- 10 Waken, Noah, to me take tent!
 Noah, [but] if thou hear this thing,
 Ever, whilst thou live, thou shall repent

Noah respond[e]t:

- What art thou, for Heaven's King, 42
 That wakens Noah off his sleeping;
 [In faith] away I would thou went

Angelus dicat:

- It is an angel to thee sent,
 Noah, to tell thee hard tiding 46

- 11 For [everilk] a wight (forwarkis) wild,
 And many fow[ld] in sins sair
 And in felony [is] fowly fi[l]ed,
 Therefore a ship thou dight to steer 50

35 Hence forth) Henceforth B Bd S H W, Hethenward Bk.
 40 but) bid B Bd S. 41 shall) shalt Bd S W respondent) so Bk, respondit B Bd S H W. 43 off) of Bk W. H makes ll 43 and 44 change places. 44 In faith) omit B Bd S H W. away) Away forthwith H 47 everilk a) after Bk for every ilk a B Bd S W, ever-ilk H forwarkis) for warkis Bk W, for works B Bd S, for-warks him H 48) And many fowled in sins sair B Bd S, And many fouled in sins sere W. And many are soiled in sinnis sere H. Is fouled in many sinnis sere Bk 49 is fowly filed) after H Bk fowly filled B Bd S fouly filled W

Of true timber highly railed,
 With thirty cubits in defence 52

13 Look that she draw when she is drest,
 And in her side a door thou shear.
 With fenesters full fitly fest,
 And make chambers both [less and mare] 57
 For a flood that up shall b[re]st

14. [In earth shall be such a flood]
 That [everylke] life that hath life war[m],
 Beast and body with bone and blood,
 They shall be stormed through stress of storm 61

15. Albeit thou, Noah, and thy brood,
 And their three wives [and your, in] hand,
 For you are full righteous and good,
 You shall be saved by sea and land 65

51 Of true timber) With tree and timber II. Of drye timber Bk (Bk W think that two lines have been lost after l. 51.) 52 With) Of II cubits) cubittis Bk W, cubits hight H. in defence) but feare II. (Some lines are evidently missing after l. 52, though there is no indication of this in B Bd S.) 54 a door thou shear) thou shear a door II 56 les and mare) so Bk II W (more II W) for more and less B Bd S. 57 brest) so Bk W, burst B Bd S II omits the line altogether. 58 earth) earth there II, medil-earth Bk, B Bd S read. Such a flood in earth shall be. 59 everylke) so H. every like B Bd S, every ilke W, eur-ilk Bk. hath life warm) hath life-ward B, hath lifeward Bd S, is livand II, leuand es Bk, hath life form W. 61) They shall be stroied in water and sand H, pai shall be stormid purg stormis stress Bk. 62 Albeit) Al but H 63 And) Thy wife and H Bk (pi Bk) and your in in your B Bd S W n H on Bk

- 16 In the ship ere you [entent],
 You take with you both ox and cow,
 Of ilk a thing that life has lent
 The male and female you take with you 69

17. You fetch in fother for your freight,
 And make good purveiance for you[r] pro[w]e,
 That they perish not in your sight:
 Do, Noah, as I have bidden thee now 73

Noah respond [e]t :

- 18 Lord, be then in this stead,
 That me and mine will save and shield!
 I am a man no worth at need,
 For I am six hundred winters [e]ld;
 Unhusty I am to do such a deed,
 Worklooms for to work and weeld; 79

- 19 For I was never, since [on-life],
 Of kind of craft to bur[d]en a boat,
 For I have neither [ruff nor ryff],
 Spyer, sprund, spro[u]t, no sprout
 Christ be the shaper of this ship,
 For a ship need make I m[o]t 85

66 In the) Into the H, Into Bk W. entent) so H, enter out B
 Bd S, ere bent Bk, are bent W. 68 has) is H. 71 good)
 ount H. your prow) you prove B Bd S W. 72 perish
 not) noȝt perisch Bk. 74 respondet) respondit B Bd S H
 W. Lord) A lord Bk. then) then present H W, dou pan Bk.
 76 no) noȝt Bk. 77 winters eld) so H, winters old B
 Bd S W, winter of eld Bk. 79 weeld) weild Bd S. Bk reads
 the line: To wirk and warklomis for to weld 80 since) in
 H. on-life) so Bk, on life W, all my life H, I was born B B Bd
 S 81 of) or Bk, burden) so Bk, burthen B Bd S W, build H.
 82 ruff nor ryff) ryff nor ruff B Bd S, raff nor ruff Hb.
 83 sprout) so H W, spront B Bd S, spout Bk. In H the line runs:
 Nor spyer nor sprund nor sprout nor sprout; in Bk. Sqyre, spout
 i r sȝ rund ne sprout 84 ship) skiff Bk 85 For) For
 now H need) needs H in t) so H Bk must B Bd S W

- 20 Eve[r] wo worth th[e] fouled sin
 For all too dear thou must be bought;
 God [forthenks] he made manki[n].
 Or with his hands that he them wrought. 89
 Therefore [lordings], or ever you bli[n].
 You m[e]nd your [l]ife and turn your thought,
 For of my work I will begin.
 So well were me were all forth brought. 93

[SCENE 3 NEAR NOAH'S HOUSE]

Deabolus intrat.

- 21 [Out, out.] harro and [wele-away],
 That ever I uprose this day!
 So may I smile and say
 I wen[e] there has been none alive.
 Man, beast, child nor wife,
 But my servants were they. 99
22. All this I have heard say,
 A ship that made should be.
 For to save with-owten nay
 Noah and his meenye; 103

86 Ever) Even B Bd S. the) then B Bd S II. 87 must)
 mon Bk. 88 forthenks) so II, forpinkis Bk, forthinks W,
 tor thanks B Bd S. mankin) mankind B Bd S W. 90 lord-
 ings) omit B Bd S, good men H W, Sirs Bk You) I Bk. blin)
 blind B Bd S W. 91 mend your life) mind your wife B
 Bd S. 92 of) on Bk. 93 were all) all S. forth
 brought) forthbrought Bk 94 Out out) Put off B Bd S, Putt
 of H. wele-away) wele away B, well away Bd S, welaway W,
 wailaway Bk. 96 so) zit Bk. smile) sike II. 97 wene)
 went B Bd S. 98 man beast) Nor man nor beast nor II,
 Man nor best nor Bk. nor) ne Bk 100 All this) All-th-
 ough H 102 with-owten) so H with owten B withowten
 Bd S Bk W

- 23 Yet trow I they shall [die]
 Thereto I make a vow,
 If they be never so slee,
 To taynt them yet I trow 107
24. To Noah's wife will I wynd
 Gare her believe in me;
 In faith she is my friend,
 She is both whunt and slee 111

[SCENE 4 NOAH'S HOUSE]

[*Deabolus dicat.*]

25. Rest well, rest well my own dere da[me]
Uxor Nouh dicat
 Welcome [b]ews[c]here! what is thy name?
 Tyte that thou tell me

[*Deabolus dicat.*]

- To tell my name I were full l[ai]th. 115
 I come to warn thee of thy skaith.
 I tell thee secr[e]ly.
 And thou do after thy husband read.
 Thou and thy children will all be dead,
 And that right hastily. 120

[*Uxor dicat.*]

- 26 Go, devil! how say? for shame!

[*Deabolus dicat*]

Yes, hold thee still, le dame,

104 trow I) trowbled H die) so Bk, be B H, be Bd Sh W
 105 Thereto) Therto W 108 wynd) wend H. 111 whunt,
 whaint H, quaint Bk. 112 dere dame) Deteday B Bd S.
 113 bewschere) Fewsthere B Bd S 114 me) me hie H
 115 laith) louth B Bd S. 117 secretly) so Bk; secretly B
 Bd S H W. 118 husband) husbands H. 119 all)
 out H 121 say) said Bk for shame) t ice z H
 122 le) and stable H

At I I s I tel Iet Iy
 I swen thee Ie Ie it
 All that thy husband goes about
 Is little for thy pro|w 126

27 Yet shall I tell thee how
 Thou shalt weet all his will,
 Do as I shall bid thee now,
 Thou shalt I weet every deal 130

28 Have here a drink, full good | it is |.
 | Made | of a mightful man
 Be he hath drunken a drink of this
 No longer shall he | a | u 134

29 Bel|I|ve, bel|i|ve, my own |dame dere
 I may no longer lude, (P 141)
 To ship when thou shall |f|ayre,
 I shall be |by| thy side 138

[SCENE 5 AT THE SHIP.]

Noah dicat.

30 This labour is full great
 For |s|like an old man as me,
 Lo, lo, fast I sweat,
 It trickles |at-our| myn ee 142

123 thee) omit B Bd S. 126 pro|w) profit B Bd S.
 128 shall) shalt Bd S W 130 shall) shalt B Bd S H W, every)
 ilka Bk 131 it is) omit B Bd S, owis H Bk W.
 132 made) That is made B Bd S, W, That made is H Bk (makid
 Bk) a) omit Bk mightful) mightful W. 134 Iam) so Bk W.
 lie nor Iam H, Iearn B Bd S 135 Bel|ve, believe) Believe, be-
 lieve B Bd S W, Believe H, Be Iene Bk, own) old H, dame dere)
 dear dame B Bd S H. 137 (thou) thow W fayre) sayre B
 Bd S. 138 by) omit B 140 sluke) like B Bd S W.
 141 fast) how fast H W f all fast Bk 142 it is) so H t
 our B Bd S atour W al oure Bk

- 1 N w h o [then will I vende
 My weāry bones for to rest,
 For such good as God hath sen[d]
 There I get of the best 146

[SCENE 6 NOAH'S HOUSE]

[*Noah dicat*]

- 32 Rest well da[me]! what chear with thee?

Uxor dicat

- Welcome Noah, as might I thee,
 Welcome to thine own wayns!
 Sit down here beside[n] me. 150
 Thou hast full weary haynes.
 Have eaten, Noah, as might I thee,
 And soon a drink I shall give thee,
 Such dr[u]nk thou never [anes] 154

Noah dicat.

- 33 What the devil! what drink is it?
 By my father's soul, I have nere lost my wit! 156

143 then) *omit* B Bd S 144 for) *omit* Hb 145 For)
omit H bath send) hath sent B Bd S W, doth send H, will
 send Bk. 147 dame) so Bk, day B Bd S, good day H
 W. 148 night) not Bk 150 here besiden me)
after Bk, here beside me B Bd S W, beside me here H.
 152 night) not Bk. 154 drunk H, drink B Bd S, drank
 Bk W anes) none afore B Bd S, afore H W, name but fere
 Bk 156) *As two lines in* H Bk H *reads*: I have forsooth
 nere lost my wit By my fathers soul no more Bk *reads*
 In faith I haue nere lost my wit Be in faders sa le forbere

Uxor dicat

34. Noah, do[t] you tel me now
Whereabout you wends
I give God a vow.
We two shall here be friends 160

Noah dicat

35. O yes, dame, could thou [levnd],
I would thee tell my wit
How G[o]d of heaven an angel sen[d]
And bad me make a ship 164
36. This world he will foredoe
With storms both [steer and stiff],
[Fell] all but [me and you],
Our children and [their] wif[i]s 168

Uxor dicat

37. Who, devil, made thee a wright—
God give him evil to fayre'—
Of hand to have such slight
To make ship less or [mare]?
When you began to smite
Men should have heard wide where 174

157, 158) *As one line in* B Bd S 157 both bade
B Bd S you tell me now) you tell me B Bd S, if you tell
me shew Bk 158 whereabout where about Bd S W you
wends) you winds Bk. 159, 160) *As one line in* B Bd S
159 give God) give to God H, geue gret God Bk 160 friends)
friends Bd S 161 levnd) so D; layne B Bd S, lanne
trewly Bk, stint H W 162 thee tell) tell thee S W
163 God) Good B of heaven) omit H Bk send) so D, sent B Bd
S H W, sent fra hie Bk 165 foredoe) fore due B, fore-doe
H, foredo Bk, foido W. 166 both steer and stiff) so H; both
stiff and steer fell B Bd S, tell baith stiff and stere D, both stiff
and steer W, pat stere and stiff is Bk. 167f.) *Written
as one line in* B Bd S 167 Fell) omit B Bd S H Bk W
me and you) so Bk W; thee and me B Bd S, thee and me thereto
H. 168 their) inserted by H Bk, wifis) so Bk; wives B
Bd S H wives dere W D. 170 evill) ill Bk 170
mare) more perfect B Bk S 171 if) *Pruney seal* in Bk W
173 smite) smite H

Noah dicat

- 38 Yes, dame, it is God's will;
 Let be, so thou not say!
 Go make an end I will
 And come again full thr[ay] 178

Uson dicat

30. By my faith, I no rake
 Whether thou be friend or foe.
 The devil of hell thee [take].
 To ship when thou shalt go! 182

Noah dicat.

- 40 God send me help in h[1][e]
 To clink yo[n] nail[s twain].
 God send me help in h[1][e]
 Your hand to hold again,
 That all may well [done be].
 My strokes be not in vain 188

Angelus dicat.

- 41 God hath thee help hither send,
 Thereof be thou right bold,
 Thy strokes shall fair be kend.
 For thou thy wife has [t]owld 192

176 so) do H 178 thray) throug B Bd S 179 no
 rake) do noȝt rake Bk, take no heed H 181 take) so Bk
 W, speed B Bd S H 183 hie) so Bk, hy W, high B Bd S
 In H the line runs God help me from aboon 184 yon)
 you B, on you H. nails twain) so Bk W; nail too B Bd S, amain
 H. 185 in hie) in hv W, in high B Bd S, full soon H
 187 may well done be) after Bk; well done may be W, may
 well be done B Bd S H 189 hath thee) doth H wi l pe Bk
 192 towld) told W cowl'd B Bd S H Bk

Scalp & crew

- 42 Now is this ship well gotten
 Within and without thanks me
 Now hope thee will ' wind
 To fetch on me to money
 Have good day, both old and young
 My blessing with you be' 198

Heatholus dead

- 43 All that is gathered in this strand
 There will not believe in me
 I pray to Dolphin prince of dead
 Scald you all (so) in his lead
 That never a one of you thrive nor thee' 203

FINIS Amen

193 well gotten) after Bk W, well made B Bd S, all gave at
 195 wind) so Bk; wind B Bd S W, fare H. 196 money
 after Bk's money; money B Bd S H W. 197 old) less H
 ying) after Bk, young B Bd S W, mare H. 201 Dolphin) Dili
 Bk 202 Scald) He scald H so in; in B Bd S Bk W,
 within H. 203 never a one of you) none of you may H
 Hb would read U. 202, 203 as,

Scald you all, (both low and he),

That never a one of all this bede.

~~Ma~~ nor would I say to thy r fee

f a at one a lopt 1th fo own l xpa d h

Ch = *The Chester Plays*. EETS, ES, 62

J & Cr = *The Creation of the World ou W. Jordan*. Translated from Cornish by J. Keigwin and edited by J. Gilbert. London 1827

LC = *Iudus Conventus*. EETS, ES, 120

OM = *Origo Mundi*. Translated and edited by E. Norris in *Ancient Cornish Drama*, Vol. I

T = *The Towneley Plays*. EETS, ES, 71

VT = *Le Mystère du Vrai Testament*. Ed. Baron J. de Rothschild. 5 Vols. Paris, 1878-1885

Y = *York Mystery Plays*. Ed. Miss E. Foulman Smith. Oxford, 1885]

It is perhaps not surprising that of the cycle of plays performed at Newcastle the only one that should have survived is the Shipwrights' Play. But doubtless the comic realism of the piece had at least as much to do with its survival as the Shipwrights' gild. The cycle of which our play formed part comprised no fewer than twenty-two plays and may very well have comprised at least half a dozen more. Though even the names of no more than twelve of them can today be ascertained there can be little doubt that, as at York, there used to be a second Noah play handling the story of the Flood and its Waning, for which play the present one was only a prelude and preparation. (See H. pp. 12—16; Chambers, *The Medieval Stage*, II, p. 424, W, pp. xxxix, xl.).

Our play was probably written in the earlier half of the fifteenth century, and—if we are to judge by the various entries regarding performances that are to be found in the gild books from 1428 to 1586—the gild-cycle, including our play, was performed annually on Corpus Christi day till about the middle of the sixteenth century, when the performances seem to have become irregular and occasional. But it is obvious that the copy used by Bouine was a later transcript, which Bk (p. 167) places in the second quarter of the 15th century and H (p. 20), more plausibly, in the 16th century.

As for the manner of performance of the Newcastle plays, I agree with Bk (p. 196) and W (p. xli) that it was processional, each pageant wagon carried from station to station through the

3 *Their* 'these' Cf *Curs Mundi* 1536 5831

I made of nought. Cf *Norwich Creation*, B, 2; *T.* III, 287; and *Ch.* III, 2.

4 I see no need to alter the line or add to it. For *are .my* *for*, cf. *Ch.* III, 6, and as for *fully*, with the stress on the second syllable, cf. *Curs Mundi*, 488.

5, 6, For *take vengeance of*, cf. *Curs Mundi*, 1822 (Göttingen), 1823 (Fairfax)

* 8. *hoope*, 'valley' (O.E. hōp) Cf. *Wars of Alex.* 5390 and *Morte Arthure*, 2503 (W wrongly reads *hoothc* and explains it in his Glossary as "probably a miscopying of heethe, heath. O.E. hæg")

10ff. *stiff wifs . lufs*. These rimes (resulting from my inversion of B's *stiff and steer*) though inexact are surely permissible especially in the Northern dialect. For *steer and stiff*, H refers us to *Sir Eger* (*Eng. Studn.* XIX); we may also cf. *St. Brandan* (Wright), 21 "þe wind was strong and stif inoug."

12 *their wifs*. That is, his own wife as well as his sons' wives. Cf *F.* VIII, 31, 32.

15. *Hence forth*. As *henceforth* indicates time—see *Mätzner*, II, 2, 187a—we may either read *ward* for *forth*, as does Bk, or take *forth* as a separate adverb having the force of 'be off.' Cf. l 35 below, *Curs Mundi*, 744 (Cotton), and *Ch.* VI, 263f, where *thyder* is similarly used.

15ff. In the *F. T.* and *Ch.* Noah plays and in the Cornish *O. M.* and *Creation*, God is (after *Gen.* VI, 13) presented as speaking directly to Noah; but *L.C.*, IV, 96ff, and the French *V. T.*, 5518ff, agree with our play in making an Angel convey the divine message (Bk is wrong when he says—p. 194—that in the *V. T.* God Himself delivers the message. The fact is that the *V. T.* occupies a middle position between the canonical and the apocryphal traditions; for, though an Angel speaks to Noah, he speaks as though he were the Almighty Himself and Noah thinks he is face to face with God; see ll. 5518, 5528 and 5522, and later, though we hear of God dispatching an Angel once more to Noah, yet, it is God Himself who subsequently appears to him; see ll. 5637ff and 5694ff)

The apocryphal Angel tradition in early Hebrew use thus in the Ethiopic *Book of Enoch*, I, 1—3, Uziel is sent to Noah. We may compare LX, 1—25, where Noah sees a vision of the Heavens quaking and falls upon his face, whereupon Michael sends an angel to raise him and tell him of the judgment to come. (In LXXVII, 1ff, however, the word of God is just said to appear to Noah.) Again, in the *Sefer Noah*, III, 155—160, it is said that Noah learned to build the ark from a book brought to him by the angel Raphael. In Avitus, *De Deluvio Mundi*, Gabriel is indicated as the messenger.

17. *in this degree* Though the emended *in his degree* of H and Bk may have been the original reading, I retain B's reading as it makes good sense 'in this state or condition', referring to the next line, or, alternatively, 'in this manner or wise,' referring to ll. 19ff. For the first rendering, cf. Barbour's *Bruce*, XVII, 632f.

“ And quhen that into sic degree
Had made thame for thair assauging ”

18. See the note to ll. 39—40 below.

19. I adopt Bk's change of *go make a ship to a ship go dight*, but perhaps a perfect rime is no more to be sought here than it is in ll. 162—164 (*ut* = *ship*) and elsewhere in this piece.

22. *lett*, 'delay.' Cf. *Piers Plow.*, B, IX, 1301 (which are strikingly close to our ll. 19—22):

“ And come to Noah anon and bad hym nougt lette:
Swithe go shape a shippe of shides and of bordes.”

24. *be that*, 'by the time that'; hence 'as soon as.' Cf. *Guy of Warwick*, 581, 5627, 6647, *Sege off Melayne*, 253; *Sir Eglamour*, 201; *Piers Plow.*, B, VI, 301. In l. 133 below, *be alone* occurs.

26. *seam and rove* The *N.E.D.* shows that all the corrections and interpretations of H Bk and W were unnecessary; see *Seam*, sb. 4 and *Rove*, sb. 2. We learn that a seam is “a kind of nail or rivet for fastening the overlapping edges of a clinket-built boat, the end of the nail being clinked on a rove,” and that the word is “usually associated with rove, its counterpart.” Several instances of seam and rove in conjunction are cited, the earliest one being from 1406. (*Seam* by itself occurs in a parallel context in *Y.* VIII. 77.) A rove is defined as “a small metal plate or flange on which the point of a nail or rivet is clinched or beaten

down in the building of boats or small ships a burr. The citations include *Y* VIII. 109 the *rece* of which was tentatively explained by Miss Smith as a "rule, or carpenter's tool."

27 *thing*, 'way,' as in *Wars of Alex*, 2275. For the phrase, *in any manner of thing*, cf. *Langtoft's Chronicle* (Hearne) p. 124, Chaucer, *Book of the Duchess*, 141, and *Ch* IV, 400

28 *Into ship* For the omission of the article, cf. *ll* 31, 137, 172, 182 and *T* III 371, 374

wake, 'walk.' Cf. *F* II, 12 and XLVIII, 196, where Miss Smith wrongly explains *wake* as 'watch'.

29 As for *beast and fowl*, cf. *Y* VIII, 124, 125, 149; and for the assonance (*thing* + *kind*) resulting from my transposition, see my note on l 19 above, cf. *ll*. 195 . 197 below and also *Y*. XI, 278: 280. 282-284; *T*. XX, 676. 678; *Guy of War.*, 8211. 8213 and Zupitza's Preface, pp. xi, xii. There is no need, therefore, to alter the line as freely as do *H* and *Bk*.

29, 30. Like the author of our play, most of the early English retailers of the Flood story are content to follow *Gen*. VI, 19, 20, and speak of a pair of each kind of beast and bird being saved with Noah; they overlook the distinction made in *Gen* VII, 2, 3, between clean and unclean creatures. See, e.g., *Gen & Exod* 69ff; *Curs. Mund.* 1687ff, *Piers. Pl.*, C, XI, 227ff; *Y*. VIII, 130; *T* III, 150ff, *LC.*, IV, 114ff, 120f Cf also *O.M.*, 977ff, *J's Cr.*, p. 175; *VT.*, 5545f and Comestor, *Hist. Schol. (Genesis)*, XXXIII, XXXIV But mention of seven pairs of clean creatures and one pair of unclean ones is to be found in the O.E. *Genesis*, 1335ff, *Cleanness*, 333ff, and *Ch* III, 117ff

32. 'That they do not die in the ship' See *H*'s note to l 28 on this kind of word-order, which is characteristic of the play

38 *While that*, 'till.' For this use of *while*, cf. *Bruce*. XVII, 624, 659-789; *Pearl*, 528, *Sege off Melayne*, 798, 1233

39-46. *Bk* (p. 194, fn. 2) hints at the possibility of this scene being copied from *Y*. XIII, 247ff, where similarly an Angel approaches a sleeping Joseph, who would fain be left alone and inquires who the intruder may be. But, as the pictures and wall-paintings reproduced by Lindblom show, it was traditional not only to have an angel sent to Noah but also to present the angel

ask g the patr arel fr h lcey Th e of the l p int
ngs the Swed sh b r l a Fds et reveal the angel address
ing a Noah rising from his bed, while his wife is fast asleep

42. *for Heaven's King*. Perhaps the original had the uninflected *heaven*; see Mead on *Squire of Low Degree*, C 287 and my note on l 118 below.

47—49. I have attempted to make sense out of these lines with the minimum amount of change. I take H, I take B's *for Warls* as a verb, though, unlike H, I do not insert a reflexive, *him*, after it; *forwarls wild* means 'offends or sins wildly'. As for my *many fowld*, cf. 7 III, 48—54 (for *fowld*, cf. *Ch* II, 654). The lines, as I take them, mean: 'For every one trespasses wildly (thoughtlessly) and is defiled many-fold with sore sins and with felony.' I should, perhaps, have altered *san* to *sore*, but, as Bk observes, the rime is good enough without the change. As for the rime, *wild fled*, cf. Y. XIII, 213 : 216.

51, 52. Bk and W think that some lines are missing between ll. 51 and 52. But they seem to have overlooked the close connection there is between *highly ruled* and *thirty cubits* (the height of the ark). The missing lines must have preceded our l 51 and mentioned the length and breadth of the ark, details of which invariably precede the particulars regarding height. As for the lines themselves, there is no need to change anything; *true timber* may be either 'trusty timber' or 'timber accurately fitted' (see *V E D*, s.v. True, adj. 1b, 4d, and cf. J. VIII, 73—78), and *in defence* means 'by way of defence, as a fortification' (cf. *Conf Amantis*, III, 214).

52. *thirty cubits*. No figures are given in *LC* IV, and in the *Chester* 'Noah' the height is given as fifty cubits in three MSS and sixty in two others. Of course sometimes 'ell' or 'fathom' is used as an equivalent for 'cubit'—see, e.g. Aelfric's homily *De Innitio Creaturae*, *Gen. & Exod.*, 563f, and Lyndsay's *Monarchae*, 1377f—but in *Curs. Munda*, evidently an ell is considered equal to two cubits, for the dimensions of the ark are given as

"seven score ellen lang and ten,

Thrys aght on wide, on heght fueten" (1675-6).

(Note Thrys aght instead of twenty five as width

3 *draw* Bk defines the word after Webster as 'to sink in water, to require a depth for floating.' But, firstly, this means that a missing line specified the depth drawn, and, secondly, the earliest instance cited for this use of the word in *N.E.D.* is from 1555 (see *Draw*, vb 13). May not the phrase, *draw when she is drest* mean 'move when (? where) she is steered'? See *N.E.D.*, s.v. *Draw*, vb, 68, and *Mätzner*, s.v. *Dressen* 4.

55. *fenesters*. As *Gen.* VI, 16 mentions only one window, and as no medieval account is known to me which mentions more, I am inclined to think that the word originally was *fenestere*. For the omission of the indefinite article in that case, cf. "At fenestre" in *Robert of Gloucester* (Hearne) p. 312. Note, moreover, that here, as in *Curs. Mundi*, 1682f, and Lyndsay's *Monarchie* 1379ff, the order is door, window, instead of the biblical and more usual window, door (see *Ch.* III, 29ff; *T.* III, 136f). And, indeed, our line, with its *full fitly fest*, resembles "A window sperand weel on hei" of *Curs. Mundi*. (In the Cornish plays the window is not mentioned, and in the *Y* and *L.C.* plays neither window nor door.)

56. The exact number of compartments and storeys is not specified here or in *Y* VIII, 127, 129 or in *V.T.* 5545f. But see *Ch.* III, 35, *T.* III, 129, and Lyndsay's *Monarchie*, 1374f. For the elaborate account of the number and arrangement of floors and apartments given in *Curs. Mundi*, 1691—1700, and for the views of Augustine and Josephus, see Comeston, *Hist. Schol. (Gen.)*, XXXII.

59—61. Because of B's *uaid* in l. 59, many rather drastic changes have been made by earlier editors in ll. 59 and 61. But surely by reading *uarm* for *ward* (the "d" of which may be due to the attraction of *flood* in l. 58), we restore the text sufficiently, even though the rime *uarm storm* may be a faulty one in M.E. As for *life uarm*, cf. ll. 11, 15, 35, 48, 135, where the rime demands that the adjective follow the noun. For the lines themselves, cf.

"I schal stienkle my distress & strye al to-geder
Bope ledez & londe & alle pat lyf habbez"

(Cleanness, 307-8)

60 *with bone and blood*. See my note on *Ch.* I 167 in these *St. hes.* VI Arts) pp. 49-50 and Hall's note to *Av. g. Horn* L. 916

63 My correction of B makes *en* hinges in the text. Perhaps B's original read *at your en hand*; the first *in* being really for "and" (see my note on *T* III, 20 in *Eng. Studn.*, LXIII, 224); and B "corrected" the phrase by omitting the second "in."

65 *by sea and land*. Cf. *Sir Isumbras* (Halliwell) 732. The more usual expression, however, is the alliterative *by sea and sand*, of which Matzner, I, p. 362, and Hall (*Poems of Minot*, p. 51) have collected many examples.

66 *entent*. I adopt H's *entent*, which may be rendered either (i) 'intend to go' in which case for the suppressed infinitive cf. *Guy of War.*, 7672 and Zupitza's note to H. 855-6, or (ii) 'turn' or some such word indicating motion, cf. Chaucer, *Boethius*, I, 2, p. 3. "For sope than she, entending to me-ward with alle the lookinge of her eyen, seide . . ." Cf. also Shakespeare's use of *intend* in the sense of 'propose making a journey' (see Orons. *Shak. Glossary*). For the rime, *entent* *lent*, and, incidentally, for *life has lent* of l. 68, cf. *V* VII, 31, 32.

66—73. This is virtually a repetition of ll. 17—34, but such repetition is inevitable when an angel conveys the message; cf. *L.C.* IV, 114, 120, *V.T.*, 5426f, 5545f. It is this that makes Ten Brink (*Eng. Lit.* II, p. 273) consider the mediation of the angel a "questionable improvement"; but, as Bk (p. 194) observes, there is, nevertheless, some skill shown in making the angel insert new particulars when communicating God's commands to Noah.

76. *at need*, 'in time of need.' Cf. *Piers Pl.*, B, VI, 121, C, XXI, 444; *Kyng of Tars*, 432, 950.

77 *six hundred winters old*. According to *Gen.* VII, 5, the ark is *entered* by Noah when he is six hundred years old. Our play, as also *T.* III, 145ff. would indeed suggest that the ark was built within a very short time, but the common belief was that the making took a long time. Rabbinical writers estimated it, some at five years, others at fifty-two (see *Noah* in the *Jewish Encyc.*), while the O.E. *Genesis* (l. 1322) talks vaguely of many winters. Most Christian writers, however, reading *Gen.* VII, 5, with *Gen.* V, 32 and VI, 3, concluded that the construction of the ark took a hundred years see e.g. Bede *Hieronymus* Lib II. Comestor *Hist. Schol.* (*Gen.* XXXI. And this last view is re-

flected in *Gen. & Exod.* 567, } VIII, 114; *L.C.* IV, 206 and Lyndsay's *Monarchie* 1391f (though the O.E. prose *Salomon and Saturn* and the similar M.E. *Master of Oxford and his Clerk* speak of the ark taking *eighty* years to make) In *Y* VIII, 91 and in *L.C.* IV, 27 it is also distinctly stated that Noah was five hundred years old when he commenced work on the ark, and as much can be inferred from a combination of *Gen. & Exod.*, 575 with 567. Nevertheless, because of *Gen.* VI, 3, it was sometimes said that the ark was a hundred and twenty years in the making: see, e.g., *Ch.* III, 149, 150 and *Curs. Munda*, 1702, in which latter, however, Noah is, curiously enough, still said to have been five hundred years old when the divine command came to him (ll. 1627ff) 78ff. Cf. *Y.* VIII, 67f, *L.C.* IV, 126ff, *T.* III, 265ff.

80. *since on-life*. I adopt Bk's emendation of B's *since I was born*, but perhaps B's original had *since I was on-life*, the *never* of the line being pronounced, and even possibly spelt, as a monosyllable

81. *of kind of craft*. H cannot understand this and Bk emends it to *of kind or craft*; but does it not mean 'of such craft as'? For the juxtaposition of kind and craft, cf. *Piers Pl.*, B, X, 177:

"Of alkinnes craftes I contoured toles."

burden. I adopt Bk's emendation and understand 'put boards together.' Bk cites Huloet, *Abecedarium* "bourden, or make of bouides; buldinge or ioynynge of bourdes together." Cf. also the M.E. verb *timber*, meaning 'build.'

82. *ruff nor ryff*. B's *ryff nor ruff* is very close to M.E. *riff nor raff* (O.E. *rif ne raf*) meaning 'nothing at all.' But the difficulty is that the rime seems to require *ruff nor ryff*, and the M.E. expression referred to does not seem to allow of an inversion; see *N.E.D.*, s.v. *Riff*, sb 1. If then we are to interpret our phrase otherwise than as 'nothing at all,' the question is: What is *ryff* and what *ruff*? *Ruff* may be, as BK and W understand it, 'rough-tree, a rough, untrimmed mast.' The word may, however, have been *raff*, meaning a board or timber ready for use, or a rafter or spar, see *N.E.D.*, s.v. *Raft*, sb 3 and *Raft*, sb 1. As for *ryff*, it is perhaps a form of *reef* (see *N.E.D.*, s.v., *Reef*, sb 1), one of the horizontal portions of a sail" and this is how Bk and W take the word. Thus our phrase may mean either *mast nor sail*

o spar r sa l B afte ill l uch e t thuk t means simply nothing at all note the paralel furnished by ll 97, 98 below

83 This line, taken with the *uff nor yff* of the preceding one, conveys broadly the fact that Noah has 'nothing at all in the way of wood.' (Cf. the very similar ll. 97, 98 meaning 'no living thing') For, all the four substantives in this line point to wood or timber in one form or another. For *spær*, see *N.E.D.*, s.v. Spire, sb 2: 'a spar or pole of timber' (Bk's *sgyre*, 'a carpenter's square' is thus unnecessary.) *Sprund* is explained as a 'spar or pole' in *N.E.D.*, which, however, cites only our passage. *Sprout* (H's correction of B's *spront*) is perhaps the same as modern *sprout*, 'a shoot of a plant,' and so there is no need to read *spout*, 'a round plane,' as Bk does. This same *spout* has been suggested by W for the last of our four substantives, *sprot* but this too is unnecessary, see *N.E.D.*, s.v. *Sprote*, 'a shiver, splinter' (Cf. Icel *Sproti*, 'twig, stick, rod') H compares *Harelock*, 1142. "I ne haue stikke, I ne haue sprote"

85. *ship*. Bk would read *skiff*, but the earliest instance cited for the word in *N.E.D.* is from 1575. Besides, in ll. 162: 164 the similar assonance, *wit ship*, cannot be corrected even by reading *skiff*. See the notes on ll. 19 and 29 above.

86. *Ever wo worth the*. Cf. *Ch.* I, 258 and my note to it. Davidson (*Eng. Mystery Plays*, p. 260) was the first to suggest this correction and others in this stanza: *forthenkes*, *monkin* and *blin*.

87. *all too*. See *Mätzner*, II, 1, 57a

88. Cf. *Cleanness*, 285

"Me for-pynkeȝ ful much put euer I mon made": and *Piers Pl.*, B, IX, 129.

90. *lording*.. Cf. *Ch.* IV, l. 15, etc., and see Zupitza on *Athelston*, l. 7 and Zielke, *Orfès*, p. 8.

or ever you blin. 'without stopping,' and so 'at once, straight-away.' Bk is wrong in changing *you* to *I*, cf. *Ch.* VI, 264; *Y* XXXV, 256.

90f. For Noah's preaching to his generation, see 2 *Peter* II 5 (1 *Peter* III 20), *Sibylline Oracles* I, *Josephus Antiquities* I, iii 1; and cf. O.E. 6 1317ff *Cors Mendi* 1729ff *Lyndsay's M* hie 1315ff and *J. Cr* pp 169ff

92. *of my work*. Bk changes the *of* to *on*, but cf. T III, 253 ('To begyn of this tree my bonys will I bend,") and see Hall's notes to *King Horn* C 122 and *Poems of Manot*, ix, 13

94. For similar expressions of helplessness and despair, cf. F I, 97, XI, 403, XXXVIII 185, 343; T II 275, *Ch.* I 245, *L.C.* XXIII, 187, *Croton Sacrament* (Waterhouse) 401, 593. See also Mead's note on *The Squyr of Loue Degre*, 675, to the instances cited in which we may add T. I 132; *L.C.*, XII, 57, 78, XV 253.

94ff. With this scene between the Devil and Noah's wife Bk asks us to compare F. XXX, 159ff and *Wisdom in Digby Plays*, p. 150). But once more Lindblom's reproductions of medieval pictures reveal to us the fact that the Devil's appearance to, and intrigue with, Noah's wife were part of a medieval tradition. The relevant illustrations (reproduced from *The Queen Mary's Psalter* edited by Warner, London, 1902) show the Devil speaking to Noah's wife, and the woman welcoming Noah and handing him a drink in a bowl. And the accompanying legend runs

"Coment le diable viint en forme de homme a la feme Noe e demandia u son mari estoit. E ele disoit qe ele ne sont ou il est alé 'pur toi trayr et tote le mund' preyne ces greynes e feriz un aboycion et le donetz a boyre e il te dura tote!' E issint fist ele."

96. *so may I smile and say*. I retain B's version unchanged and take the line to refer to what follows, but I do not feel that this is very satisfactory. Not only is the balance of the stanza destroyed, but also the transition from grief to joy is too sudden. After all, the line may have had reference to the two preceding ones and read: *So may I sike and say* (H's emendation). In that case the following lines would convey "I wene that *so far* all have been obedient to me, but now this Noah compels me to this painful 'uprising.' " For *sike and say*, H refers us to the instances in Kolbing's *Ipomedon*, p. cxxvi

101. 'That a ship should be made.' For the placing of the subject before the conjunction, see H's note to l. 28.

102. *withouten nay*, 'undeniably, assuredly'; a common stop-gap. See Zupitza on *Guy of War.*, 3054.

105. *Thereto* to that f T III 385 .

106 *If* though Bk compares H f H r 231 208
Cf. also 7 H, 113, 388, 389; IV, 81, 82, and see Matzner's *Grammar*, III, pp. 472, 473.

107 *taunt*, 'strike, hurt' (cf. F XXVI, 6)

111. Cf. *The Wrought's Chaste Wife*, 305

"Women beith both queynte & slye"

For the form *whunt* (O F count), cf. T. XX, 114, as against XIII, 593, and the forms *wheme* and *whake* in T. VII, 62, 182, and *whikly* in Y. II, 128

113 *Uxor Noah* I have not encountered a single English account of the Flood which refers to her (or any of her daughters-in-law) by name, though the *Hist. Schol.* was there to draw upon (and, indeed, was drawn upon by the author of the V.T.) and catechisms like the O.E. prose *Sal. and Sat.* and the M.E. *Master of Oxford* had long interested themselves in the matter. According to Comestor (*H.S. Gen.*, XXXIII) her name was Phuarfata, according to the two catechisms mentioned it was Dalila (Dalida), according to the *Book of Jubilees*, IV, 33, it was Emzara, and according to *Genesis Rabbah*, XXVI, 2, Noamah

bewschere. Cf. T. IX, 142: "Welcom. bewschere, say what tythyng!" and also T. XVI, 273; Y. XIX, 76. (*Bewschers* in *Monte Arthure*, 1047, is a different word, see *Hatzner*, s.v.) *Beau Sir* occurs in *House of Fame*, II, 135, and *Gun. & Green Knight*, 1222. Cf. also *beau fitz* and *beau pere* in *Piers Pl.*, C, X, 311; X, 248, XXI, 241.

For stock forms of salutation in M.E. romances see Kolbing on *Tristram*, 838, and his *Six Beues*, pp. xlvii, li. See also *King Horn* (Hall) C 765 note.

117. *secretly*. For *secretly*, meaning 'surely, positively,' in this kind of expression, cf. *Ch.* XII, 121. *Ipomedon*, A, 7424; *Genevrides*, 2095, *Guy of War.* 4121, etc.

118. *husband* For this uninflected genitive, cf. *Curs. Mundi* 7136 Cotton, and *Metrical Homilies* (Small), p. 145. Cf. also uninflected *day* (Y. I, 158; T. IV, 116; L.C. XI, 155); *world* (*Ch.* II, 342), *man* (T. VII, 8), *woman* (Y. VI, 150), *priest* (T. II, 104), *angel* (L.C. XII, 77), *doril* (T. II, 439) and *heaven* (T. VII, 162 I.C. XII 84 (Y. V 421 Brime MS *Abraham* 465) and see Campbell's note on *The Seven Sages of Rome* 193

121 *how say* With H, I take *say* to be a form of *so*, see V.E.J. s v H compares *Erl of Tolous* (Iudtke), 853: "A, devil, he seyde, how soo?" Cf also *Curs Munda*, 5207, *Will of Palerne* 980. Bk reads *hou says*, but l 123 answers rather *how so* than *how says*

for shame. Cf L.C. XII 71, XXXVIII, 230; *Amis & Amil*, 1229.

122. *Hold thes still* Cf. *Monte Athure*, 15; *Squyr of Lowe Degre*, C428

* *la dame*. *Le* is a permissible O.F. form of the fem definite article, which may (as here) precede a noun in the vocative case For the same practice in M.E., see Kellner, *Syntax*, §223

124. For swearing by the snout, cf *Sir Beues*, C, 1695f

"Then seyde the portar, 'Be my snowte,
Thys was Befyse that y lete owte.'"

Also *Seven Sages* (Weber), A, 1483f

"Is hit nou time, hup snoute,
For to ben thous longe thei oute"

With the *crooked snout* of our passage, cf the *collide* or *colmac* snout of the disguised Horn in *King Horn*, L, 1088, C 1082. Probably our Deabolus wore a mask

131—134. See the note on ll. 94ff It is interesting to find that, according to a Hebrew tradition, the First Woman adopted a similar ruse to deceive her husband For, according to *Numbers Rabbah* X, Eve, at the invitation of the Serpent partook of wine and later mixed some with Adam's drink (See *Jewish Encycl.* under 'Eve.')

131, 132 My emendation of B's text takes the fewest liberties with it and makes l. 132 metrically parallel to l. 134.

133 *be*, 'by the time that, as soon as.' Cf the similar use of *fro* in Y. IX, 287 and *to* in T VII 152, XIII 108, XXIII 385; and see the note on l. 24 above.

134 Cf. Y X, 167.

135 *Belure, belive*, 'Quickly, quickly' He is in a hurry to get away and hence wants her to take the drink from him without delay See *Mat ner* s v B fe adv 2 .

In the Chester play, though Uxor Noah discloses herself, comparatively early, as rather 'temperamental', yet she is helpful throughout the making and freighting of the ship, and proves really troublesome only when it comes to her making one of the company and entering it, see ll. 65—68 and 173—176 as against ll. 97—112 and 193ff. But in our play the quarrel starts, and in right earnest too, while the ship is building, and in the Towneley one even before Noah sets his hand to it. On the other hand the conjugal comedy finds no place in the *L.C.*, *O.M.*, *J's Cr.*, and *V.T.* Noah scenes, for, Mrs. Noah in these plays is hopelessly pious and infinitely helpful. In *J's Cr.*, indeed, she is a little late in entering the ship and is in danger of drowning, but that is only because she is an ideal housewife and (as she sweetly remarks) is bent on saving every possible thing, for it all cost a pot of money!

161, 163 For *leynd* and *send* see my remarks in *Mod. Lang. Review*, XXI, p. 430.

166, 167 In *Mod. Lang. Review*, XXI, p. 431, I suggested placing *fell* (meaning 'sharp, cruel') before *both*, but all that need be done is to carry over *fell* to the next line and understand 'knock down, destroy.'

174 *wide where*, 'widely, far.' Cf. *Guy of War*, 8222: "Thou schuldyst be knowyn wyde where," and see Zupitza's note to it. Cf. also *Cant. Tales*, B, 136; *Troil & Cres.*, III, 404; *Piers Pl.*, B, VIII, 62.

178. *thray*, 'boldly, eagerly, quickly;' an adjective used adverbially as in *Curs. Mundi*, 5997 (Trinity) and *Cuthbert* (Surtees) 6032.

184ff. H and Bk think, each in his own way, that there is some horseplay here and that the strokes and the clinking are directed by Noah at his wife no less than at the ship. And they retain B's *could* and interpret it as 'struck, hit,' referring us to *Matzner* s.v. *Cullen*, *Colen* (=to kill) and to *N.E.D.*, s.v. *Coil*. But this does not satisfy me. For one thing, the first use of *coil* in the sense of 'beat, thrash' occurs, according to *N.E.D.*, in the 16th century. For another thing, though the Noah of the Towneley play does indeed beat his shrewish wife, this our Noah has been presented hitherto as too venerable and patriarchal to blossom suddenly into a wife-beater, and that too only because his mate evinces an almost natural feminine curiosity. And & we not see

I am perfectly free. But the first word to her (ll. 180, 186).² Moreover, the Angel would hardly be expected to gloat over a wife-beating however provoked and justifiable. And so I take B's *could* (l. 192) to be a misreading of an earlier *could*, and I find the rhyme *bold - could* in V XIII, 192-193.

186 Bk. very strangely, cites T IV, 260 to show that to hold one's hand means to stop or pause. But Noah is not speaking here of staying his own hand, but of clasping his wife's.

196 *meenge*. See l. 103 and cf. T. III 289, 290.

197. Cf. T V, 67 and see *King Horn* (Hall) C 727 note, *Sir Beues* (Kolbing) p. xlvii, and *Amis & Amil* (Kolbing) p. xlviii.

201 *Dolphin*. Though Bk supports his *Dylf* by reference to a *dylfe* in *Mary Magdalene*, I am for adhering to the reading of B, *Dolphin* being the Dauphin (later Charles VII), who appeared to the English as monstrous as the devil himself.

202 *lead*, 'cauldron.' Cf. *Cant. Tales*, A 202.

203 *thrice nor thee*. See Brandl on *Thom. of Erceeld.*, 344, and *Amis & Amil* (Kolbing), p. xlvii.



SECTION II

HINDI

ENGLISH LOAN-WORDS IN HINDI

BY

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1. Though the East India Company was formed as early as 1600 A.D., the influence of the English people was felt in the Northern India after 1757 A.D.

Introductory remarks Some parts of the Hindi speaking area, however, definitely passed into the hands of the British people after 1803 A.D. when Delhi fell before General Lake, and the Doab, country between the Ganges and the Jumna, was surrendered by Scindhia. The history of English loan-words in Hindi cannot, therefore, be very much older than a century and a half.

2 The extent and form of English loan-words in Hindi differs with the social status of the speaker. Ordinarily an English-educated middle class gentleman can hardly speak a sentence in Hindi without using—mostly unnecessarily—some English words. English-educated Hindustanis have thus got a Hindi jargon which they invariably employ when they are naturally conversing amongst themselves. In the present paper, however, naturalised English loan-words alone have been considered, that is, words which are usually found in the mouths of the vast majority of the uneducated masses living both in the villages and the towns and who have had no regular education in English language. The pronunciation given here is that of the uneducated and not that of the educated classes who employ more or less correct English pronunciation with slight variations.

From it we learn that the classification of words in Hindi may be classed under the following main heads.

A. Words used to convey ideas connected with foreign institutions established in the country, such as,

- (i) courts and office, e.g., *apni, samān, istām, kōlatār, kōlark, bāristar*.
- (ii) military and police, e.g., *aphsar, kapṭān, gārāh, polis, rapat, kāmsibāl*.
- (iii) educational system, e.g., *kālāj, iskūl, māstār, apar praeaurī*.
- (iv) systems of transport and communication, e.g., *istāsān anjan, tīkal, parhān, gāt; anjan (tār), rīstārī, pārsal, kūrāl*.
- (v) miscellaneous institutions, medical system, P.W.D., etc., e.g., *dākdar, kunārā, aspatāl, āprēsān; injīniar, dārsār*.

B. Names of articles of everyday use introduced in the country on account of foreign influence, such as,

- (i) dress and toilet, e.g., *kōt, pattīn, lūm, kālā, burnus, bārsīn, labanjar, tūkh-lāt*.
- (ii) food and drink, e.g., *biskut, mutān, bārūtī, lamlēt, līmātar*.
- (iii) machinery and its accessories, e.g., *singar māsīn, mōlar, lūrī, panear, pump*.
- (iv) objects of recreation, e.g., *thēthar, bārskop, sīn, pōlō, aektar, tērūp, pārah, ghōṇō-grāph, hārmōnīam, sarkas, phulbāt, hākhī*.
- (v) miscellaneous articles of everyday use e.g. *maos liltae kag, botal rībar, lamp*

4 English loan words undergo certain striking phonetic changes when they are adopted by the Hindi-speaking people.

In this connection the general tendency may be summed up in the following formula, viz., that

Hindi system of articulation is substituted for the English system with the result that the unfamiliar English sound is generally replaced by the nearest Hindi sound: in some cases awkward sounds are dropped or new sounds are introduced to facilitate pronunciation. Some of the important phonetic changes are pointed out below.

A. Vowel changes

- (i) As *e*, *ē*, *a*, etc., do not exist in standard Hindi, they are changed to nearest Hindi vowel, e.g., *anjan*, *kālīj*, *line*, *aphsar*, *kāngres*, *aspatāl*, *ekē* or *ikat*, *kalanjar*.
- (ii) Diphthongal sounds are rare in Hindi, hence English diphthongs are generally converted into the nearest simple vowel or diphthong, e.g., *rapaṭ* or *rapōt*, *kōt*; *tēns*, *rēl*, *paetmaen*, *janṭ*; *paep*, *tēm*.
- (iii) Anaptyxis or appearance of vowel to avoid conjunct consonants, e.g., *phāram*, *silīpar*, *burus*, *kulark*, *oirāṭī*.
- (iv) Prothesis, e.g., *islēsan*, *ishkūl*, *astabal*, *isṭām*, *ispēsāl*.

B. Consonantal changes:

- (i) cerebral or dental sounds substituted for English alveolars, e.g., *rapaṭ*, *isṭām*, *likas*, *dirāmā*, *sitambar*, *bōtal*, *sikattar*, *disamāar*, *darāj*, *darjan*.
- (ii) *c* and *j* substituted for *tʃ* and *dʒ*, e.g., *cāk*, *cēar*, *curat*; *jaṭ*, *jūn*, *jēlar*.
- (iii) fricatives *f*, and *θ*, changed to nearest stops, viz., *ph*, and *th* or *ṭ*, e.g., *phutbāl*, *phēl*, *phoesan*, *thard* *tharmāmēṣar*, *lanṭlāt*,

- (o) A n i a s i v t i u s
pronunciation e.g., *kālātīar*, *hōdīar*, *matī-
lar*.
- (i) Elision of a consonant particularly of *r*, in
a compound, e.g. *hūīkōī*, *rapat*, *bās-kat*,
pōsh-kāt.
- (ii) Metathesis, e.g. *songar*, *phās*, *jarnat*
(general).
- (iii) Sonant for sord or *r* or *u* or *sa* e.g., *kāḡ*,
diḡrī *lāḡ*.
- (iv) *l* substituted for *n*, e.g., *lambār*, *lambēt*.
- (v) final or medial *r* is clearly articulated, e.g.,
mīstar, *kālār*, *pārī*, *pārsol*.
- (a) Initial unvoiced *h* is changed to voiced *h*, e.g.,
hōīat, *hūīkōt*, *hōdīar*.

5. As is usual with loan-words in general, the
English loan-words in Hindi are mostly
Grammatical nouns. Examples of words belonging to other
changes. parts of speech and taken in loan in Hindi
are extremely rare.

Hindi nouns have two genders, *viz.*, masculine and feminine; consequently English neuter nouns are assigned to either of the two Hindi genders. There is hardly any principle in assigning the masculine or the feminine gender to an English neuter noun. Ordinarily the gender of the Hindi word nearest in meaning to the adopted English word has some influence in the assignment of the gender. There are, however, large number of loan-words in which it is difficult to point out definite reason for the assignment of a particular gender. In the list of the loan-words appended to the paper, the gender assigned in Hindi to the English word is mentioned in each case. There is sometimes a different usage with regard to the gender of a particular word in the different parts of the Hindi-speaking area.

For the purposes of extension, English loan nouns are treated exactly like Hindi nouns. The usual postpositions are added to the nouns or their oblique forms wherever they exist. The principle of the formation of the direct and oblique plural is given below.

Masculine

	Singular	Plural
--	----------	--------

•	Direct	..	.
	Oblique	.	ō (e.g., <i>sammanō</i>)

Feminine

	Singular	Plural
--	----------	--------

	Direct		ē (e.g., <i>apīlē</i>)
	Oblique	..	ō (e.g., <i>apīlō</i>)

7. Abstract nouns are formed by adding Hindi affixes, particularly, *ī*, to the loan-noun, e.g., *kīlarkī*, *jaī*, *gabarnarī*.

8. Niceties of the stress accent are mostly unknown even to the English-educated Hindustanis. They are never observed by the uneducated people except if it be by chance. The stress accent in Hindi is not so marked as in English. The rules pointed out in the Anglo-Hindi grammars on this point are not very conclusive.

LIST OF NATURALIZED ENGLISH LOAN-WORDS

Note.—The list does not claim to be exhaustive.

HINDI FORM	PROMINENT	ENGLISH WORD
अजन, <i>m</i>	[anjan]	engine
अक्तूबर, <i>m.</i>	[aktubar]	October
अगिनबोट, <i>m</i>	[agin-bōt]	gun-boat or (सं० अग्नि + अ० बोट)
अगस्त, <i>m.</i>	[agast]	August
अटेलिअन, <i>m., f.</i>	[atelian]	Italian (cloth)
अपर-प्रैमरी, <i>m.</i>	[apar-praemī]	Upper-Primary (class)
अपील, <i>f.</i>	[apīl]	appeal
अप्रैल, <i>m., f.</i>	[aprael]	April
अफरीका, <i>m.</i>	[aphrika]	Africa
अफसर; अपसर, <i>m.</i>	[aphisar, apsar]	officer
अमरीका, <i>m.</i>	[amikā]	America
अमुनिआ, <i>f.</i>	[amunia]	ammonia
अदाली, <i>m.</i>	[adalī]	orderly
अलपका, <i>m.</i>	[alpaka]	alpaca (cloth) (sp.)
अल्बम, <i>f.</i>	[albam]	album
अस्पताल, <i>m.</i>	[asptal]	hospital
अस्तबल, <i>m.</i>	[astabal]	stable
असम्बली, <i>f.</i>	[asambli]	assembly
आइर्लैंड, <i>m.</i>	[āirlaent]	Ireland
आडर; आर्डर, <i>m.</i>	[ādar; ārdar]	order
आपरेसन, <i>m.</i>	[āpresan]	operation
आफिस, <i>m.</i>	[āphis]	office
इंगलिस्तान <i>m</i>	[inglistān]	English + (Pers.) stan Eng m

HINDI FORM	PRONUNCIATION	ENGLISH WORD
इंच, <i>m.</i>	[ine]	inch
इंजीनियर, <i>m.</i>	[injīniar]	engineer
इंटर्, <i>m.</i>	[intar]	abbreviation of intermediate (a class in the Railway compartments)
इंट्रेंस, <i>m.</i>	[intraens]	entrance (class)
इंस्पेक्टर, <i>m.</i>	[inspaktar]	inspector
इन्कम टैक्स, <i>m.</i>	[inkam-tacks]	income-tax
इम्पायर, <i>m.</i>	[impāir]	umpire; empire
इटली, <i>m. f.</i>	[itlī]	Italy
इस्टेचर, <i>m.</i>	[istēcar]	stretcher
इस्प्रेस; इक्सप्रेस, <i>f.</i>	[ispres; ikspres]	express (train)
इस्काउट, <i>m.</i>	[iskaot]	scout
इस्काटलैंड, <i>m.</i>	[iskāt laend]	Scotland
इस्कूल, <i>m.</i>	[iskūl]	school
इस्पिरिट, <i>f.</i>	[ispirit]	spirit
स्पेन, <i>m.</i>	[ispēn]	Spain
इस्पेशल, <i>f.</i>	[ispēsāl]	special (train)
इस्टूल, <i>m.</i>	[istūl]	stool
इस्टाकिंग, <i>m.</i>	[istākiṅ]	stockings
इस्टीमर, <i>m.</i>	[istīmar]	steamer
इस्टेशन, <i>m.</i>	[istēsān]	station
इस्टोर, <i>m.</i>	[istūr]	store
इस्कू, <i>m.</i>	[iskrū]	screw
इस्प्रिंग, <i>m.</i>	[isprīṅ]	spring
इस्टाम्प, <i>m.</i>	[istām]	stamp
इम्पीच, <i>f.</i>	[ispic]	speech
इस्पेलिंग, <i>m.</i>	[ispēliṅ]	spelling
इस्टोब, <i>m.</i>	[istōb]	store
एजेंट, <i>m.</i>	[ējant]	agent
एजेंसी, <i>f.</i>	[ējānsī]	agency
एरन, <i>m.</i>	[ēran]	ear-ring
ए० फे०, <i>m.</i>	[e f e]	F A

HINDI FORM	PRONUNCIATION	ENGLISH WORD
ए० मे० <i>m</i>	[ē-mē]	M.A.
एकड़, <i>m.</i>	[ēkar]	acre
एडवर्ड, <i>m</i>	[ēdbard]	Edward
ऐक्ट; इक्ट, <i>m</i>	[aekt; ikat]	act
ऐक्टर, <i>m.</i>	[aektar]	actor
ऐक्टिंग, <i>m.f</i>	[aektiŋ]	acting
ऐडवोकेट, <i>m.</i>	[aedvōkēt]	advocate
ऐलक्लाथ, <i>m.</i>	[ael-klāth]	oil-cloth
ओवर-कोट, <i>m</i>	[ōvar-kōt]	overcoat
ओवर-सियर, <i>m.</i>	[ōvar-siar]	overser
औट, <i>m.</i>	[aot]	out
कलक्टर, कलक्टर, <i>m</i>	[kalattar, kalaktar]	collector
कमिस्तर, <i>m.</i>	[kamistar]	commander
कमीसन, <i>m.</i>	[kamisan]	commis-sion
कम्पनी, <i>f.</i>	[kampnī]	company
कलेंडर, <i>m.</i>	[kalandar]	calendar
कम्पौंडर, <i>m.</i>	[kampaondar]	compounder
कफ, <i>m.</i>	[kaph]	cuff
कन्ट्रैक्टर, <i>m.</i>	[kantraektar]	contractor
कट-पीस, <i>m.</i>	[kat-pīs]	cut-piece
कप्तान, <i>m.</i>	[kaptān]	captain
कर्नेल; कर्नेल, <i>m.</i>	[karnael; karnal]	colonel
कमेटी; कुमेटी, <i>f.</i>	[kamēti; kumēti]	committee
कास्टर ऐल, <i>m.</i>	[kaṣṭa-ael]	castor-oil
कंटूनमिन्ट, <i>m.</i>	[kantūnnint]	cantonment
कानस्तर, <i>m</i>	[kanastar]	canister
कम्पू, <i>m</i>	[kampū]	camp
कार्बन, <i>m.</i>	[kārban]	carbon
कान्फ्रेंस, <i>f.</i>	[kānphrens]	conference
कॉपी; कापी, <i>f.</i>	[kōpi, kōpī]	copy
काफी, <i>f.</i>	[kōphī]	coffee
काज़र, <i>m.</i>	[kālar]	collar
कान्जी हाउस, <i>m</i>	[kānji-hauṣ]	kine-house. catch-

HINDI FORM	PRONUNCIATION	ENGLISH WORD
काग; काक, <i>m.</i>	[kāg; kāk]	cork
कार्ड, <i>m.</i>	[cārad]	card
कानिस; कार्निस्, <i>f.</i>	[kānis; kārnis]	cornice
कांग्रेस, <i>f.</i>	[kāgrēs]	congress
कामा, <i>m.</i>	[kāmā]	comma
कालिज, <i>m.</i>	[kālij]	college
कानिस्टबिल, <i>m.</i>	[kānistbil]	constable
क्वाटर; कोटर, <i>m.</i>	[kwāṭar; kōṭar]	quarter
क्लब, <i>m.</i>	[klab]	club
किरिस्तान, <i>m.</i>	[kiristān]	christian
क्रिकेट, <i>f. m.</i>	[krikṭ]	cricket
क्लास, <i>m.</i>	[klās]	class
क्लर्क, <i>m.</i>	[klark]	clerk
कुलतार, <i>m.</i>	[kultār]	coal-tar
कूपन, <i>m.</i>	[kūpan]	coupon
कुनैन, <i>f.</i>	[kunaen]	quinine
केक, <i>f.</i>	[kēk]	cake
केतली, <i>f.</i>	[kētlī]	kettle
कैच, <i>m.</i>	[kaec]	catch
कोट, <i>m.</i>	[kōṭ]	coat
कोरम, <i>m.</i>	[kōram]	quorum
कोकोजम, <i>m.</i>	[kōkō-jam]	coco-gem
कोको, <i>f.</i>	[kōkō]	cocoa
कोचबान, <i>m.</i>	[kōc-bān]	coachman
कौंसिल, <i>f.</i>	[kaonsil]	council
गजट, <i>m.</i>	[gajaṭ]	gazette
गर्डर, <i>m.</i>	[gardar]	girdler
गार्टर, <i>m.</i>	[gāṭar]	garter
गार्ड, <i>m.</i>	[gārad]	guard
गाट; गाड; गारड, <i>m.</i>	[gāṭ; gād; gārad]	guard
गइड, <i>m.</i>	[gaid]	guide
गिरमिट, <i>m.</i>	[girmit]	agreement
गिलास, <i>m.</i>	[gilas]	glass
गिलट, <i>f.</i>	[gilat]	gilt

HINDI FORM	PRONUNCIATION	ENGLISH WORD
गिन्नी, <i>f.</i>	[ginnī]	gunica
गेट, <i>m.</i>	[gēt]	gate
गेटिस, <i>m.</i>	[gētīs]	gaiters
गैस, <i>f.</i>	[gaes]	gas
गोपाल, <i>f.</i>	[gōpāl]	copal (varnish)
ग्रोस, <i>m.</i>	[grōs]	gross
गौन, <i>m.</i>	[gaon]	gown
घासलेट, <i>m.</i>	[ghā-sēt]	gas-light
चाक, <i>m.</i>	[cāk]	chalk
चाकलेट, <i>m.</i>	[cāk-ēt]	chocolate
चिक, <i>f.</i>	[cik]	chicken, chick
चिट, <i>f.</i>	[cit]	chi
चिमनी, <i>f.</i>	[chimnī]	chimney
चुरट, <i>m.</i>	[cūrat]	cheroot (orig. Tamil)
चेअर, <i>f.</i>	[cēa]	chair
चेअर-मैन, <i>m.</i>	[cēa-maen]	chairman
चैन; चेन, <i>f.</i>	[caen, cēn]	chain
जंटलमैन, <i>m.</i>	[jantal-maen]	gentleman
जंट, <i>m.</i>	[jant]	joint (-magistrate)
जमनास्टिक, <i>f.</i>	[jamnā-stik]	gymnastic
जज, <i>m.</i>	[jaj]	judge
जर्मनी, <i>m.</i>	[jarmam]	Germany
जनैल; जर्नेल, <i>m.</i>	[jarnal; jarnal]	general
जनवरी, <i>f.</i>	[janvarī]	January
जाम, <i>m.</i>	[jān]	jam
जारज, <i>m.</i>	[jārāj]	George
जाकेट, <i>f.</i>	[jākat]	jackot
जुलाई, <i>f.</i>	[julāī]	July
जून, <i>f.</i>	[jūn]	June
जेल, <i>m.</i>	[jēl]	jail
जेलर, <i>m.</i>	[jēlar]	jailor
जम्पर; जम्पर, <i>m.</i>	[jhampar; jampar]	jumper
टन, <i>m.</i>	[tan]	ton
टल, <i>m.</i>	[tal]	tal

HINDI FORM	PRONUNCIATION	ENGLISH WORD
टमटम, <i>f.</i>	[ʈamʈam]	tan-dem
टिंरंक, <i>m.</i>	[ʈiɾaŋk]	tunk
टिराली, <i>f.</i>	[ʈiɾālī]	trolley
टिराइसिकल, <i>f.</i>	[ʈiɾāiskil]	tri-cycle
टिराम्बे, <i>f.</i>	[ʈiɾāmbē]	tramway
टिरेन, <i>f.</i>	[ʈiɾēn]	train
टिकट, <i>m.</i>	[ʈikɪt]	ticket
टिकस, <i>m.</i>	[ʈikas]	tax; ticket
टिमाटर, <i>m.</i>	[ʈimāʈʊr]	tomato
टिम्परेचर, <i>m.</i>	[ʈimprēca]	temperature
टिफिन, <i>f.</i>	[ʈiʃin]	tiffin
टीम, <i>f.</i>	[ʈīm]	team
टीन, <i>f.</i>	[ʈīn]	tin
टुइल, <i>f.</i>	[ʈuɪl]	twill
टेनिस, <i>f.</i>	[ʈenis]	tennis
टेबिल, <i>f.</i>	[ʈēbil]	table
टेशन, iṣṭēsan, <i>m, f.</i>	[ʈēsan ; iṣṭēsan]	station
टेलीफोन, <i>m.</i>	[ʈēliphōn]	telephone
टैम; टैम, <i>m.</i>	[ʈēm ; ʈem]	time
टैक्स, <i>m.</i>	[ʈæks]	tax
टैर, <i>f.</i>	[ʈær]	tyre
टैप, <i>f.</i>	[ʈæp]	tap; type
टैम टेबिल, <i>m.</i>	[ʈiem-tēbil]	time-table
टोल, <i>m.</i>	[ʈōl]	toll
टौन हाल, <i>m.</i>	[ʈaon-hāl]	town-hall
थेटर, <i>m.</i>	[ʈhēṭhar]	theatre
डबल, <i>m.</i>	[ʈabal]	double
डबल मार्च, <i>m.</i>	[ʈabal-mārc]	double-march
डम्बल, <i>m.</i>	[ʈambal]	dumb-bell
डाक्टर; डाक़्दर, <i>m.</i>	[daktar ; dākdar]	doctor
डाइरी, <i>f.</i>	[dāiri]	diary
डिरामा, <i>m.</i>	[dirāmā]	drama
डिक्शनरी <i>f</i>	[hksnari]	dictionary
डिप्टी, <i>m.</i>	[diptī]	deputy

HINDI FORM	PRONUNCIATION	ENGLISH WORD
डिस्ट्रिक्ट बोर्ड, <i>m</i>	[dīstikt̪-bōd̪]	district-board
डिग्री, <i>f.</i>	[dīgrī]	degree : decree
डिर्बहार, <i>m</i>	[dīraebhar]	driver
डिमरिज, <i>m.</i>	[dīmārij]	demurrage
डिक्स, <i>m.</i>	[dīkas]	desk
डिप्लोमा, <i>m.</i>	[dīplōmā]	diploma
डिउटी, <i>f.</i>	[dīutī]	duty
डिरिल, <i>f.</i>	[dīril]	drill
डीपू, <i>m.</i>	[dīpū]	depot
देरी, <i>f.</i>	[dērī]	dairy
डैमनकाट, <i>m</i>	[daeman-kāt̪]	diamond-cut
डैरक्टर, <i>m.</i>	[daerakt̪ar]	director
डौन, <i>m</i>	[daon]	down
तमाखू, <i>f</i>	[tamākhū]	tobacco
तारकोल, <i>m</i>	[tārkōl]	tar-coal
तारपीन, <i>m.</i>	[tārpīn]	turpentine
तुरूप, <i>f.</i>	[turup]	trump
तौलिया, <i>m.</i>	[taoliā]	towel
थर्ड (किलास),	[thard̪]	third
थर्मामिटर, <i>m.</i>	[tharmāmētar]	thermometer
दर्जन, <i>f.</i>	[darjan]	dozen
दलेल, <i>f.</i>	[dalēl]	drill
दराज, <i>f.</i>	[darāj̪]	drawer
दिसम्बर, <i>f</i>	[disambar]	December
नर्स, <i>f.</i>	[nars]	nurse
नेकटाई, <i>f.</i>	[nakt̪āī]	neck-tie
नोवम्बर, <i>f.</i>	[naombar]	November
नंबर ; लंबर, <i>m.</i>	[nambar, lambar]	number
नाविल, <i>m.</i>	[nābil]	novel
निकर, <i>m.</i>	[nikar]	knickers
निब, <i>f.</i>	[nib]	nib
निकलस, <i>f.</i>	[niklas]	necklace
नोट खोट, <i>m</i>	[not, lōt̪]	note
नोटिस, <i>m.</i>	[nōtis]	notice

HINDI FORM	PRONUNCIATION	ENGLISH WORD
नोटबुक, <i>f.</i>	[nōtbuk]	note-book
पसंजर, <i>f.</i>	[pasin̄ar]	passenger
पलटन, <i>f.</i>	[pal̄tan]	platoon
परेड, <i>f.</i>	[parēd]	parade
पलस्तर, <i>m.</i>	[palastar]	plaster
पतलून, <i>f.</i>	[patlūn]	pantaloon
पंचर, <i>m.</i>	[paŋcar]	puncture
• पंप, <i>m.</i>	[paŋp]	pump
पाकेट, <i>f.</i>	[pākat]	pocket
पारक, <i>m.</i>	[pārak]	park
पॉलिश, <i>f.</i>	[pālis]	polish
पार्टी, <i>f.</i>	[pātī]	party
पापा, <i>m.</i>	[pāpa]	papa
पाट, <i>m.</i>	[pāt̄]	pot
पार्सल, <i>m.</i>	[pārsal]	parcel
पास, <i>m.</i>	[pās]	pass
पिरैमर, <i>f.</i>	[piraemar]	primer
प्लॉट, <i>m.</i>	[pilōt̄]	plot
पिलीडर, <i>m.</i>	[pilīd̄ar]	pleader
पेंसन, <i>f.</i>	[pinsan]	pension
पेंसिल, <i>f.</i>	[pinsal]	pencil
पिआनो, <i>m.</i>	[piānō]	piano
पिलेट, <i>f.</i>	[pilēt̄]	plate
पिलेट-फारम, <i>m.</i>	[pilēt-phāram]	platform
पिलेग, <i>m.</i>	[pilēg]	plague
पिटरोल, <i>m.</i>	[piṭrōl]	petrol
पिन, <i>f.</i>	[pin]	pin
पिपरमंट, <i>m.</i>	[piparmant]	peppermint
पिस्तौल, <i>f. m.</i>	[pistaol]	pistol
पिरेस, <i>m.</i>	[piēs]	press
पुल्टिस, <i>f.</i>	[pul̄tis]	poultice
पुर्फेसर, <i>m.</i>	[purphēsar]	professor
पुलिस, <i>f.</i>	[pulis]	police
पुर्तगाल, <i>m.</i>	[purtgal]	Portuga

HINDI FORM	PRONUNCIATION	ENGLISH WORD
पुटीन, <i>f.</i>	[putīn]	putting
पेटीकोट, <i>m.</i>	[pētikōt]	petty-coat
प्रेसीडेंट, <i>m.</i>	[prē-īdant]	president
पैट, <i>m.</i>	[paent]	pat
पैटमैन, <i>m.</i>	[patmaen]	patman-man
पोलो, <i>m.</i>	[pōlō]	pole
पोसकार्ड, <i>m.</i>	[pōskāṭ]	post-card
पौंड, <i>m.</i>	[paund]	pound
पौडर, <i>m.</i>	[paodai]	powder
फस्ट, फस्ट, <i>m.</i>	[phast; phast]	first
फलालेन, <i>f.</i>	[phalālen]	flannel
फरबरी, <i>f.</i>	[pharbarī]	February
फरलांग, <i>m.</i>	[pharlāṅ]	fur long
फारम, <i>m.</i>	[phāram]	form
फिरांस, <i>m.</i>	[phirāns]	France
फिनैल; फुनैल, <i>m.</i>	[phinael; puunael]	phenyl
फिटन, <i>f.</i>	[phitān]	phelon
फिराक, <i>m.</i>	[phirāk]	flock
फीस, <i>f.</i>	[phīs]	tees
फुटबाल, <i>m.</i>	[phutbāl]	football
फुलबूट, <i>m.</i>	[phul būṭ]	full boot
फुट, <i>m.</i>	[phut]	foot
फेल्, <i>m.</i>	[phēl]	fal
फ्रेम, <i>m.</i>	[phirēm]	frame
फैर, <i>m.</i>	[phaer]	fire
फैसन, <i>m.</i>	[phaesan]	fashion
फैसनेबिल, <i>adj.</i>	[phaesnēbil]	fashionable
फोटो, <i>m.</i>	[phōtū]	photo
फोटोग्राफर, <i>m.</i>	[phōtōgiraphar]	photographer
फोनोग्राफ, <i>m.</i>	[phōnōgrāph]	phonograph
बैंक, <i>m.</i>	[bank]	bank
बम, <i>m.</i>	[bain]	bomb
बटालियन, <i>f.</i>	[baṭāliyan]	battalion
ब्रांडी, <i>f.</i>	[bar-īdī]	brandy

HINDI FORM	PRONUNCIATION	ENGLISH WORD
बटन, <i>m.</i>	[batan]	button
बक्स, <i>m.</i>	[bakas]	box
बग्गी, <i>f.</i>	[bagghī]	buggy
बंबूकाट, <i>m.</i>	[bambūkāt]	bamboo-cart
बर्तानिया, <i>f.</i>	[bartāniā]	Britannia
बालंटियर, <i>m.</i>	[bālantiar]	volunteer
बारनिस, <i>f.</i>	[bārnīs]	varnish
बाडिस, <i>f.</i>	[bādīs]	bodice
बारिक, <i>f.</i>	[bārik]	barracks
बाइलिन, <i>m.</i>	[bālin]	violin
बालिस्तर, <i>m.</i>	[bālīstar]	barrister
बास्कट, <i>f.</i>	[bāskat]	waist-coat
बाइल, <i>m.</i>	[bāil]	viyella (cloth)
बिल्टी, <i>f.</i>	[biltī]	billet
बिक्टोरिया, <i>f.</i>	[hiktōriā]	Victoria
बिलाटिंग, <i>m.</i>	[bilāṭin]	blotting (paper)
बिगुल, <i>m.</i>	[bigul]	bugle
बिरजिस, <i>f.</i>	[birjis]	breeches
बिरग, <i>m.</i>	[birag]	brake (van)
बिलू बिलैक, <i>adj.</i>	[bilū biluek]	blue-black
बिस्कुट, <i>m.</i>	[biskut]	biscuit
बिंच, <i>f.</i>	[binč]	bench
बी० ए०, <i>m.</i>	[hī-ē]	B.A.
बी० पी०, <i>m.</i>	[hī-pī]	V.P (value-payable parcel)
बुकसेलर, <i>m.</i>	[buksēlar]	bookseller
बुलडाग, <i>m.</i>	[bul-dūg]	bull-dog
बुरुस, <i>m.</i>	[burus]	brush
बूट, <i>m.</i>	[būt]	boot
बेटिंगरूम, <i>m.</i>	[bēṭin-rūm]	waiting-room
बैंड, <i>m.</i>	[baend]	band
बैरंग, <i>adj.</i>	[bacrañ]	beating
बैस्कोप, <i>m.</i>	[bāeskōp]	bioscope
बैसराय, <i>m.</i>	[baesray]	viceroy

HINDI FORM	PRONUNCIATION	ENGLISH WORD
बैस्किल, <i>f</i>	[bæskil]	bi-cycle
बैसलीन, <i>f.</i>	[bæslin]	vaseline
बैट, <i>m</i>	[bat]	bat
बैरा, <i>m</i>	[baerā]	beater
बोट, <i>m.</i>	[bōṭ]	boat ; vote
बोर्ड, <i>m</i>	[bōrd]	board
ब्लोज, <i>f.</i>	[blōj]	blouse
बोतल, <i>f</i>	[bōtal]	bottle
बोड्डिंग; बोर्डिंग, <i>m</i>	[bōddin, bō din]	boarding
बकसुआ, <i>m</i>	[baksuā]	buckles
मशीन, <i>f</i>	[mašin]	machine
मजिस्ट्रेट, <i>m</i>	[maji-ṭrēt]	magistrate
मनीबैग, <i>m.</i>	[manī-bēg]	money-bag
मनी-आर्डर, <i>m.</i>	[manī-ārda]	money-order
मई, <i>f.</i>	[mai]	May
मन, <i>m.</i>	[man]	round
मफलर, <i>m</i>	[maphlar]	muffler
मलेरिया, <i>m.</i>	[malēriā]	malaria
मशीनगन, <i>f.</i>	[masīngan]	machine-gun
मनेजर, <i>m.</i>	[manējar]	manager
मटन, <i>m</i>	[maton]	mutton
माचिस, <i>f</i>	[mācis]	matches
मास्टर, मास्टर, <i>f.</i>	[māstar ; māttā]	master
मार्च, <i>m</i>	[mare]	March
मानीटर, <i>m.</i>	[mānīṭar]	monitor
मारकीन (मर्कीन कपड़ा.) <i>f.</i>	[mārkin]	American
मिस, <i>f. m.</i>	[mis]	miss ; mess
मिल, <i>f.</i>	[mil]	mill
मिनट, <i>m</i>	[minat]	minute
मिनीसुपिल्टी, <i>f.</i>	[minisupiltī]	municipality
मिस्मरेजम, <i>m</i>	[mismrējam]	mesmerism
मिशनरी, <i>m</i>	[mišnārī]	missionary
मिक्सचर, <i>m</i>	[mikṣar]	mixture

HINDI FORM	PRONUNCIATION	ENGLISH WORD
मीटिंग, <i>f.</i>	[mīṭiṅ]	meeting
मील; मैल, <i>m.</i>	[mīl ; mael]	mile
मेजर, <i>m.</i>	[mējar]	major
मेम्बर, <i>m.</i>	[mēmbar]	member
मेद, (head- workman) <i>m.</i>	[mēt]	mate
मेम, <i>f.</i>	[mēm]	ma'am
मोटार; मोटरकार, <i>f.m.</i>	[mōṭar, kāṭ]	motor; motor-car
रङ्गरूट, <i>m</i>	[rāṅrūt]	recruit
रबर, <i>f.</i>	[rabar]	rubber
रसीद, <i>f.</i>	[rasīd]	receipt
रपट, <i>f</i>	[rapaṭ]	report
रन, <i>m.</i>	[ran]	run
रासन, <i>m.</i>	[rāsan]	ration
रिजिस्टर, <i>m.</i>	[rijistar]	register
रिजिस्टरी, <i>f.</i>	[rijistārī]	registry
रिजिस्ट्रार, <i>m.</i>	[registrar]	registrar
रिजल्ट, <i>m.</i>	[rijalt]	result
रिटायर, <i>m.</i>	[riṭāir]	retire
रिवाल्वर, <i>f.</i>	[ribālbar]	revolver
रिकर्ड, <i>m.</i>	[rikard]	record
रिविट, <i>m.</i>	[ribiṭ]	rivet
रीडर, <i>f</i>	[rīdar]	reader
रूल, <i>m.</i>	[rūl]	rule
रेस, <i>f.</i>	[rēs]	race
रेजिडेन्सी, <i>f.</i>	[rējīdēnsī]	residency
रेल (गाड़ी,) <i>f.</i>	[rēl]	rail
रेलवेई, <i>f.</i>	[rēlbēī]	railway
रैकेट, <i>m.</i>	[raekaṭ]	racket
रैफल, <i>f.</i>	[raephil]	rifle
रोड, <i>f.</i>	[rōḍ]	road
लॉन्गक्लाथ, <i>m.</i>	[laṅklāṭ]	longcloth
लॅप, <i>m</i>	['lɒp]	lamp
लॅप्टन, <i>m</i>	[aphtant]	lieutenant

HINDI FORM	PRONUNCIATION	ENGLISH WORD
लमलेट; लैसुनट <i>m.</i>	[lamlēṭ, laemulan]	lemonade
लंबर, <i>m.</i>	[lambar]	number
लबंडर, <i>m.</i>	[labandar]	lavender
लंच, <i>m.</i>	[lane]	lunch
लाटरी, <i>f.</i>	[lāṭrī]	lottery
लाट, <i>m.</i>	[lāt]	lord
लालटेन, <i>f.</i>	[lālṭaen]	lantern
लान, <i>m.</i>	[lān]	lawn
लिटरैचर, <i>m.</i>	[liṭṛēcar]	literature
लिकचर, <i>m.</i>	[likear]	lecture
लेट, <i>m.</i>	[lēt]	late
लेटरबक्स, <i>m.</i>	[lēṭar bakas]	letter box
लेबिल, <i>m.</i>	[lēbil]	label
लैंडो, <i>f.</i>	[laendō]	landau
लैन, <i>f.</i>	[laen]	hue
लैन किलिअर, <i>m.</i>	[laen kiliaṭ]	line clear
लैस, <i>f.</i>	[laes]	lace
लैसंस, <i>m.</i>	[laesans]	licence
लैमजूस, <i>m.</i>	[laemjūs]	lime juice
नोट; नोट, <i>m.</i>	[nōṭ; nōṭ]	note
लोकल (-गाड़ी), <i>f.</i>	[lōkal]	local (train)
लोअर (-ग्राहमरी), <i>m.</i>	[lōar]	lower (primary)
सम्मान, <i>m.</i>	[samman]	summons
सरज, <i>f.</i>	[saraṭ]	serge
सेंट्रल; सेंटर, <i>m.</i>	[sanṭral; sanṭar]	central (jail)
सन्तरी, <i>m.</i>	[sanṭrī]	sentry
सरकस, <i>m.</i>	[sukas]	circus
सब-जज, <i>m.</i>	[sab-jaṭ]	sub-judge
सरबिस, <i>f.</i>	[sarbis]	service
मार्टीफिकेट; सार्टीफिकेट, <i>m.</i>	[māṭiphiṭat. sāṭiphiṭaṭ]	certificate
साइंस, <i>m.</i>	[sāins]	science
सिगरेट, <i>m.</i>	[sigrat]	cigarette
सिबिंग, <i>m.</i>	[sin]	shilling

HINDI FORM	PRONUNCIATION	ENGLISH WORD
सिल्क, <i>m.</i>	[silk]	silk
सिपाही, <i>m.</i>	[sipāhī]	sepoy
सिमिंट, <i>m.</i>	[simint]	cement
सितंबर, <i>m.</i>	[sitambar]	September
सिक्तर, <i>m.</i>	[sikattar]	secretary
सिगल, <i>m.</i>	[singal]	signal
सिलीपर; सिलीपट, <i>m.</i>	[silīpar, silīpaṭ]	shipper
सिलेट, <i>f.</i>	[silēṭ]	slate
सिट, <i>m.</i>	[siṭ]	set
सिविल सर्जन, <i>m.</i>	[sibil-sarjan]	civil surgeon
सी० आइ० डी०, <i>m.</i>	[sī-ai-dī]	C. I. D., i.e., a man of the Criminal Investigation De- partment
सुइटर, <i>m.</i>	[suitar]	sweater
सुपरंडंट, <i>m.</i>	[suprandant]	superintendent
सूटकेस, <i>m.</i>	[sūṭ kēs]	suit case
सेंसर, <i>m.</i>	[sensar]	censor
सेंसस, <i>m.</i>	[sensas]	census
सेसन, <i>m.</i>	[sēsan]	session
सेफ्टी पिन, <i>f.</i>	[sēpṭī-pin]	safety-pin
सेकिंड, <i>m.</i>	[sēkind]	second
सैम्पुल, <i>m.</i>	[saempul]	sample
सोप, <i>m.</i>	[sōp]	soap
सोडा बाटर, <i>m.</i>	[sōdā-bāṭar]	soda water
हरीकेन, <i>f.</i>	[harī-kēn]	hurricane
हाईकोर्ट, <i>m.</i>	[hāī-kōṭ]	high court
हाई स्कूल, <i>m.</i>	[hāī-iskūl]	high school
हारमुनिअम;		
हारमुनिआ, <i>m.</i>	[hāimuniām]	harmonium
हाकी, <i>f.</i>	[hāki]	hockey
हाल, <i>m.</i>	[hāl]	hall
हाल्ट, <i>m.</i>	[hālt]	halt
हाफ सैड, <i>m.</i>	[ɪaps ɪed]	half side

HINDI FORM	PRONUNCIATION	ENGLISH WORD
हिट, <i>f. m.</i>	[hit̪]	hit
हिस्टीरिया, <i>f.</i>	[hist̪iriā]	hysteria
हिब्रू, <i>f.</i>	[hibrū]	Hebrew
हुड, <i>m.</i>	[hud̪]	hood
हुक, <i>m.</i>	[huk̪]	hook
हुइस्की, <i>f.</i>	[hʊski̪]	whisky
हेडमास्टर, <i>m.</i>	[hēḍ-māṣṭar]	head-master
हैट, <i>m</i>	[haet̪]	hat
हैंडबिल, <i>m.</i>	[haend̪ bil̪]	hand bill
होल्डर, <i>m.</i>	[hōldar̪]	holder
होटल, <i>m.</i>	[hōṭal̪]	hotel
होस्टल, <i>m</i>	[hōṣṭal̪]	hostel
होमोपैथी, <i>f.</i>	[hōmōpaethī̪]	homeopathy

THE SPEECH OF BIJNORE* A VARIETY OF KHARI BOLĪ DIALECT OR VERNACULAR HINDUSTANĪ

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CHAPTER I

Introduction

Bijnore is one of the districts where Kharī Bōlī is used as a dialect. As the boundary would show, it is situated neither on the borders nor too close to the Area Punjāb as to be much influenced by it. And hence it has been held by all the scholars as one of the centralmost dialects of the Kharī-bōlī area.

The district is surrounded by Kharī-bōlī speaking districts of Saharanpore, Muzaffarnagar and Meerut in the west, and by Moradabad on the south. On its east it has the Pahari speaking areas of Nainital and Garhwal.

The population of this district, as given in the Linguistic Survey,[†] is 600,000. This whole lot of persons Number of speaks the 'vernacular Hindustānī': but the speakers. number of speakers of 'literary Hindustānī' is still limited, i.e., 189,000. According to the 'census report'[‡] of 1921 the population of the district is 740,182.

* The speech of Moradabad and Meerut has also been studied along with this and the essential differences have been noted.

† Linguistic Survey, Vol. IX, p. 64, edition 1916.

‡ Census Report of United Provinces recorded in 1921.

In this paper I have noticed the system of the
Transliteration - R. A. S. for transliteration, with the following
additions.

- (i) d = for a sound tending more towards d than towards r , e.g., *Bēdā buchēdā ghadī ghādī*; this is different from $dōdī$ or *larkī*.
- (ii) c = This is a sound between $ē$ and ai , e.g., *csā, hc, pcsē*.
- (iii) $ē$ = for a sound between $ō$ and au , e.g., *Bimēlā; hēslā*, etc.

The following are some of the most remarkable
General phonetic peculiarities of the speech used in
this district.

1. The d sound occurring in the last syllable of a word if stressed is sounded as dh , e.g., *Bēdhā; buchēdhā*.

This is different from *lunḍā* or *larkī*.

2. Instead of ai they generally make use of c , e.g., *pcsē, kcsē, esē*, etc.

3. y sound is not heard between two vowels when one of them is i and e , e.g., *khā riā; jū riā; lū*. (cf. with Hindi) *khā riṃyā, jū riṃyā*, etc.

4. y is added in the last syllable of a verb in the past tense if it ends in $ā$ and $ō$, e.g., *likhyā, padhyā, calparyō*, etc.

5. In the word 'bīt' the t changes into c , e.g., *bīc*, and *bicānā*, for *bīt* and *bītānā*.

6. The h sound occurring in the last syllable of a word is not pronounced, e.g., *ke diā, cāē jō hō jū kaī*, for (kah diā; cāhē jō hō, jahī kahī).

7. In some cases the nasalised y and $ī$ before n adopt only n , e.g., *nū* for *yū* and *nankū* for *inkū* and *int* for *it*.

8. N is sometimes changed into n , e.g., *pūnī, bānīā, rānī*; but *kahānī, bhagwān, camkām*, etc.

9. When $ī$ and $ā$ occur in the end of a stressed word they are pronounced like i and a e.g., *gaddī* and *ghōddā* will be pronounced as if i and a were on y short.

The *au* and *ō* sound is sometimes pronounced as *tā* for *mōtā* and *kēn* for *kaīn*: and *bhḍkanā* for (pierce).

In some cases it is observed that the semi-vowel *y* goes into the *o* and the preceding *a*, is dropped, e.g., *poāl* (paira), etc., (cf) *savār*, *gāvār*, *puāl*, etc.

When a consonant occurs in the stressed syllable it is generally doubled e.g. *ghōḍḍā*, *gāddī*, *skān*, *makhlān*, etc.

Sometimes *l* or *r* change into *r*, e.g., *nikār* for *caprā sī* for *caprāsī*.

—It is remarkable that persons of higher castes, do evince a difference perceptible in their accent and pronunciation of the Speech. Obviously this is not due to any peculiar education: but that might be due to their ancient culture that they naturally inherit, e.g., the higher class will call a horse

(i) *ghōḍā*: while the other group will call it *ghōḍḍā* or *gāddī*, *gāddī*; *pīth*, *pīthṭhā*, etc.

—The general tendency of the speech is to utter it swiftly and with jerks. It might be a correct guess that the redoubling of the consonant and the deleting of some sounds might be due to the rapidness involved in the speech but it is difficult to say whether the jerks are due to the redoubling of consonants or the redoubling of the consonants is due to the jerks.

The tendency of jerks and rapidity in the speech and the frequency of harsh sounds such as cerebrals might be one reason for its nomenclature as *kharī-bōlī*, which literally means 'a straight-speech.' The above tendencies do bring in a sort of straightness in the speech.

—The chief phonetic difference between the speech of Meerut, Moradabad and Bijnore is that Morādābād is free from the tendency of doubling the consonant and the substitution of *n* for *n*. But Meerut bears a number of such characteristics found also in the speech of Bijnore.

CHAPTER II

Noun

As is the case with all the dialects and speeches of Hindi
 there are only two genders in this, viz.,
 Gender (i) Masculine and (ii) Feminine.

There is no Neuter gender in Hindi; and hence their
 determination is more or less arbitrary. Unlike the standard
 Hindi no exhaustive rules can be formulated with regard to
 the determination of the gender in nouns.

There are two different ways by which a Masculine noun
 is distinguished from a Feminine—

(i) By a change of word

e.g.: *marad—ōrat*

bel—gā

(*cītā*) = *māta—(ipti = left)*

(ii) By adding suffixes to the masculine.

Some of the most commonly used suffixes are:—

ī *bakrā—bakri; ghōddā—ghōddī; billā—billī, etc.*

in *dhōbī—dhōbīn and dhoban; nāī—nāīn;*

camār—camārīn.

nī *hāthī—hāthnī; ōrhnā—ōrhnī.*

an *camār—camāran; kahār—kahāran, ahīr—ahīran.*

ān *thākū—thākūrān*

yan *nāī—nāīyan.*

NOTE I.—The last three suffixes are peculiar to the speech and
 are not to be found in standard Hindi.

NOTE II.—There being no fixed rules for the application of
 these suffixes the convention plays the determin-
 ing role.

There are only two numbers (i) Singular and
 Number (ii) Plural

(1) NOMINATIVE PLURAL [Suffix generally added is *e*]

In some nouns the form is not changed in the nominative plural: the number being indicated by the form of the verb, e.g.,

- (a) *yādmī āyā thā*
yādmī ayē thē
 (b) *ghar gir geā*
ghar gir gaē
 (c) *bās lambā hē*
bās lambe hē, etc.

With reference to this it might be noted here that

- (i) When the noun ends in *ā* it necessarily assumes its plural form,

e.g., *ghōḍā dēṛā thā*
ghoḍē dēṛē thē
rājā mārā geā
rājē marē gaē
gadhā bhāg geā
gadhē bhāg gaē

- (ii) When the noun ends in *ī* the change is optional,
 e.g.: *billī bhāg gaī*
 and *billī or billiā bhāg gaī, etc.*

- (iii) When the noun ends in *ū* the change does not take place.

ullū ur geā
 and *ullū ur gaē*

- (iv) When the noun ends in a consonant the direct case is used in the nominative singular, nominative plural: and in the singular of other cases; but in the plural of other cases the oblique case is used.

e.g.: *ghar bikatū hē*
ghar bikatē hē
ghar kō sē mē, etc geā
gharō se kē me etc geā etc

- (2) OBLIQUE PLURAL — Commonly the oblique plural is formed by adding the suffix *ō* to the singular

e.g. : *ghōddā*—*ghōddō*
admī—*admīyō*
lōg—*lōggō*, etc.

The rules for adding this suffix are :—

- (i) When it is added to a word ending in *ā*, the last *ā* disappears and the suffix takes its place.

e.g. : *ghōddā*—*ghōddō*
patthā—*patthō*
gharā—*gharō*, etc.

- (ii) When it is added to a word ending in *ī* or *u* or *ū* the long *ī* or *ū* is shortened

e.g. : *larkī*—*larkiyō*
bakrī—*bakriyō*
gāddī—*gaddiyō*
ullū—*ulluō*
bhāllū—*bhālluō*, etc.

- (iii) When a word ends in a consonant the suffix is added to them

e.g. : *ghar*—*gharō*
cil—*cillō*
 (Report) *rapōt*—*rapottō*, etc.

Cases There are two cases (i) the direct and (ii) the oblique. e.g. : *ghōddā* and *ghōddō*.

Nouns ending in *ā*.

	Singular	Plural
Dir.	<i>ghōddā</i>	<i>ghōddē</i>
Obl.	<i>ghōddē</i>	<i>ghōddō</i>
	or	
	<i>ghōddā</i>	

In nouns ending in *ā* unlike the standard Hindi the direct singular is used in the nominative singular and

- . optionally in the Accusative, Instrumental and the Genitive singular also, e.g.:

ghōddā āyā
ghōddā
 or $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} kō, sē, kā, kē, ki, \text{ etc.} \end{array} \right.$
ghōddē

The direct plural is used in the nominative plural and in the singular of all the other cases.

e.g.: *ghōddē āē*
ghōddē—kō, sē, lē khātar, sē
kā, kī, mē, p. etc

The oblique plural is used in the plural of all the other cases except the nominative.

e.g. : *ghōddō kō, sē, kū, kā, etc.*

Nouns ending in *ī*.

	Singular	Plural
Dir.	<i>billī</i>	<i>billī, billiā</i>
Obl	<i>billī</i>	<i>billō</i>

In the nouns ending in *ī* the direct singular form is used in the nominative singular and in the singular of all the other cases and optionally in the nominative plural also.

e.g.: *billī bhāg gāī*
billī bhāg gāī
 and *billī—kō, sē, mē, par, etc.*

The direct plural form is used only in the nominative plural.

e.g.: *billiā bhāg gāī.*

The oblique plural form is used in the plural of all the other cases except the nominative.

e.g. *billō kō se par me etc.*

The direct singular form is used in the singular and plural of the nominative case, and in the singular of all the other cases.

eg. *ullū ur geā*
ullū ur gaē
ullū—kō, sē, mē, pai, etc.

The oblique plural form is used in the plural of all the other cases except the nominative.

eg.: *ullō—kō, sē, pai, mē, etc.*

Nouns ending in consonants.

	Singular	Plural
Dir.	<i>ghar</i>	<i>ghar</i>
Obl.	<i>ghar</i>	<i>gharō, etc.</i>

The direct singular form is used in the nominative singular and plural and in the singular of all the other cases.

eg.: *ghar biktā he*
ghar biktē hē
ghar—kō, sē, mē, pai, etc.

The oblique plural form is used in the plural of all the other cases except the nominative.

eg.: *gharō—kō, sē, mē, pai, etc.*

In the declension of a noun, the various postpositions are used to convey the meaning of the different cases.

NOTE.—These 'post-positions' have been classified and given in the chapter on 'Indeclinables.'

Besides the regular application of the postpositions there are some special declensional forms and they rightly deserve special attention.

In the Locative plural the oblique plural form is used without the necessary postposition: and that gives out the sense of the locative.

e.g.: *gharō gharō phirū hū*
gāw gāw jāttā phire he.

NOTE —But cases like this generally come with a repetition.

The Instrumental is also formed in the like manner.

e.g.: *bhūkkhō marū hū*
 or
bhukkhā marū hū
pyāsō marū hū
 or
pyāsā marū hū.

	Singular	Plural
Acc.	$\begin{cases} mu\dot{y} ko, ku, etc \\ m\ddot{e}r\ddot{e} ko, k\ddot{u} \end{cases}$	<i>ham kō, ku, etc.</i>
Instr.	$\begin{cases} mu\dot{y} s\ddot{e} \\ m\ddot{e}r\ddot{e} s\ddot{e} \end{cases}$	<i>ham sē</i>
Dat.	$\begin{cases} mu\dot{y} k\ddot{o} \\ m\ddot{e}r\ddot{e} li\ddot{e} \\ mh\ddot{a}r\ddot{e} li\ddot{e} \end{cases}$	$\begin{cases} ham k\ddot{o} \\ ham\ddot{a}r\ddot{e} li\ddot{e} \\ mh\ddot{a}r\ddot{e} li\ddot{e} \end{cases}$
Abl.	<i>mu\dot{y} sē</i>	<i>ham sē</i>
Gen.	<i>mēṛā, mhārā</i>	$\begin{cases} ham\ddot{a}r\ddot{a} \\ mh\ddot{a}r\ddot{a} \end{cases}$
Loc.	<i>mu\dot{y} mē, etc.</i>	$\begin{cases} ham m\ddot{e} \\ mh\ddot{a}, \ddot{e} m\ddot{e} \end{cases}$

NOTE I.—Except the Ablative and the Locative cases in every other case there is an optional form in the singular. The form *mēṛā* and *mēṛē* in the Accusative, Instrumental, and Dative, is a peculiar use in this speech.

NOTE II.—In the plural there is only one form '*ham*' in all the cases except Dative, Genetive and the Locative which accept '*mhārā*' form also.

Second Person

	Singular	Plural
Nom.	$\begin{cases} t\ddot{u} \\ t\ddot{u}n\ddot{e} \end{cases}$	$\begin{cases} tum \\ tum n\ddot{e} \end{cases}$
Acc.	$\begin{cases} tu\dot{y} ko, etc. \\ t\ddot{u}j\ddot{e} \end{cases}$	$\begin{cases} t\ddot{u}m ko \\ tum\ddot{e} \end{cases}$
Instr.	<i>tu\dot{y} sē</i>	<i>tum sē</i>
Dat.	$\begin{cases} tu\dot{y} k\ddot{o} \\ tu\dot{y}e \\ t\ddot{e}re li\ddot{e} \end{cases}$	$\begin{cases} tume, tum k\ddot{o} \\ tum\ddot{a}r\ddot{e} li\ddot{e} \end{cases}$
Abl.	<i>tu\dot{y} sē</i>	<i>tum sē</i>
Gen.	<i>tērā</i>	<i>tumārā</i>
Loc.	<i>tu\dot{y} mē</i>	<i>tum mē</i>

NOTE I Quite a number of optional forms are to be seen in this as we and they are more in the singular

than in the pure. The oblique singular form is used in the singular except in the nominative but in the plural the nominative plural form is used in all the cases except in the Ablative and the Genetive plural.

NOTE II—The honorific form of 'tū' is 'āp.' It remains unchanged all through. The plural is formed by adding 'lōg' to it, and the case terminations are regularly attached.

Third Person

	Singular	Plural
Nom.	$\begin{cases} wō \\ usnē, wisnē \end{cases}$	$\begin{cases} wō \\ winnē \text{ and } winnē \end{cases}$
Acc.	$\begin{cases} wis kō, kū, \text{ etc.} \\ us \end{cases}$	$\begin{cases} win kō, kū, \text{ etc.} \end{cases}$
Instr.	$\begin{cases} wis se \\ us \end{cases}$	$\begin{cases} win se \end{cases}$
Dat.	$\begin{cases} wis lō \\ us \end{cases}$	$\begin{cases} win kō \end{cases}$
Abl.	$\begin{cases} wis se \\ us \end{cases}$	$\begin{cases} win se \end{cases}$
Gen.	$\begin{cases} wis kū \\ us \end{cases}$	$\begin{cases} win kū \end{cases}$
Loc.	$\begin{cases} wis mē \\ us \end{cases}$	$\begin{cases} win mē \end{cases}$

wis and *us* both forms are used in the singular and the oblique singular and the plural forms are used in all the cases and all the numbers.

e.g.: *wis ki mātā*
us ki mātā

In the nominative the form *winnē* is used both in the singular and the plural; and so does the form *wō* not change in the nominative singular and the plural.

NOTE I. Besides the regular formation of the pure sometimes words like *sab* and *loj* are also added

to form the plural in all the persons but these extra words are added only in the plural form.

e.g. : *ham sab ; ham lōg ; tum sab*
tum lōg ; wō sab ; wō lōg ; etc.

		Singular	Plural
Proximate demonstrative	Dir.	<i>yē</i>	<i>yē</i>
	Obl.	<i>is</i>	<i>in</i>

Except in the nominative when the forms are common in the singular and the plural : everywhere oblique singular and plural forms are used in all the cases.

In the nominative the plural is expressed by the plural verb

e.g. : *yē jāegī*
yē jāēgī

		Singular	Plural
Remote Demonstrative	Dir.	<i>wō</i>	<i>wō</i>
	Obl.	<i>wis</i>	<i>win</i>
		<i>us</i>	

Like the Proximate here too the case is similar.

NOTE.—Sometimes the plural is formed by adding extra words such as ' *sab* ' and ' *lōg* . '

e.g. . *wō sab āē thē*
yē sab āē thē, etc.
wō lōg āē thē
yē lōg āē thē, etc.

		Singular	Plural
Relative and Correlative.	Nom.	<i>jō</i>	<i>jō</i>
	Obl.	<i>jīs</i>	<i>jīn</i>

In the nominative the form remains the same and the plural is expressed by the plural verb.

e.g. : *jō ketā he*
jīn ketē hē

In the accusative the form *jisē* in the singular and *jīnē* in the plural is also commonly used

e.g. *jisē lekko wō nabab bana fire he*

Similar are the correlative pronouns.

	Singular	Plural
Nom	<i>wō</i>	<i>wō</i>
Obl.	<i>wis</i>	<i>win</i>
	<i>us</i>	<i>un</i>

The relative and the correlative pronouns are also liable to be used as pronominal adjectives only if they are used along with nouns.

e.g. : *jō ghōddā tēj bhagē he wīsē ī me cūṭō ī.*
wō admī muj sē lālā bhāī tū hīdār jā gā ?

	Singular	Plural
Interrogative	Nom <i>kaon</i> (mas. and fem)	<i>kaon</i> (mas. and fem)
	Obl. <i>kyā</i> (neuter)	<i>kyā</i> (neuter)
	<i>kis</i> (all)	<i>kin</i> (all)
e.g. :	<i>kaon āyā thā ?</i>	<i>kaon āē thē ?</i>
	<i>kaon āyē thē ?</i>	<i>kaon āī thī ?</i>
	<i>kyā āyā thā ?</i>	<i>kyā āyē thē ?</i>
	<i>kis kō mārā</i> , etc.	

NOTE.—The honorific is made either by using plural verb with the singular as well or by adding an extra word 'sāb' to it.

e.g. : *kaon sāb āyē thē ?*

Indefinite Pronoun	<i>kōī</i> [anyone or some one]	
	Singular	Plural
	Nom <i>kōī</i>	
	Obl. <i>kis</i>	<i>kisē</i> .

e.g. : *kōī ā sakē he ?*
kisī kū bullā dē, etc.

The plurality or the singularity is expressed by the verb. But there is a peculiar tendency of using *bi* along with it is almost invariably. Thus is to add force and emphasis to it

kuch [anything]

This means anything or something. It has got no oblique forms.

e.g. : *kuch bhejjō gē?*

kuch kū tō me uē ī batā diā thā, etc.

Compound
Pronouns

When two pronouns combined together are used as a single expression they make a compound pronoun.

e.g. . expressions like *jō kōi*, *ēr kōi*

e.g. : *jō kōi jānā cāē*

ēr kōi bī jāgā, etc.

Emphatic
forms

There are certain patent expressions which when added to these pronouns bring in emphasis. Some of the most common expressions are 'bī' and ī; this ī is the form of *hī*.

e.g. : *maṛ bī jāñ gā*

jō bī jā gā

wō ī jā gā

wisē ī bhejjō, etc.

	MANNER		Pronoun	Pron. adj.		Pron. adj. of quantity	Pron. adv.		Pron. adv. of time	Pron. adv. of place	Pron. adv. of direction	REMARK
	Pron. adj.	Pron. adv.										
Demonstrative	Proxi- mate	yē	sā	sē	ittā	abū; ab	hyā, yō	idar	None—These are the pronominal adjectives and adverbs. If they are used before a substantive they function like			
	Remote	irō	wesā	wesē	uttā	...	whā; uā	udar				
Relative		jō	jissā	jessē	jittā	jub	jañ, jahā; jhā	jadar; jidhar				
Correlative		wa	wessā	wessē	uttā	..	uā; whā	udar; widhar				
Interrogative		kam	kesā	kesē	hittā	kal	kā	kudar; kihhar				

CHAPTER IV

Adjective

Adjectives have two genders (i) masculine and (ii) feminine. Unlike certain dialects of the Eastern Gender. Hindi here the gender is very well marked out in the adjective ends in *ā*.

e.g.: *mottā ghōḷā*—*mottī ghōḷī*
tājā and *tājī*
chokkhā and *chokkhī*

NOTE.—Whereas in Audhī they would not have the gender so well marked out.

e.g.: *mwāt ghōṛī* and
mwāt ghōṛā

Formation. When the adjective ends in *ā* the feminine gender is made by changing the *ā* into *ī*.

e.g.: *thandā pānī*
thandī hawā

But if the adjective ends in *ī* or in a consonant then it does not change.

e.g.: *bhārī ghōddā*, *behārī gā*
and *bharī larakī*
safēt ghōddā; *safēt hāthī*
safēt lukarī
lall ghōddā; *lall gā*
lall lukarī, etc.

As a rule adjectives have also got two numbers (i) singular and (ii) plural. The number of the adjective number should change according to the number of the noun. But here again we see that it is only the adjectives ending in *ā* that change their number according to the noun.

e.g.: *acchā ghōddā*
acchē ghōddē, etc
pīlā kuttā
pīlē kuttē etc.

But in adjectives ending in *ny* the vowel *r* in a consonant it remains unchanged.

e.g.: *bhārī ghōddā*

bhārī ghōddē

lall kuttā

lall kuttē, etc

NOTE -- When an adjective is used as a noun the same rules of declension are applied to it.

e.g.: *whā bhēt a ghōddē thē un aur se kāllo kū*

aur liā, ēr būkayō kū fār diā.

Adjectives have generally only one form, *ra*, direct.
Form but they have an oblique form too when they end in *ā*.

The oblique is formed from the direct by replacing the *ā* with *ē*

e.g.: *kālā* *kālē*

gorā *gorē*

ūā *ūāē, etc.*

There are neither special forms nor any particular suffixes
Degree of to add to indicate the comparison. There are a
comparison few words and phrases which mean 'more' or 'less' and they are added to institute the comparison.

e.g.: *jāddā, bhēt, tan aur, kam, sab sē jāddā,*

sab mē, sab sē or sab mē kam.

With the help of these the comparative and the superlative degrees are indicated.

e.g.: *wā lōnddā jāddā barā he*

or *tan aur barā he*

or *sab mē barā he*

or *sab sē jāddā barā he*

To use a very emphatic form the word *kahī* (far more) is added to the whole expression

e.g. *wā lōnddā tō kahī jāddā barā he etc*

The following are the cardinals :

Numerals.	1— <i>ēk</i>	
	2— <i>dv</i>	
3— <i>tīn</i>	21— <i>ekīs</i>	39— <i>uṇatālīs</i>
4— <i>cār</i>	22— <i>bāīs</i>	40— <i>cālīs</i>
5— <i>pāc</i>	23— <i>tēīs</i>	41— <i>ekatālīs</i>
6— <i>chai</i>	24— <i>côbīs</i>	42— <i>byālīs</i>
7— <i>sāt</i>	25— <i>pacōīs</i>	43— <i>tiyālīs</i>
8— <i>āṭh</i>	26— <i>chabōīs</i>	44— <i>cōwālīs</i>
9— <i>nao</i>	27— <i>satālīs</i>	45— <i>petālīs</i>
10— <i>das</i>	28— <i>athāīs</i>	46— <i>chvyālīs</i>
11— <i>gyārā</i>	29— <i>unattīs</i>	47— <i>satālīs</i>
12— <i>bārā</i>	30— <i>tīs</i>	48— <i>artālīs</i>
13— <i>tērā</i>	31— <i>ekattīs</i>	49— <i>uṇcūs</i>
14— <i>cauddā</i>	32— <i>battīs</i>	50— <i>pancūs</i>
15— <i>pandurā</i>	33— <i>tētīs</i>	51— <i>ikāwan</i>
16— <i>sollā</i>	34— <i>coulīs</i>	52— <i>bāwan</i>
17— <i>satrā</i>	35— <i>pētīs</i>	53— <i>tiraiṇan</i>
18— <i>athārā</i>	36— <i>chālīs</i>	100— <i>saw</i>
19— <i>unnīs</i>	37— <i>sētīs</i>	1000— <i>hazār</i>
20— <i>bīs</i>	38— <i>artīs</i>	100000— <i>lākkh</i>

There is another remarkable tendency that after twenty they would use the cardinals by adding the numbers to the tens.

e.g. for 28 they generally use *bīs* or *āṭh*. 47—*cālīs* or *sāt*, etc

It is the educated people who would use these cardinals properly.

These admit of two genders, the masculine and the feminine.

The feminine is formed by replacing the *ā* in the end by *ī*.

Up to the fourth they are irregular.

e.g. : 1st	<i>pelā</i>
2nd	<i>duśārā</i>
3rd	<i>tisārā</i>
4th	<i>cōttha</i>

Ordinals above the fourth are formed by adding *wā* to it generally.

e.g. :	5th	<i>pācuvā</i>
	6th	<i>chatā</i> and <i>chatwā</i> , etc.
	7th	<i>sātuvā</i>
	8th	<i>āthuvā</i>
	and 12th	<i>bārwā</i>

Fractional numbers

There is absolutely no regularity about their formation.

$\frac{1}{4}$	<i>pāw</i>	$\frac{1}{2}$	<i>ādāhā</i>
$\frac{2}{3}$	<i>pān</i>	$1\frac{1}{4}$	<i>sowā</i>
$1\frac{1}{2}$	<i>dādhā</i>	$2\frac{1}{2}$	<i>adhā</i>
$+$ $\frac{1}{2}$	<i>sādhē</i> .		

Multiplicatives

They are formed from certain changed forms of the cardinals by adding the suffix *-ganā*.

e.g. :	twice	<i>duganā</i>
	thrice	<i>tiganā</i>
	4 times	<i>cūganā</i> .

In the multiplication tables certain peculiar numeral forms are observed.

e.g. :	for 2×2	they would say <i>dō dunnā</i>
	2×3	<i>dō trikā</i>
	2×4	<i>dō cōk</i> , etc.

Definite cardinals.

There is slightly more regularity to be seen in this.

e.g. :	<i>īkalā</i> , <i>dūnnō</i> , <i>tinno</i> , <i>cārrō</i> , etc.
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Forms from 1--3 are irregular - the rest are formed by adding the suffix *ō*

e.g. :	<i>pācō</i> , <i>chāō</i> , <i>sātō</i> , etc.
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Indefinite cardinals.

They are formed by adding *iyō* to the number when it is below 50.

e.g. :	<i>dasiyō</i> , <i>bisiyō</i> , <i>pacciśiyō</i> , etc.
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But if it is hundred or more then it is formed by adding *ō* in the end

e.g	<i>śaikaō</i> <i>hazarō</i> etc
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CHAPTER V

Verb

Fairly more attention is paid towards the regular use of the number. It is seldom that plural verb is used with a singular subject. And if it is used at all the instances are of honorific use. But singular verb with plural subject is never used. If the subject is a pronoun even then the plural verb cannot be used. In such cases the pronoun—though it refers to a singular object—will have to be used in its plural form.

There are two forms (*nnā* and *nā*) of a suffix which is added in the infinitive form of every verb. By removing these suffixes the root is obtainable.

e.g :	<i>khānnā</i>	✓ <i>khā</i>
	<i>pīnnā</i>	✓ <i>pī</i>
	<i>sonnā</i>	✓ <i>sō</i>
	<i>jāg-na</i>	✓ <i>jāg</i>
	<i>bāg-nā</i>	✓ <i>bāg</i>

Of course there is no specific rule about the application of these suffixes: but the usual practice is to add—‘*nnā*’ when the root is monosyllabic but—‘*nā*’ is to be added to the roots which are polysyllabic.

It has three forms (i) double consonant+*ū*, (ii) double consonant+*ē* and (iii) double consonant+*ō*. In the formation of tenses the different forms are used as follows:—

(i) The first is used with the first person singular.

e.g : *mē dekkhū hū*
mē dallū tū

- (ii) The second is used with the second person singular, first person plural and the third person singular and plural.

e.g. : *ham dekkhē hē*
tū dekkhē hē
wo dekkhē hē and *hē*, etc.

- (iii) This is used with the second person plural.

e.g. : *tum dekhō hū*.

This has got practically only one form ending in *ā* for all persons and all numbers. But when the root is monosyllabic or ending in *ā* an extra 'y' is added before *ā*.

e.g. : ' *padhā* ' and *khāyā* ; *jalāyā*, etc.

The above rule is not to be followed very rigidly.

Conjunctive participle. Is formed by adding ' *kar ka* ' and ' *kē* ' to the root.

e.g. : *naeā kar ka*
jā kar ka
jhagar kē, etc.

Auxiliary verb. To be ✓ *hō* = (*hōnnā*) = to be

Present Indicative

	Sing.	Plu.
1st person	<i>hū</i>	<i>hē</i>
2nd "	<i>he</i>	<i>hō</i>
3rd "	<i>he</i>	<i>he</i> .

Past Indicative

	Sing.	Plu.
1st	<i>t thū</i>	<i>thē</i>
2nd	<i>t thā</i>	<i>thē</i>
3rd	<i>t thā</i>	<i>thē</i>

NOTE I The feminine forms can be had by changing *a* into *i* and *e* into *ī*

NOTE II.—*Hā* form is to be had in the speech of Morādābad district only.

e.g.: *Rām Chandar āyō hō.*

Present Conjunctive

	Sing.	Plu
1st	<i>hōñ</i>	<i>hōwe</i>
2nd	<i>hōwē</i>	<i>hō hōnnā</i>
3rd	<i>hōwē</i>	<i>hōwē</i>

Past Conjunctive

	Sing	Plu.
1st	<i>hōttā</i>	<i>hōttā</i>
2nd	"	<i>hōttē</i>
3rd	"	"

NOTE.—The feminine form can be had by changing *ā* of the singular and plural and *ē* of the plural into *ī*.

Imperative Mood

	Sing	Plu.
1st	<i>hōū</i>	<i>hō, hōwē</i>
2nd	<i>hō, hōiyō, huiyō</i>	<i>ho, hōiyō, huiyō</i>
3rd	<i>hō</i>	<i>hō</i>

NOTE.—Practically speaking imperative mood is generally not used with the first person.

CONJUGATION OF *Dekkhnā*

(1) Past Indicative

	Sing.	Plu.
1st	} <i>dekkhū dekkhyā</i>	
2nd		
3rd		

(a) Simple
tenses

This one form is used with all the persons and in all the numbers. The extra addition of *y* is peculiar.

NOTE I.—In some of the compound verbs the *ō* ending forms are also formed, e.g., *firparyō, girparyō* etc.

NOTE II.—The gender changes according to the object also: hence the feminine can be had by replacing the final *a* with *i*, e.g., *dekkhi*

() Future Indicative

	Sing.	Plu.
1st	<i>dekkhā gā</i>	<i>dekkhē gē</i>
2nd	<i>dekkhē gā</i>	<i>dekkhō gē</i>
3rd	<i>dekkhē gā</i>	<i>dekkhē gē</i>

The form in the first person singular is different from the second and the third person singular. So the form in the second person plural is different from the form in the first person plural and third person plural.

NOTE I.—In some of the roots ending in *ā* it has been observed that in the second person singular slightly different formations are to be seen.

e.g. *baṇawgā*, *khāwagā*, etc.

NOTE II.—In cases of feminine gender the singular form in all the persons changes into *gā*. But the plural form changes only in the second and the third person into *gī*.

(3) Present Conjunctive

	Sing.	Plu.
1st	<i>dekkhā</i>	<i>dekkhē</i>
2nd	<i>dekkhē</i>	<i>dekkhā</i>
3rd	<i>dekkhē</i>	<i>dekkhē</i>

In this the forms of the second and third person singular are the same and so are the forms of the first and third person plural. The first person singular and the second person plural are different from all the rest.

(4) Past Conjunctive

	Sing.	Plu.
1st } 2nd } 3rd }	<i>dektā</i>	<i>dektē</i>

These forms in this tense remain unchanged in all the persons.

NOTE The feminine in the singular for all the persons and the plural third person is to be made by changing

the last vowel into *i* and in the second person plural the *ē* changed into *ī* and the first person plural remains unchanged.

(5) Imperative

	Sing.	Plu.
1st	<i>dekkhū</i>	<i>dekkhē</i>
2nd	{ <i>dēkh</i> , <i>dēkkhē</i> <i>dēkhiyō</i> , <i>dēkhiyē</i> ,	{ <i>dekkhō</i> <i>dēkhiyō</i>
3rd	<i>dekkhē</i>	<i>dekkhē</i>

The forms are the same as in the present conjunctive except the optional forms in the second person singular and plural.

NOTE.—The forms *dēkhiyē* and *dēkhiyō* do indicate futurity as well.

(b) Periphrastic tenses

These tenses are formed by adding an auxiliary with the present or the past participle of a finite verb.

(6) Present Imperfect Indicative

(i) Tenses with imperfect participle

	Sing.	Plu.
1st	<i>dekkhū hū</i>	<i>dekkhē hī</i>
2nd	<i>dekkhē hē</i>	<i>dekkhō hō</i>
3rd	<i>dekkhē hē</i>	<i>dekkhē hē</i>

In some roots such as *jā* and *kar* it also sometimes refers to an immediate futurity of the accomplishment of the action, e.g., '*maṛ jāū hū*' also means that just in the near future I shall be going. But such changes of meaning are due to colloquialism and they depend upon the context and the circumstances.

NOTE I.—Some peculiar forms have also been observed in some verbs in the third person plural e.g. *jaṛ hē* *khaṛ hē* *raḥṛ hē* etc.

(7) Present Imperfect Indicative

	Sing.	Plu.
1st	<i>dekhū thā</i>	<i>dekhē the</i>
2nd	<i>dekhī thā</i>	<i>dekhhā thē</i>
3rd	<i>dekhē thā</i>	<i>dekhhē thē</i>

Except in the first person plural where the form is common for the masculine and the feminine, in the rest the forms are changed. The *thā* form becomes *thī* in the second person singular and plural, and in the third person singular. But in the third person plural it becomes *thī*.

(8) Present Imperfect Conjunctive

	Sing.	Plu.
1st	<i>dekhhū hū</i>	<i>dekhhē hī</i>
2nd	<i>dekhhī hī</i>	<i>dekhhā hī</i>
3rd	<i>dekhhī hī</i>	<i>dekhhē hī</i>

These forms are the same as in the present imperfect indicative. The '*hū*' form of the standard Hindi is not found in this speech.

e.g. : *jo mē kām dekhkhū hū to tum kyū bolō ho ?*

(ii) Tenses
with perfect
participle.

(9) Present Perfect Indicative

	Sing. and Plu.
1st	{ <i>dekhhā hū</i> <i>dekhhī hū</i>
2nd	
3rd	

The above are the only forms used in all the numbers and all the persons. In the feminine instead of *ā* we have *ī* substituted.

(10) Past Perfect Indicative

	Sing. and Plu.
1st	{ <i>dekhl ha thā</i>
2nd	
3rd	

It is the only form used in all the persons and all the numbers. The change of gender does not affect it.

(11) Future Perfect Indicative

	Sing. and Plu
1st	} <i>dekkhā hōgā</i>
2nd	
3rd	

is the only form for all the numbers and all the persons and genders.

(12) Past Perfect Conjunctive

1st	} <i>'dekkhā hō'</i>
2nd	
3rd	

is the only form used for all the numbers, genders and persons.

NOTE—Unlike the standard Hindi this speech has not some of the recognized tenses.

- (i) *Present Indicative*—has been always replaced by present continuous and if sometimes it is used then it indicates wonder, habit or historic force.

e.g. : *mē kyā dekkhāi ke bijān sahar kī dīvār
sunne ēr jiwāharāt kī intō kī banī he.*

Even in this sense sometimes the continuous tense is used.

- (ii) *Future Imperfect Indicative*—This form is never used.

- (iii) *Past Perfect Conjunctive*.—This too has no definite verbal form to express. Generally in this sense they would use simple past tense.

e.g. : *jō mē lē raī thī tō tum nē
kyā manē kiā or karā ?*

As is the common trait of dialects in general the expressions of this speech are also simpler and less steadied. They make use of gestures to complete the sense to a certain extent.

There are three different forms of infinitives used in this speech in (i) *ni*, (ii) *nā*, and (iii) *ne*. Every Infinitives. verb can have these three forms. But if the instances are carefully examined it will be noted that these three suffixes have separate objects. Truly speaking (*n* or *n*) is the only suffix that forms the infinitive

e.g. *uskū whā sē bulānā ō,*
whā sē bhājan lūgī.

The suffix *nā* is added to form the gender

e.g. *bhēt sāmā acchā nā*

The suffix *nē* is also added to form the infinitive but it has been generally noted that when a postposition is to be used after it the suffix *nē* is added; but when no postposition is to be added then only 'n' or 'n' is added

e.g. *tūghē bulān,* or *bulān āw h.*
tūghē bulānnē kō āwē h.
mai tō khā jāū hō
mai khānnē kō jāū hū, etc.

The noun of agency is generally formed by adding 'wālā' to the infinitive form of the verb.

The general way of expression is direct and active

Passive form of the verb is practically absent from the common speech. But of course we do find use of the causative form of the verb. Generally the significance of such a use is to bring in a force of speech. There is no such thing as double causative.

Commonly the causative is formed by adding an extra *ā* to the root: and in different roots different consequent changes take place.

e.g.:	<i>calnā</i>	<i>calānā</i>
	<i>pitnā</i>	<i>pitānā</i>
	<i>khānā</i>	<i>khulānā</i>
	<i>rōnā</i>	<i>ruānā</i>
	<i>bhagna</i>	<i>bhagana,</i> etc.

In practical life it is generally found that only one verb is not enough to bring in the full force in the expression and hence more than one verb is used together and the expression is called 'compound verb.'

Compound
verbs.

eg. : *calā jana*
uth baithnā, etc.

NOTE I.—About the imperfect indicative tense in this speech it must be noted that they can also be formed by adding an extra word 'rah.' This can be added in all the tenses. It brings in the force of continuity along with the sense of incompletion of the action.

e.g. : *khā ra ā ū*
jā ra ā thā
khēl ra ā thā, etc.

NOTE II.—But a distinction must be made between compound verb and certain idiomatic expressions in which two verbs are combined together; but for a different purpose

e.g. : *ānā jānā*
khānā pīnā
uthnā bethnā, etc.

These are not the instances of compound verbs at all. Some of the instances of the most commonly used compound verbs are as follows :—

calā jānā, *mār bethnā*, *khā jānā*, *gir par nā*,
cal dēnā, *ā jānā*, *lē lēnā*, etc.

Thus the compound verb is formed by adding a few generally used verbs to the root

e.g. : *jānā*, *lēnā*, *dēnā*, *bethnā* and *parnā*, etc.

CHAPTER VI

Indeclinables

The use of the adverbs or of adverbial expressions is remarkably less in this speech. By this it should not be understood that they do not use the adverbs or adverbial expressions at all. But all that is meant by this is that they have got only a few such expressions; and besides they have got a peculiar system of emphasizing and stressing their words.

This suffices to a great extent to make for the adverbs and then they supplement it with gestures as has already been remarked in a previous chapter.

e.g.: for *jaldī ā* they would say *arē ājā bāi*

For run up run up they would say
calū ā calū ā.

Yet whatever adverbs or adverbial expressions they have got, if they are classified together they will be as follows:—

The commonly used expressions are *yā, wā, idar, mlar,*
(a) Adverb *kyahā, kā, jhā, jidar, ular, inghē* (here),
of place *ūghē* (there), *ktghē* (where), *sabtāraf, agārī*
(before), *parē* (a-side).

(b) Adverb The most common of them are *abī, tabī, jab,*
of time *rāj, tarkeh* (morning), *utunū* (so long).

(c) Adverb Commonly used are
of quantity *bhēt jādā, jittā, kittā ghaṇā, dhēri.*

(d) Adverb *kyū kur, kest, kyū.*
of reason

Sometimes it is definite and sometimes indefinite. It is
(e) Adverb generally formed by adding a word '*lafē*' and
of number *lar* to the numerals used

If the number is definite the adverb is also definite, otherwise it is indefinite.

e.g. : *dō bār, cār bār, kaī bār, bhōt bār*

Sometimes a definite number is used and yet it expresses indefiniteness.

e.g. : *bīsīyō bār, dasīyō bār.*

(f) Adverb of manner

Some of them are

ε *sē, we sē*, and sometimes by adding the word *tarā* or *tariā*.

e.g. : *esē tariā, ortalā, jāgā kī tū dekkhē gā*, etc.

(g) Compound adverbs

Besides making a compound adverb such expressions also make a strong idiom.

e.g. : *idar udar,*

jā kaī

yā wā

aggē picchē, etc.

Post positions

The following postpositions are used after a noun or pronoun to form cases :—

Noun Wanting—but sometimes *nē* is used and its force is agentive

e.g. : *Rām geā*

Rām nē mārā.

Acc. *kō, kū, sē, seti* [e.g. : *Rām sē kahō*]

Instr. *sē*

Dat. *kō, kū, khātar.*

Abl. *sē.*

Gen. *kā, kē, kī.*

Loc. *mē, pa, par, uppar.*

NOTE.—These postpositions can be used with all the pronouns also except in the genitive in the first person and second person

In this speech much too use is made of vocatives and interjections.

Vocative and
Interjectional
forms

The vocative is very peculiar in this speech, mainly in the masculine singular they use *ōrē*, and *rē*

e.g. : *ōrē lōddē !* *ōrē, banīrē, rē kuttē, rē kacchūrāj*, etc.

In the masculine plural they use *arē* and *rē* with a plural noun.

e.g. : *arē lōddo*
arē lūgō
rē bhāīuo, etc.

When the noun is in feminine gender

the *ōrē* becomes *arī*
and *rē* becomes *rī*

In this speech a number of interjections are used. Some of the most commonplace are :—

hā for *hāy*
bāp rē, gajab, marjā, etc.

Rightly speaking the conjunctions used in this speech are those used in the standard Hindī; but their pronunciation is much too different.

Conjunction-

e.g. : *mūttā ballī ak bettā kuch rojigar karī*
wo ē m ā bettē
nā khānnē de ha nā pūnnē de ha
caiyō jō hō ghar to nā jāttā, etc.

APPENDIX A

Specimen of the Speech

Dānē pūṇē māḡ khāe mērā larkā kaparā būcce ē—Pedda

I A weaver's
speech

hyā to fakat okellāi ũ. Umar tō pacās sāth sāl

hōggī. Bāggō bāggō mē sē lakarī lē āū hū.

Kaiyō par raū hū. Ajī nū ī ũ. Mujhē dikkhē

ī kahā rāh batāū dikkhē he. Hyā tō bās mōth dhān nakkā

bās yē ī hōe he. Hyā tō bas jamin kamā ka nalwādē hē

Agī batērī hojjāyhe koivyō deddey he cīthrā tab pahan lū hū

[Village Pedda six miles east of Bijnore

Ek Lahelā-majanū kā kissā

II A dhimar's
speech aged 50

Āskī nā kījīe ghār bēc khaiē

ēr khōddē dhōrē nō nē āp dūr jāiē

Āskī kē dard nē kaon dard gard he

Sinē mē cōt lagī paslī mē dard he

Lahēla kē isk mē majnū yār mard he

Mhārē gām mē sāb camhār kē dō dellē haī, dōnnōī barē

sarārtī hē, gām mē kū bhāgē ēr Bangālē pōc gaē. Whā kyā

kam keā jī kī kucchī dīnō me jādū sik liā or tēr wāpas ānkar

ke gām mē lagē udam macānē, ab tō jādū bī jān raē hē, unse

to gām kē cawdhari bī darē hē, ēr kaī pāṇṇī barsō cāe naīpar

sāb unkī khettī tō harī ī dikkhē he. Sāb unkū tō sabī darē

hē. Ab āgē tō nai yād sāb !

[Timaipur, five miles west of Bijnore.

Kissā Harīschand kā

Ikkupur and
Azipur seven
miles west of
Bijnore.

Yē biramhan kesā mil geā rō rō māḡge dān

Abī calēgē tīrth kō wahī karē asnān

Wahī karē asnān rē mīssar man kō bādḥ lē dhīrā

Bhukō nāḡō karē dān ban geā yahī matīrā

Soran gurtī karai dān bhī uppar laggaē saccē hīrā

Kahū me bāmhan ka kājā

Muje ane jag sansar nam mera Harīchand raja

4 Stot

Hamārē wā dākkā jō parē ēk ādmī hamārē whā ke pakre
gaē tīn ādmī sāb ! unkē calān hōgī, calān hōgī unkā sāb
Bijnore ā liē mukaddamā hōtū dū kāī posī hōwāi . . . hamē kī
kōsis hōtī nāī pmādr kī wō lē de ke unkā pīchā chūt
geā . . . sāb bas.

Kōī bādsā thā sāb uske dō rānivā thā, ēk ke tō dō larkē
thē ēk kē ēk larkē thā, wō ēk tōj apnī rām se kahanē lagā
merē samān . . . kōī bādsā hē bī tō jiske dō larkē
thē wō bōllī kē rājā tum samān . . . kōī hōggē
jossū tum wesā . . . kōī nāī hē . . . Jiskā larkā ek
thā usse pīchā kī tum hī batte muj samān
kōī or rājā hē kī nāī . . . Kī rājā musse mat bujhlō
kehvā kī nāī jab bagī ne batlāyā tō tujhlō bī batlānē hōggē.
Rājā nē kihyā ke rājā musse bājhte hō tō ek bijān sahar hē
uskē kilē mē jīnē tumārī sārī hē sāt hē utanī ek int lagī hai hē.

Āhō isne mihūnī kue bāt nāī rakhī iskō tagmārñī karñī caie,
uskū tagmārñī kar dū ēr barī kō sab raj kā mālīk kar dū,
bhēt dīn bīe gae kue dīn bād larkō nē kahyā kī putā ham
us sahar kō dekana cuete hē kesū bijān sahar hē, bādsā
ne donno kū ikkā ghōrā lē dū, larkē whā se bhēt sū māl
kharjīō mē bhar kar bijān sahar kō caldiē, bhēt dīn bīe gae
unkē pās khānnā thōrā sāī re geā, kī-sī sahar me ēk sarāī thī
jab unkō bilkul kue nāī milā tō ghōre tak bī hēc dīe, bād ko
bijān sahar tak nāī gae . . . Whā se bijān bhēt dūr thā, wā tētē
tētē unkū bhēt dīn hō gae, unkē putā ne unke khabar talūs
karē kī jāē huē bhēt dīn hōgae bijān sahar se abūtāk nāī āē.
Tagmārñī kā larkā bōllā kī mujkō ek ghōddē lede to bhaiyō kī
khabar lē aū. k bijān sahar gaē yā nī gae unki khabar lē aū.

Tagmārñī kā larkā majal dar majal calā jā rīō thō, jis
sahar mē sarāē thī whā ī jā pōcā, larkē bhēt tang hogae the,
ghās bēc bēc kar apānū gujar kāī kartē the, wē dōnō sahar
mē ghās bēch lē fir raē the . . . Bhatīārī sē kyā kahyā kī orī
bhatīārī mērē ghōddē kē waste ghīs lī . . . Bhatīārī rupī lē kar
sahar ko cal dī, dek itī kya . . . kī dōnno larkē ghās se hue

Adampuri,
Nahoi Bijnore,
Jamli Banlas,
85 years, cul-
turator

sahar mē bēc tē fir raē he. Bhatiārī nē kehyā kē larkō calō hamārī sarāe mē ēk bādsā jāddī āyā hawā he, larkē donnō ghās lekhar sarāe mē āē, patī uskī bī cal geā thī ki *luīh* liā thī bhatiārī sē ki ē larkē jā raē thē bijān sahar. wō jā Kāgmārī kā larkā thā, us nē un donnō kō bhōt tāwajjeh kī or mithāī or pakorī khub masālē dār unkō khalāī, khākar wō usē sarāy mē sōraē jis wakta āddhī rāt hauī un donnō kō peyās lagī, ghōddē kā jotthā baltī mē pānī rakkhā hawā thā usī kō pinne lagē, bādsā jāddī tō sorī jab subē huī tō us larkē nē apanē sahar kī bāt nī puchī. wā sē cal bijān sahar kī iāha lī, caltē caltē majal dā majal bijān sahar bī ā liā, whā kyā dektā hai kē ēk hālī hāl jōt rīā he, hāt tō uskā hall mē he, bel we sē ī siddē kharē huwē hē, jō uskō awāj dī tō bōllēī nāī bijān aur wō larkā whā sē cal diā. uskō bhēt pyās lagī howī thī, dektā kyā he ke caras cal rīā he, bel thārrē pe kharē hwē hē, māhik caras par rīā he ēr jō unku awāj detā he tō boltē nāī bejān, fir larkā whā sē āgē cal diā, āgē kyā dektā he kē baut acchā bīg he, lāve lāve kī nās pattī parī hawī hē, tul lagē hawē hoī, malī tul bin bin kar daliā mē ekatthā kār rīā he, fullō kī daliā hāt mē hai, larkē nē awāj dī tō bollaī nāī bejān. wā sē larkā fir āggē calā, bijān sahar kē kille kē karīb ī jā pōcō, ghōddī chōr kī bādsā jāddē nē tatak sē bānd diā ēr bijān sahar mē calī geā, dektā kyā he kī tamām sahar bijān he tō larkē nē cā ā kē whā kī bādsā jāddī or bādsā kō dekhnī cāīē kis jagai par raitē hē, wai ēk loharō mē pōcā, sōcā kē ēk int killē kī jaiūr lē jānā cāiyē, akē namūnā dikhā wē kī bijān sahar geā thā, larkā tānkī lē kar apanē pās rakh lē or bijān sahar kē killē kī atārī par jā bādsā jāddī rai we thī wā geā, bādsā jāddī palang pe so rai thī, jō hāk māī tō bolleī nāī bejān. us larkē nē kehyā kī iskā bī namūnā kuc lē jānnā cāīē, larkē nē apanā rumāl or gustānā tō uskē hāt mē pinhā diā or uskā lē kar k apanē hāt mē pen liā. larkē kē pās tān kī thī, kilē mē sē ēk int upār kar apanē jhōrī mē dāl lī, ab sab namūnā lē liā tō whā sē cal diā ā kē apanē ghōddē kō kīo jā calte cū te bhōt dīn bic gae itana mē uskī bai rani

ke larkē nē sarār me p'ogē s' ila jādūn sarār se cal
diā tō thōrē dīn bād wō dēs jān kā hōgē kyū kar usmē kuc
dēw rahā karē thē wō mainē dō mainē mē usai jān kā kar
dettē thē fir o bejān kā kar dettē thē

Chottī Rāpī kā larkā bī hōe gaē wī dōnnō nē kehā
kī pitā bijān sahar ham dēk nē, larkō ' kyā kyā namunā hē
whā larkō nē wase ī bhēt sā phūt māt kō butadiā Bādsā nē
unkū akin kar lēā kī aisā ī bijān sahar hōgā, fir uskū bulāyā
tū bī tō batlā—sab namūnā dikhā saktā hū, kōī namūnā whā
kī dikhāw ! jab bādsā jādī syānī ho gā tō usnē muāl guslānī
dekkhā tō bōllī hai tō us bādsā jādā sē mērī sādī karōdē nai
tō mai bacū gī nai, us larkē nē bijān kā patā purā batlā diā
bādsā kō wō larkā bhūt pyārā lagā or sab rāj kī mālīk us
chottē larkē kō karā diā or uskō byah nē kō cal diā ēr us
rānī kō bī nīkāl diā ēr larkō kō bī rāj nā diā, bijān sahar sē
sādī kar kē usī sahar kā malak kar diā, fir bādsā nē us chottī
rānī kō bī bhēt ābrū rakkhī. Larkē bī ēr rānī bī sab sahar
pōe kē rāj karnē lagē.

Ek larkā ēk burhiā birāmañī thī. Birāmañī apanē larkē
se kyā bōllī a krē larkē kuc rōjgā karō jis sē k dīn gujarē.

Ram Sahay
Bighān, age
40 years,
village Ja-
malpur three
miles north
of Bijnor

Kī mātā rōjigār tō kar lē par kuch khare
bī cāē. Uskī mātā bōllī rē larkē le pacās rupē
mere pās hē, jā dukkāñ kā sōddā kharīd lī.
Larkā pacās rupe hū, bajār kō calā jā rīā thā
agārī baldhiē dhōr cugū rae thē; baldhiō kē
pās ēk kuttā, ēk billī, ēk kacuē ē tinnō kun kō pacā
raē thē jab ē nacū kar k nībat cukē tab ē larkā birāmañī
kā jā kar k nnū bōllī ak rē baldhiyō nīnkū tum bōe bī
saktē hō ? hā bōe bī saktē hē. Kīmat in kī sunā. Kīmat
in kī saw rupiā. Saw rupe mīhārē pās hē nai pacās mīhārē pās
hē, pacās me dette hō tō deddo pacās rupāw mē mē kuttā billī
kā jeorā pakarā diā or kacuē kō pallē mē bād diā, apanē ghar
kā fir paryō. Aggē uskī mātā kharī hūī dēkh rāñī tō dēk
kē kuttā billī kō dēk kē mātā kyā bōllī kī rē kuc bī nī
lyaya, kutte billī jane usai pak r yaya jane mōī uye

Jab najik ā liā tab uskī mātī bōlli akrē larkē sodā khā dukān kā ? akaī mātī soddā to m kuc liyāyī naī ē kuttā, billī au kachuā tīn cīj m lyāyā ū, rē ninkū rū khā k maregā kyā ninku kharid nē kī cīj tu lyāyā naī ninkū kyā banāwgā. Rē jā hyā sē calā jā mujē mū mat dikhaiē. Pakar unkā jewrā apnī bethak mē unkū bādh k sūgeā. Jab ēk dīn sottā sottā bīc geā tab unkī mātī kō fēr darad āyā uskō whā sē bulān āī k cal rottī khallē usnē inkār kaidī, wō whā kharī hō k rōwan laggi dō ēk baiyar bānī or ekthī hō gaī un baiyar bānī nē unkū pakar pakar hāt uskū uthā lyāvā aur rottī agārī lēkkar rak diā. Rōttī khā kar wō apnē fer jā sōyyā. Jab unkē dō cār dīn bīc gaē fer akaī betē is tarā kab lō bicā mē gē l kuch sowdā dukān kā kharid lē akarī mātī kuch kharac bī ai pās akarē pacās tūnnē odinnū bigār diē lē pacās or he jā unkā soddā kharid lā, larkā lē pacās rupai fer caldiā agārī sapērā sāp kū nacā riā thā. jab sāp kū wō nacā cukā tab wō kyā bōllā akrē sāp kū bēc bī dewē he. Jī hā bēc bī saktē hē isē. Kimmat is kī sunā ddē sunāī unnē saw rupai ak bhāī pacās mē dedē nā dennā hō inkār kar dō sapērā kyā bōllā mērē kār sāpō kī he mē aur pakad līggā lā pacās mē deddē isī kō wiskō pitārī utārī uthā kē bīn hāt mē dediā. Kuttā sāth lē kar k jangal mē calā geā. Sāp pakarnē k wastē jab wō jā riā thā uskī mātī ryā bōlli ake larkā āj mērā kuc lā riā he bettā mērā kuc bōjh lariā he nār beth gaī hōggī jā kar kē pakar lū usnē inkār kaidāī Nai mātī mērē pās bōjūj tō he naī unnē lekkē or ghar kē mohnē kē sām nē pitārī dharddāī wō bōlā mātī jūrā parē kō kharī hojjā, wō piche kharī hōjā, wō piche kharī hogāī, wō apanā bīn bajāwan lagā, bīn bajātā bajātā unne sarap kō bāhar nikāl diā, mātī mārē khawf ke piche kī gir parī. Uth kar thōrī dēr mē kya bōllē kī dēs nikālā kanjē mū mat dikhaiyē muj ē jitā jī. Jākkar kuttē billī kā jebrā pitārī dhar sarap bādh kuchuē ko cal diā, calā āyā whāī pahūc gaā jhā sē kuttē billī kō kharidā thā wō kyā bōllā tumārī karī tumārē agārī mhārī karī mharē agārī jhā sē tumē legea th whu tumhe chore ja rea u kuttā an bīh

kye akam jī tu jell rē vī yāge Akire
 kūtē lisse j l bh r ky a eg K s r e l h r nka
 k cal diē, kachue kō lēkar samundar kī dñāk pu beñ geā
 akirē kacchū rajū dariā kē tum hō sō dariā mē calē jāō.
 Kachūā kyā bollā kī jhū bī kīhī bhūr parē whū hamē yād
 kar hō akarē jīnī bhīr ab purnī or bhī bhīr kyāhī purnī or
 vād karī jāgī aknī jāo phā lī kahū bhūr parē gī hamē yād
 kar hō thōrī dūr cal kar ēk kallar ā gū au kallar mē bamī
 āgū akarē jāo hamī k nāga. Nāgū kyā hōlā itanā mai laut
 kū jītanā jānā nāī kaī naw saw parī cāsathpurī nāgū hai
 jāgū kaī wāī das lēgē. fir thōrī dēr thahā kar kyā bollā
 mērē māmū hai hyāī par bacnō mē de k uskī māg hō sōgī au
 gustānū hē uske hāthō mē Uskī māmū kī kacērī bhēr pē-h
 hō rāī thī uskē māmī kī nigāh parī k mātā bhānjā bānābas
 kī kaid mē parī hē isse ye bujū k kis tarah sē āyā hē. Bollā
 apnē māmū sē akarē māmū bānābas kē larkē ne picēs rupai
 dekkar ham kō chutāyā hē ak dēk lō bamī k uppar kharā hē.
 Cāsathpurī kē nāgū us bamī kē uppar agāē kōī galē mē
 kōī pūrō mē padā sab nāgū ter laut gāē piche kī wē māmū
 or bhānjā dōnō kharē rāī gāē akarē larkē jō kuc māgnā hō
 māg kē mārē larkē kī jān baksī hē Bān dō tō mē māgtā
 hū nā bacn dō tō mē māgtā nāī. Arē tērē moharē tīn bacn
 jō kuc māgnā hō māg lō K yē tumāī kankī āgī mē shīnggī
 or gustānū hai ye dēdō akarē tenē māgū bī kuc nāī or chōldā
 bī kuc nāī. Itanē kahē kē bād de sīnggī or gustānū whāī sē
 ram gayā. Bhānjā kyā bollā ak rē larkē jō lojjā isē jaisē bī
 jaisē bī eij banā wāī cāgā cāgā wāī eij banjāgī yē dēs bārā
 bigā khēt parī whāī dalō kō usmē sowā hū dharī līp kar
 or gustānē kō dhark nī yē yū kadījō banjā cāddī au sunnā
 itanī bāt kē ke o bī bamī kē rah hōgē. Uchū gā kō gōbar
 or sowū hāt dharī līp kar manū bhagwān kō mnnē kaī dūā
 banjū sunnā or cāddī tamām khēt mē sunnā or cāddī
 camkan lagā. Bichū kar cāddar rāī dalē pādī liyē tamām khēt
 mittī k hojjō or yē pī- dalē cān lī- r sunnē kē rājō tamām
 khet mittī ka hogā bāc un dā dō kō wō lēta cā dūā Kūī sahar

samundar kē pūr lagā hōggā us sahar kē rājā nē dohāi pīt
 iakkhī thī k is samundar k bīc mē jō caumanjalā makkān
 cānddī aur sunnē kā kharū kar degū ussē ham apnī larkī
 byā saktē hē. Uskē kām mē bhanak paḍ gī lāgā kā gubbar
 maṇā bhagwān kū isnē makkān banā diā cānddī au sunnē kā
 huī subō caprāsī sē bōllā jāō samundar kē pās dēkh jō
 caprāsī whā sē caldiā au dekkhā cānddī sunnē kā makān kharā
 he ākar bīramhan kē larkē sē bōllā akarē saddī bī kar saktā
 ē tū Hā kar saktē hē. Bas whā sē itnī khabar hōgai nāī
 bīramhan lē sagāī, lagan ugan byā kā ikthā sāmān kar diā.
 Jis rōj bva kā dīn us rōj rājā nē apanē makkān par bulā hā.
 biā kar diā biā kar kē ūs samundar kē pās ā giā dōlā whā
 bhot dīn hō gaē raitē raitē badsā kī larkī ēk dīn kya bōllī
 kī tamām kām mharē cāuddī sunnē kē hē lakṛī kī kanghī sē
 ham apanē kēs sudhā rāgē. Us larkā nē sowā hāth dhartī līp
 lē bhagwān kā nām unnē kanghī banā di ēk dīn cānddī sunnē
 kī kanghī sē kēs bahā raī thī bethī lagā jhat kā hāt mē sē
 kangī ch it gai kanghī samundar kē bicālē unē gir gai. Kanghī
 bahī huī jā rāē thī machī aīē kyā bōllē āpas mē akē yē kyā
 oī he samundar nē bicālē mē camktī calī awe hē. Machīārō
 nē kanghī kō pakad laī. Kyā bōllā ēk ham iskū kayā kārāgē.
 Apanē rājā kē pās āē hāth jōṛ kar unkē sāmne bōllē unbhā nē
 dēk kar kanghī kō apanē caprāsī choḍ diē akarē jis kī sankī
 ē kanghī he wō kīs rangat kī hōggi akarē jāō un machīārō kō
 bulā kar law caprāsī jō thē un machīārō kā bullā kar lēgaē
 Macchīārē hāt jōṛ kar unkē sāmne khada hōgeā rājā bōllā
 akrē tum paī kanghī ē kā sē āī rē. Ak dariā mē baī ā rīē
 hamnē pakad kar āp ke sāmne lā dharā. Badsū nē duttan
 bulwāī tum mē kyā asab hē u kaē maī ambar kō fār saktē ū
 dūsri kū bulwāyā yē ambar kō far detī he mē ambar mē
 beth k thēkiē lagāē ātī ū akrē acchā jāō ē tō mharē matlab
 kī he nāī mharē matlab kī tum hō bōllē kī ē kanghī jis kī hē
 usē lādō ētī whā sē cal paṛī cal kanī whā sē dariā kē bicālē
 usī makkān kē pās rē bōllē apanē jī mē k tamām sahar to
 mere dekkh p dā sonne kī k ngh kī hoggi to hyāī hōggi

whī 1 j k r n k a n k r i c c r o w n a g u e B d d i s e p u c e l
 k a w n r e w P l n e k r j a l t k w n h e l l i b o
 a k i s m e m e r i b h a n j i h e m e n s k i m ā s i l a g ū ū w ō j ō t h h i
 w h ā s e e a l k a i a n d a r k h a b a r k a r d a i k w ō t ō t e r i m ā s i
 b a t ā w e h e t e j e c h ō d k a r e a l i g a i t h i u s k ū j u t h ā b a h i r s e
 b u l w ā l i ā L a r k ā s i k ā r k h e l ā e k a r e a p a n s ā n j h k ū ā j ā e
 k a r e w ō i t t i k h ū b p y ā m e h ō i d ō n n ō m ā s i b h ā n j i ē k d i n
 k y ā b ō l l i k t ū m n e d a r i ā k b e a l e m e m a k k ā n k e s e b a n ā l i ā
 h e ? A k a i u n k e h ā t h m e g u n t h i o r c h h a l l a h e j ā n e h e
 k e s e k j ō c ā w e h e h ō i b a n j ā e h e. Ā y ā s a m k ō t ō d u t t a n
 k y ā b ō l l i a k r e l a d k e t ā y e c h a l l ā k y ā p e r e t e w e h e k a b i
 i s a i b i p e r ā d i a k a r e a p a n i b a i k ū u s n e a p a n i b a i k ū p e r ā
 d i ā. D u t t a n y ā t h i s ō k y ā b ō l l i ē k r ō j k b e t t i k ā m e i n ā n
 k ā k a r ō h ō s ō c u n b h a i j ā e h e s ō m a j e d e d d e m e p e i l i l a r k ā
 k h ā r o t t i a p n ā s i k ā r k ū e a l ā g e ā. I t a n e t ā r o t t i b a n ā i t a n ā d e k t i
 ā i k a h ā k u j ā e k a r h e s i k ā r k ū ā s t ā ā s t ā u t a r k e ō j ō t h i a p a n e
 s a h a k ō b ā g g a i j ā k a r a p a n ā g h a t s o w ā h ā t d h a t t i l i p k a r
 k a i y ā b h a g w ā n y e m a k k ā n c ā m d i s o m e k ā h e k a r i s b ā d s ā k
 m a k k ā n k p ā s j ā l a g e m a k k ā n e a l k a r u s k e d h ō r e ā l a g ā.

D u t t a n j ō t h i a p a n ā d e m ā m ā g u s t ā n ā o r m ā u p p a r
 k ō k a r k s ō g a i. L a d k ā j ō t h ā s i k ā r l e h e l k a r ā y ā t a n ā m
 c ā ō t a r a t d e k k h ā p a r m a k k ā n n ā d i k k h ā k a i p a r b i h ā r
 k a i p a r r i ā t h ō d i s ā d e r m e k y ā b ō l l i k i a k r e k u t t ā a u b i l l i
 a b t u n ā t ā k ā m n ā k u t t ā a u b i l l i ā g ā p i c c h e b h a g t ā e a l ā
 a w e a u r h ā p r a y ā j ō t ū m m e k u c h ō t ō u s d u t t a n k ō l ā d ō
 a k a i a c c h ā ē k i t a n i b a r i b ā t a b l ā d e h e. K u t t ā u s d u t t a n k e
 m a k k ā n p e ā y ā k a i k u r a s t ā u n k a n ā m l ā ā p a s m e j h a g a r k e n i
 k y ā b o l l i ē b h a d r o d k e r a s t e c a p h j ā ō. K u t t ā k y ā b o l l ā b i l l i s e
 k i g u s t ā n e k ō l i e h u e d u t t a n s ō r ā i h e k u t t ā b o l l ā d ā t g i r g i r ā
 k a r d u t t a n k i c h ū i p a j ā k a r h e t h ū g ā w ō j i s w a k t b e t h i h ō g g i
 u s b a s e t t ā g u s t ā n ā u t h ā k a i l e k a r b h ā g j a n y y ō. B i l l i l e
 g u s t ā n ā o r b h a d r ō d k e r a s t i l a m b i h ō g a i p i c c h e p i c c h e k u t t ā ā
 r i ā b h ā j ā h u v ā k u t t ā b i l l i s e b ō l l ā t ā g u s t ā n ā l e l ū ā e y ā n ā i
 b i l i k e m ū m e g u s t ā n ā t ā u s s e b o l l i t ō g e ā n ā i u s n e k a i d i ā
 h ū h ū p a m m e t i r r u e t ō k u t t a l u b b a k k a r k y ā b o a k k e t ō

batā naī to mārddīgā . Billī gir kar kyā bōllī k lē k mujē bulāyā tō lē gustānā ē parā he jalme. Yē dōnnō larkē kē pās āgāē Billī bōllī mai gustānā mū mē lē rai thī kuttā kyā bolla kyā tū dikkhā dē naī mai dubō dū hū muj sē bollā nē geā jab bollī to jal me gir geā. Yī keh acchā jāō tumārī bas kī bāt kōī naī he ab larḱa fēr kachuē kō vād karā kachuā calā ā rahā jhāddōn jhāddōn mē kachuā uskē pas āvā rē kachuē tumārē samundar mē gustānā gir geā he. Gustāne kō liē huē wō kānī macchī apanī ākht dharō huō fattar kī jaṛ mē parī thī kachuā bollyā larkē sē jawhar hamārā or gustānā tumārā. Kachuā jal mē dūdtā firē kachuē kī nigāh us kannī machī kī ākh par camak gaī kachuā bollā kī lābō bhōt dēr kā sōbhā bogeā tumārī āk kā laō gustānē kō deddō yō kyā ketā firē he. Mērī āk kā sōbhā letā firē he wō wā sē bhajan lagī kachuā lē gustānā larkē kē pās āgēā or dē kār ih calā geā. Laḱkā khā pīkar apanā makkān dhūndne kō jō jāwē tō dekkē khyā k us sahar kā rājā au uski strī parē sō raē thē Wō duttan bī wā ī sō rai thī—kyā bollā k jhā sē makkān cal kar āyā thā whāī cal kar lag jā makkān jhā sē geā thā whā ī ā kar lag geā. Larḱā jā kār dekkhā kī dōnnō kē palang dhōrē dhōrē parē huē or majēsē nī parē sō rai haī or duttan bī wā ī he, bulā cār caprā-sīyō kū caure maidān mē us rājākū or us duttan kū garwā diā. Apnē hāt sē ī un dōnnō kō tīrō sē khūb cōk diā or apanē mahāl me tēr āgēā Larḱā kyā bollā mhārī mātṭā kyā to mar gaī hōgī kyū tō hōggī calō ghar ku calō. Ab ēk kām kariē k mu tō sikār kheltā aūgā tū makkān kē samnē utar kar unke pāw lag liē awjō kuc gālī guptā deggī tī gillā kuc mat manīē fir kar apanē makkān par ā baithī. Sunnē makkān ā lagō utar kē makkān sē apnē sāsū kē jū pāw lagī usnē picḥāṇā naī or bollī us din mērā larkā ā jāgā us din mērē ākh ap sāb khuljāgī. Mērā larkā khā sē ā jāgā larkā bī sikār khēl kar āgiā bollā sāsū kē pāw lagī naī. Sāsū kē pā tō me lagī par gālī mērē kō bhōt dhukāī. Larḱā bollā Rām Rām hāth ferā tō ākh khul gai pakkar ke hath le kar k apnē makkān me lē kar k bethī to pahle dōnnō ma bette the ab ek aur a lagi unke lūraf

APPENDIX B

Standard Words and Sentences used in the Speech

NOTE.—The English words and phrases I have taken
from the Linguistic Survey List

English		English	
One	ēk	His	wiskā
Two	dō	Thev	wai and wō
Three	tīn	Of them	unai, unē, wine
Four	cār	Their	unkā, winkā
Five	pāc	Hand	hāt
Six	chai	Foot	per, pā
Seven	sāt	Nose	nāk
Eight	āth	Eye	ākḥ
Nine	naw	Mouth	mū, mo
Ten	das	Tooth	dāt, dāntō
Twenty	his	Ear	kān
Fifty	picās	Hair	bāl
Hundred	saw	Head	sar
I	mē	Tongue	jībḥ
Of me	mujkñ, mujē	Belly	pēt
Mine	mērā, mērē	Back	kamar
We	ham	Iron	lōhvā, lōyā
Of us	hamkō	Gold	sonnā
Our	mbāiā	Silver	chānddī
Of thee	tērā, tujhē	Father	bāp, bābhā
Thine	tērā	Mother	mā, bhābī
You	tum	Brother	bhaiā, bhāi
Of you	tumc tūme	Sister	bhennā, bahān
Your	thārā	Man	yādmī, admī
He	wō	Woman	lōgnī baiyū
Of him	uska, wiska		banī ōrat

English

Wife	gharse ba ı
Child	bāṛak, laūddā
Son	larkā
Daughter	larkī, lōdiā, bertī
Slave	gulām
Cultivator	kisānā, haljōtt
Shepherd	baldhiā
God	parmessar
Devil	
Sun	sūraj
Moon	cāḍ
Star	tārā
Fire	āg
Water	pāṇī
House	ghar
Horse	ghōṛā, ghōddā
Cow	gā
Dog	kuttā
Cat	billi
Duck	battā
Ass	gadhā
Camel	ūnt
Bird	ciriyā
Early morning	pôphattē tarkā
Go	jā
Eat	khā
Sit	beth
Come	āō
Beat	pīṭaṇā, mārṇā
Stand	kharyā, kharā
Die	marnā
Give	denā, dēna
Run	dōrnā, bāgnā, bhāj
Up	uppar

English

Near	dhōrā, tarfā, kñ
Down	niccē
Far	dūr
Before	pēstar
Behind	picchē pichāri
Who	kaon
What	kyñ
Why	keyō, kyū
And	or, or, e
But	par, aur, balak
If	jō, manō, jad
Yes	jī, hā
No	nā
Alas	
A father	bāp
Of a father	bāpp kā
To a father	bapp kō, ka. etc
From a father	bapp sē
Two fathers	dō bap pō
Fathers	bāp, bappō
Of fathers	bappō kā
A daughter	lōddiyā, bēttī
Of a daughter	bettī kā
To a daughter	bettī kō
Two daughters	dō lōddiyē
Daughters	lōnddiyē
Of daughters	londdiyō kā
To daughters	londdiyō kō
From daughters	londdiyō sē
A good man	bhalā yādmī
Of good man	ēk bhalā yādmī kā
To good man	ēk bhalā yādmī kō
From good man	ēk bhalā yādmī sē
Two good men	dō bhalē yādmī

English

Good men	bhale yadmī
Of good men	bhalē yadmīyō kā
To good men	bhalē yadmīyō kō
A good woman	bhalī ādman
A bad boy	setān lōnddā
Good woman	bhalī orat
Good	acchā, cōkkhā
Better	ghanā, baut, acchae, chokkhā
Best	bhōtī acchā
High	ūcā
Higher	tan aur ūcā
Highest	ghanā, bhaut ūcā
A horse	ghōrā, ghōddā
A mare	ghōḍī
Horses	ghōddē
Mares	ghōḍī
A bull	bijār
A cow	gā
Bulls	baḍadō
A dog	kuttā
A bitch	kutiā
Dogs	kuttē
Bitches	kutiyā
A he-goat	bakarā
A she-goat	bakarī
Goats	bakarē and bakariyō
A male deer	hiran
A female deer	harnī, hiranī
Deer	hiran
I am	me hū
Thou art	tū he
He is	wō he
We are	ham haī
You are	ham ho

English

They are	wai hē
I was	me thā
Thou wast	tū thā
He was	wō thā
We were	ham thē
You were	tum thē
They were	wai thē
Be	hōṇā, hōnnā
To be	
Being	
Having been	hō cukyā
I may be	me hō sakū hū
I shall be	me hūgā
Beat	mārṇā
To beat	pitanē kō
Beating	mār rayā
Having beaten	mār pīt kē, ankyā
I beat	me mārū hū
Thou beatest	tū māre he
He beats	wō māre he
We beat	ham māre hē
You beat	tum mārō hō
They beat	wai mārē hē
I beat (past)	menē mār्या
Thou beatest (past)	tū nē mārā
He beat (past)	us nē mār्या
We beat (past)	ham nē mār्या
You beat (past)	tum nē mār्या
They beat (past)	unō nē mār्या
I am beating	mai mār reā hū
I was beating	mār reā thā
I had beaten	mārā, mār्या thā
I may beat	mār bethū
I shall beat	mārīgā

English

Thou wilt beat	mārēgā
He will beat	marē gā
We shall beat	ham marē gē
You will beat	tum mārō gē
They will beat	wai mārē gē
I shloud beat } I am beaten }	mai pitya
I was beaten	mai pityā, muje mārā
I shall be beaten	me pitū gā
I go	me jāū hū
Thou goest	tū jāwē he
He goes	wō jāwe he
We go	ham jāwē hē
You go	tum jāō hō
They go	we jāwaī he
I went	mai giā
Thou wentest	tū geā
He went	wō geā
We went	ham gaē
You went	tum gaē
They went	wē gaē
Go	jāō
Going	jā riā ū
Gone	geā
What is your name ?	tenē kyā kaē hē? terā nām kyā?
How is this horse ?	yō ghōddā kaissē he ?
How far is it from here to Kashmeer ?	hēssē kasmere katekdūr ai ?
How many sons are there in your father's house ?	thārē bāp kē kai beittē hē ?
I have walked a long way to-day.	āj mē ghañī dūr calyā ū.
The son of my uncle is married to his sister	māhārē cācā kē lōddē kā byā uski bahan se hawa he

English

In the house is the saddle of the white horse.	dhawlē ghōrē kī katthī is ghar mē dharī he.
Put the saddle upon his back.	uskī kamar p katthī kas dō.
I have beaten his son with many stripes.	me nē uskē lōddē kē kaī capat lagāē.
He is grazing cattle on the top of the hill.	pahār pe dangar cugā riā he.
He is sitting on a horse under that tree.	pēd kē niceē ghōddē pa charḥ- yā khadā he.
His brother is taller than his sister.	uskā bhaiyā uskī bhēn nā sē lambā he.
The price of that is two rupees and a half.	uskī kīmmat dhāī rūpe he
My father lives in that small house.	mhārā bāp us chottē sē makkān me raē he.
Beat him well and bind him with a rope.	use khūb mārō ḥr rassī sē bānddō ḥr nejjū sē bānddō.
Draw water from the well.	kuē sē pāṇī bhallā.
Walk before me.	mērē āggē cal.
Whose boy comes behind you?	tumārē picchē kiskā larkā āe riā ā?
From whom did you buy that?	tum nē kis pai sē liā?
From a shop-keeper of the village.	gām kē bāṇniē se.



APPENDIX C

Some of the Typical Local Words

Words	English meaning	No	Words.	English meaning.
Nejjū ..	Rope	26	Dhāk ...	Ridge
Baldhūē .	Shepherd	27	Kankiunqalī	Small finger
Jēwṛā .	Collar string	28	Asab	Work
Baiyar bānnī	Women .	29	Gērñā ...	To drop down
Bhēr .	Trouble .	30	Lārñā; ghāl dō	Put in
Kallar	A forlorn piece of ground .	31	Labāñā	Calf
Singḡī or gus- tāñā	Ring and signet	32	Katrī ..	Young one of a buffalo
būjh ..	enquire	33	Rār ..	Quarrel
Matta ...	Big ant .	34	Razanī ..	Churning handle
Luptī .	Small ant .	35	Urhlā-dhikanī	Pour the water
Duhāl pītanā	Make an an- nouncement	36	Arbī .	A vegetable
Bicālā .	In the middle	37	Ganthī ...	Onion
Ambar	Sky	38	Dharī	Five seers
oūp ...	Flour ..	39	Muhassē .	Winter
Bhadrōd ...	Gutter	40	Istēsan	Station
Rahābatāū ..	Traveller .	41	Nāl, Tūē, and Tūr.	These are terms of weaving
Mōth, dhān nakka ..	Kinds of grains	42	Hatthā, kūc .	These are terms of weaving
Nalwā dē .	To clear the field	43	Bhūrā, Bhūddā	Sandy earth
dhōrē ṇōne	Near	44	Kassī ...	Small spade
Dellā ...	Sons .	45	Hālī .	A ploughman
Soran gurtī	Beeds of gold ..	46	Rōspattī ...	Paths in a garden
Tagmarnī ...	Put into prison	47	Attārī ...	Roof
Majl ...	Stage in a journey	48	Upāpnā ...	Dig out
Mōh nē ...	Door ..	49	Manjhī ...	A crude sort of receptacle to carry the wet clay.
Parē	Aside	50	Phāwīā	Spade

SECTION III

PHILOSOPHY

THE PUZZLES OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

BY

A. C. MUKERJI,

Reader in Philosophy

The doctrine that the Self the existence of which none can seriously doubt is yet essentially unknowable through the ordinary avenues of knowledge is as old as the Upanishads. The puzzle was started by Yājñavalkya, the distinguished teacher of the early 'Vedānta' absolutism, in his famous dialogues with Maitreyī and Gargi. That through which everything is known, he urged, cannot itself be made an object of knowledge, none can know the knower (*yenedam sarvam vijānāti tam kena vijāniyāt vijñātāramare kena vijāniyāt*—Bṛih Up., 2. 4. 14, 3. 8. 11). The puzzle has remained ingrained in the Vedānta philosophy of a later age, and has found in Shankara one of its most powerful exponents. In the history of western thought, a strikingly similar doctrine has been the upshot of Kant's critical analysis of knowledge. Kant's relentless criticism of rational psychology for its erroneous application of the categories to the transcendental ego brought out the puzzle of self-knowledge in a manner which is strongly reminiscent of the thoughts of Yājñavalkya and Shankara. As nothing can be an object of knowledge without the application of the categories, and as the self is the source of all the categories of knowledge, reason is committed to an awkward pass in its attempt to know the knower which, therefore, can best be represented by the X

This peculiar agnosticism has naturally elicited vehement criticism, both in the East and the West; yet there seems to be a remarkably smooth passage of thought from the premises to the agnostic conclusion. From the admission that the self is the ultimate presupposition of everything known and knowable, that it is the universal centre to which all that can be known as existing has a necessary reference, it seems to follow naturally that the transcendental ego cannot be an object of knowledge except through a process of logical decentralisation which places the ego somewhere on the periphery. Indeed, those who have accepted the premises and yet denied the conclusion appear to have been influenced more by a sentimental horror of agnosticism rather than by the logical cogency of the arguments, the result being that while the logic of the situation tends towards some sort of agnosticism in respect of the nature of the self, this agnosticism itself is made the basis of the logical inadequacy of the initial analysis. In other words, it is first assumed by the critics that the self cannot be a featureless X, and then various methods are devised to reconcile this assumption with their respective theories of knowledge, and, as a consequence, the reconciliation becomes more or less strained and artificial according as the theory of knowledge is more or less precise and true.

The truth of these observations will be verified in due course. In the meantime, we may suggest that there is an important element of truth in the contention that the self, when rightly seen in the light of its place in knowledge, points beyond itself as a definable entity; hence some sort of agnosticism must be a necessary accompaniment of every theory of self that can successfully avoid the confusion of the self as the knowing subject with one of the objects which the self knows. This fatal confusion, according to Kant and Shankara, is *natural*, it is a transcendental illusion as the former names it or an *adhyasa* as put

by the latter. And if it can be shown that every theory that repudiates the alleged mystery of self-consciousness and defends the knowability of the self has done so only by confusing either consciously or unconsciously, the transcendental ego with one of the objects of knowledge, it will at least help us to appreciate the difficulties which, according to Kant and Shankara are present in the problem of self-knowledge. The Pure Ego, the innermost subject, however, should be for this purpose, carefully distinguished from those objects with which it is generally confused, namely, the body, the mind, the sense-organs, etc., which may be called, following the Indian tradition, the 'kosas' or, following James Ward's terminology, the objective zones. When, on the other hand, the distinction is overlooked or repudiated, we get either epiphenomenalism, or behaviourism or any other disguised form of materialism which may make its appearance in the history of thought due to the ruling conception of the age. Or, again, the confusion may lead to the theory of spiritual or mental atoms. In either case, the position of the ego remains unaltered in so far as the subject is identified with an object.

Now, confining ourselves to the history of Western philosophy, the difficulties in self-knowledge have been challenged from two different directions. Some have altogether rejected the Kantian distinction between the self as subject and the self as a substance. And having once identified the self with the brain or the nervous system, or the mind they have no difficulty in showing that the self has nothing mysterious about it. On the other hand, those who accept the Kantian distinction as true have been equally led to doubt the existence of an insoluble difficulty in the way of self-knowledge. The self, they urge, is like the light which illumines itself as well as the objects it knows. We may call the former attitude as predominantly

psychological as it looks upon knowledge as a relation between two entities one of which is called the self. The latter attitude, on the other hand, is predominantly epistemological in so far as it refuses to reduce the self in knowledge to one of the things known. Despite this internal incompatibility between these two attitudes, however, they have presented a united front to the agnostic theory of self. If, however, it comes to be true that there is a necessary relation between the assertion that the self is the transcendental condition of all objects of knowledge, and that the self cannot be known through the ordinary avenues of knowledge, then a theory which refuses to see any inexplicable mystery in self-knowledge must do so by an unconscious identification of the transcendental ego with one of the objects or things.

I—THE PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES

The initial assumption of the psychological approaches to the problem of knowledge in general and that of self in particular, as we have urged elsewhere, (Review of Philosophy and Religion, Vol. II No. 2) consists in regarding knowledge as a relation between two things one of which is the self that knows. When the psychologist, for example, describes the elements involved in knowledge as the self that knows, the object that is known and the act of knowing what he fails to notice is the relation in which he himself stands to the total situation. Yet, regarded from the epistemological stand-point, the latter relation is of infinitely more importance for a right analysis of knowledge than the former. When A knows B, and I seek to know or understand the actual nature of the events or elements involved in A-knows-B, I have necessarily to regard the knowledge situation as a definite object of thought but this would have been impossible if A knows-B

had not conformed to the conditions of objectivity. Yet by virtue of what may be called a sort of transcendental blindness, some of our most gifted thinkers end their analysis of knowledge with A-knows-B, and thus fail to see that the ultimate transcendental conditions of knowledge are not adequately brought out till it is realised that even the knowledge situation which is the object of their enquiry can only exist for a self.

This, of course, does not mean that A cannot know B except in so far as P knows AB (P standing for the analyst). That would be the natural consequence of that extreme type of idealism which we have frequently repudiated. An object exists for the self we have always maintained, in the sense that we cannot think of an object except in so far as it exists for a self, and as this existence-for-self is the ultimate condition of all objects, whatever does not conform to this supreme condition is as good as nothing for us. Hence, when P analyses A B, it is indispensable for a right understanding of the knowledge situation that the psychologist should not drop himself out of sight. The relation of A to B has in this sense, for its presupposition, the relation of P to A B. When, however, this latter relation is totally ignored the gate is opened to the wildest theories of knowledge all of which owe their plausibility to the initial suppression of the most ultimate relation involved in knowledge. The inductive method of ascertaining what is involved in the knowledge situation by reference to the discoveries of experimental and comparative psychology has therefore, to be abandoned in favour of the transcendental method which seeks to bring to explicit consciousness the implicit implications of knowledge. It may be a fascinating study to enquire how the lower animals and the infants, for example, come to "know" the maze or the food, and then define knowledge behaviouristically as a conditioned reflex but

this does not materially help us to understand how the animals, the infants, the maze or the food come to exist for the self that knows them. And if it comes to be true that all these facts exist for a self in virtue of the principles of unity and causality substance and reciprocity which enter into all objects of knowledge, then, the appeal to comparative psychology for understanding the origin and nature of these transcendental principles of knowledge would be evidently as absurd as to use Green's example, the Geologist's appeal to the series of past events for accounting for the present conformation of the earth while assuming the present conformation to be a determining element in each of the past events.

When, therefore, the inductive method leads to the translation of knowledge into terms other than itself, or when it points towards such conclusions as that "no mental occurrence has, in its own intrinsic nature, that sort of relational character that was implied in the opposition of subject and object, or of knower and known"¹ the only effective means of realising the absurdity of the false method is to enquire how far the relation of the self for which the psychological and the physiological facts exist to the world of facts can itself be adequately described in terms of one particular type of relation that obtains among those facts, or, again in terms of something which is supposed to be non-relational. It will then appear as indubitable that the rats and the chimpanzees, quite as much as the physiological facts about glands and muscles can exist only for a self-conscious subject as it is generally conceived, i.e. for a subject which distinguishes one fact from another and at the same time relates these different facts in certain definite ways. And regarded in this light, the acutest sophist cannot deny that the primal stuff of which 'consciousness' is supposed to be a function or the

¹ B. Russell *An Outline of Philosophy* p. 225

mental events that are supposed to occur in brains and cause a particular type of reaction called knowledge, can exist for him only in so far as he is able to exercise the functions of unification and differentiation and thus is himself *conscious of*, or *knows*, the primal stuff and the mental events. He must at least agree that the term consciousness or knowledge cannot be used in the same sense in both the contexts. When he knows that 'knowledge' is a reaction caused by the mental events occurring in brains, his own knowledge cannot itself be identified with this reaction which he differentiates from other types of reaction and relation. It is this ambiguity in the term knowledge or consciousness which lends plausibility to his attempts to trace knowledge to something other than itself.

All talks about the origin of consciousness are then bound to be futile, once we cease to play fast and loose with the concepts of knowledge or consciousness, and realise clearly that the subject-object relation is not an inter-objective relation, on the contrary, it is the ultimate presupposition of every type of relation obtaining between one object and another. In other words, the self as the subject of knowledge is not one thing among other things, it is rather the presupposition of all knowledge of things and their relations. Similarly, knowledge is not one type of reaction or response which the environment elicits from a particular thing, on the contrary, it is the medium through and within which alone the reactions and responses have their meaning.

Empirical Account of Self-Consciousness Ignores the Real Problem.

The very first point, therefore, which should be made clear once for all is that the puzzles of self-consciousness have nothing to do with any empirical treatment of the self which avowedly regards it as one thing among other

things and fails to distinguish the subject of knowledge from the mind or the empirical ego. A psychologist, for instance, may be thoroughly justified in ignoring the real crux of self-consciousness and content himself with tracing the development of mind through a number of distinguishable stages in the life-history of an individual. And then we may be told how the apprehension of the self, at the perceptual level, is extremely vague owing to the absence of clear distinction between the external and the internal, the process of attending and the object attended to, the self as the feeling, willing and thinking thing and the material world as something to which these internal processes are directed. We may be further told how the ideal apprehension of the self is conditioned by the development of trains of ideas and constructive processes arising from practical motives incidental to intersubjective intercourse. Kant need have no quarrel with these psychological descriptions of the stages through which the individual comes to be aware of himself as one self-conscious being among others. But all these psychological descriptions of the growth of the structure of the mind or of the evolution of the empirical self-consciousness leave aside the problem of knowing that which is the ultimate presupposition of all knowledge, in other words, the psychological accounts of the development of self-consciousness have a meaning only in so far as the self is regarded as one object among other objects which go to constitute the world. But to identify this empirical ego that develops in time with that which is the ultimate source of the constitutive and regulative principles through which alone the world including the developing self exists for us, is just that transcendental illusion which is inseparable from the psychological attitude.

To know the actual processes through which the individual passes in his knowledge of the world is to know

nothing of the conditions which make those processes actual events co-existing and following other events. It makes no difference whether I am investigating the material world with its electrons and energy, or the mental world with its attention, imagination, feeling and volition. As events actually existing in time both the worlds are on the same footing. And if the physical sciences do not pretend to solve the problems of epistemology, it will be equally absurd for psychology to solve the real questions of knowledge. In other words, the special investigations into 'Nature' do not solve the problem of the possibility of 'Nature'. Or, again, in the words of an eminent contemporary psychologist, a special science like psychology "cannot explain how it is possible that an individual can consciously mean or intend something. To say that he has a present modification of consciousness which resembles an object is very far from being the same thing as saying that he has a thought of this object—that he means or intends it. . . . As psychologists, we deal not with the ultimate possibility of will and thought, but only with their mode of occurrence as time-processes taking place in the individual mind"²

If, then, we do not confuse the psychological analysis of self-consciousness with the epistemological, it will be realized that Kant's position and his remark on the 'inconvenience' cannot be met simply by closing our eyes to the real difficulties. "Some psychologists," remarks Prof. W. McDougall, "make a great mystery of 'consciousness of self.' But whatever mystery is involved in thinking of oneself is the mystery of thinking in general, of consciousness or awareness of anything. The mystery of self-consciousness is not a new and additional mystery. We have seen that our belief in things of all kinds, in

² Prof G F Stout *A Manual of Psychology Fourth Edition*
p 654

continuously existing self-identical realities, is founded upon our experiences of striving, of effort, of putting forth power or energy in the pursuit of our goals. One thinks of oneself as that which knows and strives, enjoys and suffers, remembers and expects"³ This is certainly true, but it is true only from the limited stand-point of psychology which, like other sciences, cannot dispense with assumptions. For psychology there is no mystery in the awareness of anything including the awareness of self, not because the fact of knowledge is in reality simple but because the psychologist does not think it necessary for his science to raise certain questions about knowledge which are nonetheless very important for a right understanding of the apparently simple fact of awareness. The law of gravitation, for instance, may be completely ignored in accounting for the fall of an apple which is apparently a simple fact of daily occurrence, but no one will on that account regard Newton's labour as purely gratuitous. It is, therefore, imperative that in giving a psychological analysis of knowledge one should be clearly conscious of its limitations, and in this regard the value of the warning of such psychologists as Stout and Ward cannot be over-estimated. The nature of these limitations may be easily seen from the Kantian analysis as Kant was the first in modern times to raise the problem of the nature of awareness and of the conditions of its possibility.⁴ "If we disregard," says Prof. N. K. Smith, in indicating the contrast of Kant's analysis of consciousness to the previous theories, "his antiquated terminology, and state his position in current terms, we find that it amounts to the assertion that *consciousness is in all cases awareness of meaning* . . . And inasmuch as meaning is a highly complex object of apprehension, awareness cannot be regarded as

³ *An Outline of Psychology* Third Edition p 426

⁴ Prof N K Smith *A Commentary* p

ultimate or as unanalysable ⁵ From the Kantian standpoint, which is the stand-point of epistemology, all awareness, to quote Mr. Smith once more, "no matter how rudimentary or apparently simple, is an act of judgment, and therefore involves the relational categories. Not passive contemplation but active judgment, not mere conception but inferential interpretation, is the fundamental form, and the only form, in which our consciousness exists" ⁶

When, therefore, we realise clearly that awareness is an act of judgment and involves the relational categories, and that except in terms of the categories nothing exists for us, we can easily understand the hollowness of such remarks as that Kant's theory of transcendentalism is just the theory of "Substantialism grown shame-faced, and the Ego only a 'cheap and nasty' edition of the soul,"⁷ or that Kant's logical Ego is but a "chimæra buzzing in a vacuum and feeding on second intentions" ⁸ These remarks all arise from ignoring the truth that without a synthesising subject there can be no object, whether this object be matter or mind, sensation or volition, man or God. Every object is a determinate something standing in definite relations to other things, and thus presupposing a relating principle. In other words, we can make no intelligible assertion about anything except by relating it, spatially, temporally or causally, with other things; and consequently all knowledge, irrespective of the nature of the objects known, implies a synthesising subject which therefore does not admit of being known as an object. Whether mind be conceived as static or dynamic, whether it be a continuum of physico-chemical processes in the brain or a peculiar type

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. xli.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. xli.

⁷ *The Principles of Psychology*, I, p. 365

⁸ James Ward *Naturalism and Agnos* II p 189

of response to the environment arising out of conditioned reflexes, whether, finally, it is described as a flux of sensations cohering in a complex stream which under abnormal conditions are split up into a number of collateral streams or described simply as a cross-section of the universe—there is one peculiarity which must be admitted to belong to it under all circumstances, namely, that it is something determinate and so has a number of determinate relations with other things. It follows from this that for a creature that does not identify and differentiate, that, in other words, does not apply the categories, the mind like any other objects must remain unknown and unknowable. So much in fact is implicitly accepted even by those psychologists who explicitly reject the theory of the Pure Ego. When W. James tells us that “the position of a point is not only revealed, but created, by the existences of other points to which it stands in determinate *relations*,”⁹ he is hardly conscious of the profound truth he has unwittingly tumbled upon about the basic principle of objective knowledge, namely, that mutual determination is the very life-blood of knowledge. If James had only universalised his insight into the nature of a point, he would have easily seen the necessity of rewriting his entire chapter on the self and self-consciousness. Similarly, when we are told by our eminent psychologists that ideal construction enters into our knowledge of space, time, material world or the self, and that the motive for such ideal constructions is to be found in “the endeavour to clear experience from incoherence, contradiction, and ambiguity”¹⁰ and “to apprehend the world as a single coherent whole,”¹¹ they come

⁹ *The Principles of Psychology*, II, p. 158. Italics in the original

¹⁰ Prof. G. F. Stout, *Manual of Psychology*, Fourth Edition, p. 561.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 442

perilously near the truth that the determining subject cannot be entirely identical with the determined objects including the mind which is the subject-matter of psychology. This truth, strange as it may appear to be, is indirectly suggested by Prof McDougall himself when, notwithstanding his professed blindness to the difficulties of self-consciousness, he goes so far as to say that "the structure of the mind is a conceptual system that we have to build up by inference from the data of the two orders, facts of behaviour and facts of introspection."¹² All these admissions, we venture to think, go to confirm the view that the mind has to be constructed out of given data, and as every construction implies data as well as interpretation or the mediating activity of thought, the mind exists only for a unifying or synthesising principle which on that very account is not one of the determined objects.

The Universal Aspect of Consciousness.

The point we have tried to press so far may be further elucidated by reference to the admirably lucid exposition by Prof Smith of Kant's objective unity of apperception. "Though man's natural existence," it is urged, "is that of an animal organism, he can have consciousness of the spatial world out of which his organism has arisen, and of the wider periods within which his transitory existence falls. Ultimately such consciousness would seem to connect man cognitively with reality as a whole. Now it is to this universal or absolutist aspect of our consciousness, to its transcendence of the embodied and separate self, that Kant is seeking to do justice in his transcendental deductions, especially in his doctrine of the transcendental unity of apperception."¹³ The distinction between the transcendental self and the empirical self, it is maintained further,

¹² *Outline of Psychology*, p 42.

¹³ *Loc cit* p 270

remains whatever explanation may be adopted of its speculative or other significance. Now, it is well known that the conversion of this universal attitude of the self into one universal self, in the opinion of many accomplished thinkers of our time, is purely arbitrary. It has even been called the "radical error" of post-Kantian idealism.¹⁴ Going further still, it has been questioned whether it can be called a self at all, for "the logical analysis of knowledge" it is held, "yields us no more than the Kantian unity of apperception, which, as such, is no real self (whether human or divine) but simply the ideal unity of systematised knowledge. . . . But to treat the postulate of knowledge as itself a real being—the so-called universal consciousness—is in effect to hypostatise an abstraction."¹⁵ It is unnecessary for our present purpose to raise the problem of human personality as distinct from the divine. It is, however, significant that Prof. A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, notwithstanding his insistence on the distinction of the *real* from the *logical* presuppositions of knowledge or experience, holds that "the subject cannot be presented in experience as an object,"¹⁶ and, notwithstanding his protest against the reduction of personalities into mere 'peepholes,' admits that "in one aspect of my existence, I am universal, seeing that I distinguish my individual existence from that of other beings, while embracing both within a common world."¹⁷

These admissions, we say, are significant because if it be conceded that the subject cannot be presented as an object, and if it be further granted that "we may truly speak of the categories as realised in nature" or that "nature is laid out, as we may say, according to these

¹⁴ Prof. A. Seth, *Hegelianism and Personality*, p. 226

¹⁵ *The Idea of God*, p. 427.

¹⁶ *Hegelianism and Personality*, p. 21.

¹⁷ *Loc. cit.* p. 225

conceptions²⁸ then it seems to follow that the so-called real self must either be within nature and consequently the categories are as much realised in it as in any other object, and in that case it is no more the subject, or the real self must ultimately reduce itself to a thing-in-itself, and, as such, unknowable. It is true that existence is one thing and knowledge is another, but it is only one side of the truth. Because it seems to be equally true that existence has no meaning for us except as known or knowable, that is, except, in the last resort, as revealed through the relational categories. And the subject, therefore, which is the source of the categories is beyond relational consciousness altogether. The subject, in other words, is beyond relational categories and, as such, unthinkable through the categories, though it is the indispensable basis of all knowledge—this is one of the strictly logical consequences following from the rejection of the transcendental illusion. In other words, between transcendental illusion which turns the subject into an object and the theory of a noumenal subject beyond relational consciousness, there is no third alternative, and it may be shown that all attempts at striking a *via media* have been, as they are bound to be, unsuccessful.

We must, however, gratefully accept Prof Pringle-Pattison's contention that the post-Kantian conversion of the subject into an Eternal Spiritual Principle is not wholly satisfactory. The misleading associations of the term spirit as distinct from matter do not leave us even when this Principle is carefully raised above all distinctions of finite knowledge or is conceived as transcending, though not obliterating, these distinctions. Our knowledge is necessarily discursive, and hence to call the subject a spiritual principle is to attribute a predicate to that

²⁸ *Loc cit* p 132

which is presupposed by all predications. The distinctions between spirit and matter, sensation and idea, real and unreal, good and bad, have meanings only *within* knowledge, and all of them consequently presuppose a synthesising subject for which they exist, and which therefore cannot be characterised by means of these predicates. We should not, however, anticipate what will have to be pressed later on again, when we come to examine the epistemological theories of the self.

Self as Beyond the Category of Unity.

What need be admitted even in the present context is the truth that the unity of apperception or the synthesising subject is nothing like a divine spark or a heaven-born entity. If it be so logical analysis of knowledge at least gives no clue to such discoveries. But it is indispensable for logical thinking to recognise clearly that without this ultimate unity there can be no knowledge of objects in general and of mind in particular, and consequently this unity must be carefully distinguished from what is generally called mind. And it is significant that Kant took particular care to warn his readers against confusing the pure unity of apperception with even the category of unity¹⁹. The category of unity is, of course, the highest concept under which we must think of the world of objects. But this unity of the object would be impossible without the unity of the unifying subject. When we talk of this pure unity, it is rightly pointed out by Caird who, however, has his own quarrel with Kant, "we are no longer dealing with an object to which we can apply the principles that enable us to explain and connect objects of experience . . . If, therefore, we seek to determine the self which is the subject of knowledge we must recognise that we are going beyond

¹⁹ *The Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by J. M. D. Meiklejohn p. 80. *Watson's Selections* p. 64.

experience, and dealing with something which, though implied in the objects of experience, cannot be related to them as they are to each other, or determined as an object in the same way in which *they* are determined—through principles which bring their manifold to a unity” Because that would be to put “into the objective world, as one object among others, that in virtue of which, and in relation to which alone there is any knowable object or world of objects at all”²⁰

Yet, the tendency to put the self that knows, Caird points out further, into the world known, “and relate it to that world as one object to another” is a natural illusion. Kant’s name for this illusion is paralogism which is committed as often as we forget that “it is the ‘determinable’ self and not the ‘determining’ self which can alone be known as an object, and the former escapes knowledge just because it is the unity in relation to which all objects are known”²¹. Here, we are in sight of the real problem of self-consciousness. The transcendental unity or the epistemological subject, strictly interpreted, reduces itself to a mere formal unity which is different even from the category of unity and which is devoid of any positive attributes. It tells us ‘not how we appear, not how we inwardly are, but only *that* we are’. Or, as Prof. A. Seth Pringle-Pattison rightly urges, the self as a principle of unity is merely “the ideal focus into which the system of relations is reflected, the empty form of the ego or consciousness in general, the dot upon the *i*, which the theory of knowledge exacts”²². This is the logical consequence of the refusal to think of the subject as an object or to apply the relational categories to the source of all categories. The difficulty does not make itself felt so long as the subject

²⁰ *The Critical Philosophy*, II, p. 25

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 27

²² *The Idea of God* p. 199

is identified with a thing among other things and confused with either the body or the mind. So James Ward, in an admirable chapter of his monumental work, points out that if we begin with self "represented by concentric objective zones, sensory, ideational, personal, spiritual" we at last end with a *focus imaginarius*, which, though "suggested by the structure of experience, is not only devoid of all 'content' in fact, but is necessarily so devoid from its very nature as limiting concept—like its analogue the point, that which has position but neither parts nor magnitude. This concept of the Pure Ego, or I, in other words is the limit to which the empirical Ego points"²³ What then, asks Ward, "can be the meaning of talking of a 'pure subject' to whom it is all presented?"

James Ward on Self-Consciousness.

Ward himself admits that his own answer to this question, though psychologically simple, may fail far "of being speculatively adequate" And it has been urged by Prof G. F. Stout that "as an account of the development of the self and of self-consciousness, Ward's work is here admirable and ought to be carefully studied by every psychologist. But considered as an attempt to meet his own theoretical problem of how the pure ego, as such, can be known at all, it seems to me to be a brilliant failure"²⁴ For, how can the pure ego "be known at all, seeing that in becoming known, it must become an object and so cease to be pure subject?" Even an indirect knowledge of the pure ego is impossible, because "the pure ego is supposed to be initially invisible," and it follows logically that we can know, either directly or indirectly, "only its presentational doubles" which are not the pure ego but only "presentational wrappings which mask and disguise it"

²³ *Psychological Principles*. p. 377.

²⁴ *The Monist* Vol XXXVI 1926 p 47

Into the empty form of consciousness says Ward "our being fits"²⁵ But how can it be *known* to fit if all that is known is the empty form, the positive content not being known but merely experienced"²⁶

We need not examine the alternative method, suggested by Stout, of "giving up" the conception of the pure ego altogether, and substituting in its place the unity of a complex whole, partly because we have already sufficiently exposed the fallacy of confusing the subject with the mind, and, we believe that nothing less than this confusion is involved in identifying the unity of the self, considered as the ultimate presupposition of experience, with "the unity of the total complex of its experiences"²⁷ But apart from the question of the tenability of his positive doctrine, his statement of the problem of self-consciousness, we think, is as clear as it can possibly be. And if our previous contentions be correct, then the pure ego, notwithstanding the difficulties which it leads to, is the inexpugnable postulate of all knowledge and experience

Despite the difficulties, however, Ward's account of the pure ego has a unique importance. Because, it seems, that of all the contemporary thinkers who have approached the study of mind exclusively from the stand-point of psychology, he has the merit of keeping his eyes wide open to the perplexities which beset the psychological approach and of offering solutions in so far as such solutions are possible at all within the limitations of a special science. As a psychologist he has, for instance, to present a scientific account of the nature and growth of individual experience, and this commits him to treat the subject of experience as

²⁵ *Principles of Psychology*, p. 381

²⁶ *Loc. cit.*, p. 50.

²⁷ Prof. Stout, *Some Fundamental Points in the Theory of Knowledge* p. 6

one object or thing among other things, much as a physicist or a biologist treats the materials of his investigation connecting them in multifarious directions in space and time. And as a biologist, in interpreting his data, has to take the help of a different order of categories from that which the physicist employs, owing to the special nature of his subject-matter, so Ward too, as a psychologist, has to bring into his service a number of notions peculiar to his subject-matter and expose the insufficiency of mere physical and chemical analogies in interpreting the growth of individual experience. Nevertheless, he is not blind to the difficulties of such a procedure which he seeks to surmount by forcing Kant to tell a psychological tale. Thus while repudiating all attempts to bring the subject-object relation under any other subordinate relation, he continues to view it as analogous to the relation between an organism and its environment, and interaction is explicitly stated to be the most salient feature of the subject-object relation. We need not repeat here what has already been said in this respect²⁶. Ward, as we have contended there, has failed to do justice to his speculative insight owing to a strong biological predilection. When, however, he comes to deal directly with the nature of the pure ego and the possibility of self-consciousness, he makes a desperate attempt to rise above his prepossessions. The subject, then, is no more described as a thing distinguished from other things by the capacity to feel, act and attend in relation to a sensori-motor continuum. On the contrary, it reduces itself to a limiting concept to which the empirical ego points, an empty form, a *focus imaginarius*.

Thus Ward's exposition of self-consciousness suffers from a vacillating attitude which seems to arise from his

²⁶ Vide *The Allahabad University Studies*, Vol. VII, Arts Section

attempt to reconcile the best teachings of epistemology with the findings of psychology. But the epistemological and the psychological attitudes are as distant from each other as the north pole from the south pole, and the result is that his analysis has failed to satisfy the psychologist as much as the epistemologist. Bradley, for example, has some very serious observations on Ward's position which go to the root of the matter. The puzzles of consciousness and self-consciousness, we are told, are due to "the internal difficulties of the relation and its terms, and then again in the fact of the relation itself"²⁹. The difficulties, according to Bradley, arise in the following way: "We have an object, a something given, and it is given to the subject. Is the subject given? No, for, if so, it would itself be an object. We seem, then, to have one term and a relation without a second term. But can there be a relation with one term? No; this appears to be self-contradictory, and, if we assert it, we must justify and defend our paradox. But, again, can a term be known only as a term of a relation or relations, while it is not, in any respect, known otherwise? No, once more; this is impossible, and in the end unmeaning. Terms are never constituted entirely by a relation or relations. But, once more, can we have a relation, one term of which is contained in the experienced and the other not? No, for a term, which is not in some sense experienced, seems nothing at all."³⁰

It is probably under the force of these searching criticisms that Ward had to distinguish between experience and knowledge. The pure ego, he says, though first in the order of existence is, yet, last in the order of knowledge. But this knowledge is not, as he is careful to explain, knowledge in the sense in which it implies an object

²⁹ *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 195

³⁰ *Ibid* p. 102

Experience is wider than knowledge in the strict sense and the pure ego, though within experience, cannot be known as an object. But the difficulty, we believe, cannot be met in this way, and Ward seems to win an easy victory over his critic, by pushing back the problem. For, the question remains how, if experience always involves a subject-object relation, it is possible to experience the subject without turning it into an object. There can be no experience without a subject—this is the corner-stone of Ward's analysis of experience, and it follows from this that the subject to be experienced must have another subject, and so on *ad infinitum*.

The fact is that these difficulties are insurmountable as long as the subject-object relation is regarded as a relation between two things, and Ward in spite of his insistence on the unique nature of this ultimate relation, has the tendency, sometimes too clear to be ignored, to represent it as analogous to any other relation *within* knowledge. And so far as he does so, the remarks of such competent critics as Stout and Bradley will remain unchallengeable. On the other hand, when his attitude advances from the psychological to the epistemological plane—and this, be it remembered, he can only do by forgetting the results of his previous analysis—his position is unassailable. The pure subject, he then urges, is not to be confused with the concentric objective zones, such as the sensory, the ideational, the personal or the spiritual ego. The latter, as Prof. Stout aptly describes them, are but presentational wrappings which mask and disguise the pure ego. As every presentation implies a subject to which it is presented, all attempts to grasp the subject as a presentation will necessarily end in giving us, not the pure ego, but only its presentational misnomer, and it matters little in the long run whether the presentation be the so-called bodily self the ideational self or the spiritual self.

II—THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL THEORIES

The psychological theories of self which all agree in conceiving it to be one thing among other things and in refusing to distinguish between the subject of knowledge and what is generally called mind were found, on examination, to have obscured the knowledge situation owing to their failure to recognise clearly and consistently that knowledge is the medium through which all that is real must reveal itself, and that knowledge, in the strict sense, implies interpretation according to certain ultimate principles which on that very account are principles of existence as well. The most fundamental of these principles, we have maintained, is a synthesising or interpreting subject which being the source of all the fundamental concepts imbedded in the objects of knowledge cannot itself be an object. The psychological theories, in ignoring this important truth have been under the influence of a sort of error which may be called, after Kant, a transcendental illusion. This illusion we have seen to have its origin in the difficulty of overcoming our inveterate habit of conceiving the subject-object relation on the analogy of inter-objective relations, and thus forgetting that every relation between one object and another must necessarily imply their relation to a subject, and hence the latter relation is not on the same footing as the former. Under the influence of this habit the subject has inevitably come to be conceived as a thing and knowledge as an attribute.

As we now pass on to the consideration of the epistemological theories, we may begin by concentrating on the fundamental agreement between their contentions and those which we have so far tried to justify. It is well known that the post-Kantian idealists, whatever be their differences from Kant in other respects are at one with him in

recognising the important distinction between the self as an ultimate unity presupposed in all knowledge and the self as one of the objects of knowledge. In other words, the psychological approach to the problem of self and other allied problems of knowledge have been always condemned as unsatisfactory by those who are generally known as the neo-Kantians or the neo-Hegelians owing to the varying degrees of similarity between their contentions and those of Kant and Hegel. The most significant of the contentions which bind them to Kant and Hegel, however, is, at least in so far as our present purpose is concerned, that the subject is not a substance and that knowledge is not a quality. And if our previous contentions be correct, then the epistemological theories represent so far a distinct advance upon the psychological theories of self, and the theories of knowledge which have not lost sight of this basic truth must consequently be much more adequate than any theory which consciously or unconsciously identifies the subject with substance. If, however, this similarity is significant, equally significant are the disparity which exists between Kant and the post-Kantian idealists, and which has led to a partial modification of the Kantian account of self and to a more or less emphatic rejection of the puzzles of self-consciousness as formulated by Kant.

The Logical See-Saw.

We have already ventured the suggestion that there is perhaps no *via media* between the theory of ego as lying beyond relational experience and consequently defying all ordinary knowledge, and the theory which, either overtly or covertly, considers the ego on the analogy of a thing and thus commutes the transcendental illusion. In other words, the recognition of a noumenal supra-relational ego is forced upon us in proportion to the success with which we are able to remove the transcendental illusion from our account

of the knowledge situation and hence there can be no third alternative theory in addition to that which accepts the noumenal ego and that which regards the ego in knowledge as a particular substance. It now remains to see how far the post-Kantian idealists have succeeded in steering clear of these alternatives, and, in fact, the epistemological theories do claim to offer a third alternative. For, if they seek to avoid, on the one hand, the mistake of identifying the subject of knowledge with a particular mind or the empirical ego, they are equally anxious to repudiate the grounds which landed Kant in an inextricable quandary regarding the possibility of self-consciousness. It is true that a reality beyond the spatio-temporal world forms almost the bed-rock of the idealistic speculations after Kant and Hegel, and this reality is reached generally through an analysis of the function of the ego in knowledge. But, it is denied with more or less definiteness of emphasis that this ego is such as to preclude the possibility of knowledge. The ego, it is held, far from being unknowable, is the knowable *par excellence*, though it is not one object among others. This position, however, as we shall see presently, has been held by different thinkers with unequal emphasis on the two points both of which are equally important for its successful exposition. As a result, some have laid a greater stress on the difference between the ego and the world of things, and have proportionately sacrificed the force of the second point, namely, that the ego is knowable. Those, on the other hand, who have accentuated the knowability of the ego have come perilously near conceiving it on the analogy of things that are constituents of the world of knowledge. This uncomfortable tendency to invest one of the two vital points with logical cogency by proportionately weakening the strength of the other is clearly noticeable in the development of post-Kantian idealism and for a detailed justification of this contention

we must now turn to some of the chief representatives of this valuable school of thought

Green on Self.

The logical see-saw which has been described above as arising from the attempt to hold together the theory of a knowable ego with the distinction of the self as subject from the self as a substance may be traced back to Green with whom practically begins that masterly treatment of knowledge which has been the source of inspiration for a number of subsequent thinkers of the idealistic school. It will be needless to enter with any detail into his theory of knowledge to which we had had already a number of occasions to refer in confirmation of our own contentions. In insisting on the impossibility of subsuming the subject of knowledge under those formal conceptions of which it is the source, in repudiating the notion of knowledge as a quality of a particular substance, in showing the self-refutation of every attempt to represent knowledge in terms of something other than itself,—he has laid the foundation of an epistemological analysis which may truly be called the prolegomena to every system of sound metaphysics. It is, however, when he comes to deal specifically with the nature of the self or the principle of union that is presupposed in all knowledge that his guidance becomes unsteady, though, even here, it does not altogether fail us.

It has become a commonplace with Green's students that the knowledge as well as the existence of Nature, according to his analysis, presuppose a unity of consciousness which is the source of those conceptions through which the world of facts exists. This consciousness or principle of unity is the ultimate condition which alone explains the possibility of that mutual relation or determination without which knowledge of objects would be unrealised and

unrealisable For that very reason however the ultimate principle of unity cannot be one of the related facts If it is agreed that knowledge "consists in the establishment of relations between data of sensibility," then, he tells us, it can be ascertained by reflective analysis that "the existence of a knowable nature implies that of a principle of union which is not itself part of the knowable nature, not one or any number of the relations which constitute it, an unconditioned, in relation to which alone the mutual conditioning of phenomena is possible, a consciousness of laws of nature, or rather a principle of consciousness which, in relation to sensibility, yields laws of nature which is not itself subject to those laws of nature"³¹ Similarly, it is urged in another context that "the really prolific element" in Kant's theory of knowledge is the view of the noumenon "which he calls the ego, as the source of the categories" and which on that account cannot be brought under the categories³² Locke's contradictions, Green points out elsewhere, are due to his "avowed enterprise of knowing that which renders knowledge possible as he might know any other object"³³ What Locke fails to see in this connection is that every "interrogator of the individual consciousness seeks to know that consciousness, and just for that reason must find in it at every stage those formal conceptions, such as substance and cause, without which there can be no object of knowledge at all. . . . He cannot state anything that he knows save in terms which imply that substance and relation are in the things known. . . . If nature is the object, he must find them in nature; if his own self-consciousness, he must find them in that consciousness"³⁴ Hence the principle of unity which is the source

³¹ Works, II, p 90.

³² *Ibid.*, III, p 127.

³³ Works, I, p 109.

³⁴ *Ibid* p 27

of the conceptions of substance and cause and which is implied in the interrogator's attempt to know "the individual consciousness" cannot be itself one of the conditioned things of the knowable nature

Green's conclusions about this ultimate principle of unity are stated in a far clearer language in a well-known section of the *Prolegomena*. "That there is such a consciousness," he tells us "is implied in the existence of the world, but *what* it is we only know through its so far acting in us as to enable us, however partially and interruptedly, to have knowledge of a world or an intelligent experience." Green is here evidently thinking of his Spiritual Principle but as he holds with a number of eminent idealists that ours is "a limited mode" of "the world-consciousness" his remarks hold good equally of what is generally called the human consciousness in that aspect of it in which it is the principle of unity presupposed in all knowledge. As he himself points out, the self-distinguishing consciousness which is the condition of nature "is one which, on however limited a scale, we ourselves exercise in the acquisition of experience and exercise only by means of such a consciousness."³⁵ This, according to Green is all that we are entitled to say positively about that something which is the ultimate condition of nature. "We are further entitled to say of it, negatively," he remarks significantly, "that the relations by which, through its action, phenomena are determined are not relations *of* it—not relations by which *it is itself* determined. They arise out of its presence to phenomena or the presence of phenomena to it, but the very condition of their thus arising is that the unifying consciousness which constitutes them should not itself be one of the objects so related."

³⁵ *Prolegomena*, p. 58

³⁶ *Ibid.* p. 59

Green's Critics

Such passages can be infinitely multiplied from Green's works to show that he was fully alive to the logical consequence of his analysis of knowledge. The subject-object relation, if properly grasped, must inevitably lead to the conception of a noumenal ego which itself is but a limiting concept without a positive content. This Ego, in the words of James Ward, is "the limit to which the empirical Ego points"³⁷ but in itself is a mere "*focus imaginarius*," that cannot be known in the same way as we know an object. Indeed, the impossibility of knowing the Ego is precluded by Green's entire analysis of knowledge, and this has been repeatedly pointed out by his critics. The Ego, here, reduces itself to "the bare geometrical point," as Mr. Balfour puts it,³⁸ or "the ideal focus," as Mr. Pringle-Pattison aptly describes it.³⁹ The critics, however, have generally considered this to be the weakest point in Green's position, and from this they have, rather hastily, inferred the fallacious character of "any argument from the conditions of knowledge to the theorem of an All-Thinker and of the universe as the system of his thought" "What difference does it make," asks Mr. Pringle-Pattison, "whether we regard nature as existing *per se*, or insist that all her processes are registered in a mind, if that mind is nothing but such a register or impartial reflection of the facts?"⁴⁰ The answer, we believe, is not far to seek, provided we remember Green's premises. A philosophical conclusion is different from a mere unmediated belief

³⁷ *Psychological Principles*, p. 377

³⁸ *Mind*, Vol. IX, p. 89

³⁹ *The Idea of God*, p. 199, cf. also *Hegelianism and Personality*, p. 28

⁴⁰ *Ib id* p. 200

Beliefs may be generated in a number of ways they may be, in the words of Francis Bacon, *idola tribus fori, specus, theatri*; and so, as it has been more recently contended, "pure insight and logic, whatever they might do ideally, are not the only things that really do produce our creeds"⁴¹ Yet, no belief which is not rationally justifiable is entitled to the name of a philosophical creed To ignore this distinction between an unmediated and a mediated belief is to fall into that suicidal scepticism which was first propounded by the great sophists and has been revived in our time by the pragmatists who would expect us to accept the pragmatic theory as providing the only *absolute* standard of truth. On the other hand, when the absurdity of the pragmatist theory of truth claiming an absolute validity is realised it will be clear that a philosophical creed must ultimately produce its logical credentials

In fact, however, these contentions are not denied by Mr. Pringle-Pattison who agrees that the ultimate principles of knowledge, such as "the principle of intellectual coherence," "we must and do accept as absolute," for, it is "a necessity of reason involved in the possibility of knowing anything—involved therefore in all practical living as well as in the immovable belief in law and order which inspires all scientific investigation"⁴² But if so much is granted, then, we cannot condemn "the direct argument from the conditions of knowledge" as yielding only nugatory conclusions. For, the principle of intellectual coherence is as much the result of the "direct argument" as the ego which is the principle of unity presupposed in "the possibility of knowing anything" Now, whether this ego should be called an empty form or

⁴¹ W. James. *The Will to Believe* p 11

⁴² *Loc cit* p 239

not depends upon the extent to which we have succeeded in avoiding the confusion of the principle of unity involved in all knowledge with one of the knowable objects, or, what is the same thing in a different language, the confusion of the subject-object relation with an inter-objective relation. We need not repeat the arguments which Green brings forward against such confusions. To those who are of his way of thinking, he says, "all knowing and all that is known, all intelligence and intelligible reality, indifferently consist in a relation between subject and object"⁴³. Hence, the subject cannot be known in the same way as the object, though it is the inexpugnable basis of all knowledge, and all intelligible reality. This, far from being a defect in his theory of knowledge is, when properly understood, an indication of the thoroughness with which he pursued his analysis to its legitimate conclusion.

Influence of Hegel on Green.

Though, however, we reach this agnostic conclusion about the nature of the ego under Green's guidance, yet, as we have remarked above, he does not always keep steadfastly to this result of his own arguments, and then, probably under the influence of the Hegelian atmosphere which came to establish itself at Oxford at that time, he did not hesitate to characterise what ought to be a mere empty form according to his own analysis as a spiritual self-conscious being of which all that is real is the activity or expression. "The subject in virtue of the act, the object in virtue of the manifestation, are alike and in strict correlativity so far determined." Now, such language may be interpreted in two different senses, and the wrong

⁴³ Works I p 386

sense has a better chance of acceptance because it is in accord with our habitual ways of thinking. It may mean that is, that the subject is real in the same sense as any knowable object may ever be, and that it is known as such a reality. This, however, would be in direct contradiction to his repeated assertions that the subject cannot be known in the same way as the object, that it cannot be brought under the conceptions of cause, substance and other categories through which the objects exist, that all intelligible reality indifferently consists in a relation between subject and object. If we follow his argument here, then even the spiritual reality, in so far as it is an intelligible reality, must presuppose the subject-object relation, and so must fall on the side of the object. And the correlativity which is said to exist between the subject and the object must be also carefully distinguished from the correlativity that may exist between one object and another. Yet, Green's language has the tendency to suggest that the spiritual principle and its correlativity are not essentially different from the things and the relations which constitute the objective world. Thus, while insisting in different contexts that the ultimate principle of union is "an unconditioned," and, as such, different from "any number of the relations which constitute" the knowable nature, he urges at the same time that the correlativity of subject and object is such that "every determination of the one implies a corresponding determination of the other." That is, while there are passages in which the ultimate principle is rightly taken to be unconditioned, and underminable, there are others where it is thought to be determinable and so far conditioned.

The fact seems to be that this oscillation on the part of Green arose out of his attempt to give a positive content to what his own impartial analysis of knowledge tended

to show to be a mere empty form. The principle of union, or the "principle of consciousness," the existence of which is discovered through "reflective analysis" has none of those determinations which make the objects knowable, and so to characterise that principle further as spiritual, or as being in necessary relation to the world of objects, is to state more than the reflective analysis warrants. The law of contradiction, for instance, is ascertained through a reflective analysis of the actual process of thinking, and in so far as it is implied in every assertion it may rightly be called an eternal principle of thinking. But this does not help us to determine the nature of that which is the presupposition of the reflective analysis itself. As Green has put it himself, the formal conceptions are found in every object of knowledge—"If nature is the object, he must find them in nature; if his own self-consciousness, he must find them in that consciousness." And consequently, these formal conceptions through which nature as well as self-consciousness exist cannot be applied to the subject for which they exist as objects. Green's critics, therefore, we believe, are essentially right when they protest against the metaphysical transformation of Kant's transcendental ego into an Absolute Spirit. It was reserved for Kant's successors, W. James tells us, "to convert Kant's notion of *Bewusstsein überhaupt*, or abstract consciousness, into one infinite concrete self-consciousness which is the soul of the world and in which our sundry personal self-consciousnesses have their being"⁴⁴. But, in the words of Prof. A. Seth, "it must be in the highest degree improper to convert consciousness in general without more ado into a universal consciousness." We can

⁴⁴ *Variety of Religious Experience*, p. 449.

have absolutely no right to transform the logical identity of type into a numerical identity of existence''⁴⁵

When, however, we follow the general trend of his thought without emphasising the conflicting modes in which it is expressed. Green appears, on the whole, to value the distinction between the self as a subject and the self as a substance, together with its logical corollary that the self cannot be known, more than the theory of a knowable Absolute or an Eternal Spiritual Principle, though he is generally known as one of the absolutists whose chief task is to expound and justify the reality of a Universal Consciousness. And it is true that the bulk of his philosophical discourses is occupied with the theory of an Eternal Spiritual Principle which is the basis of his ethical and political conclusions, yet, this Spiritual Principle, according to his own express view is not knowable except in the negative sense that it is not one of the objects that constitute nature. That this negative aspect of the doctrine is more predominant in Green's philosophy than what he says positively is also apparent from the criticism which it has evoked even from E. Caird regarding whose relation to Green it has been remarked: "Seldom have there been in the history of philosophy two men who so entirely entered into each other's mind and so entirely understood each other."⁴⁶ We pass on, then, to the masterly analysis of self-consciousness by E. Caird who is by common consent looked upon as the most reliable exponent of English Neo-Hegelianism.

Caird's Aversion to Agnosticism.

E. Caird's views on self and self-consciousness have a unique importance for the obvious reason that he is not only one of the most accredited exponents of post-Kantian

⁴⁵ *Hegelianism and Personality*, p. 32.

⁴⁶ Prof. Muirhead, *Life and Philosophy of Edward Caird*, p. 131

idealism and consequently of the epistemological theory of self, but his strenuous effort to present the Kantian philosophy in a systematic form brought him into a more intimate touch with the different aspects and tendencies of Kant's thought than could be expected of any critic who would concentrate more or less on a limited portion of the Critical Philosophy. Caird's views represent the logical see-saw from the other side. That is, while Green's analysis of knowledge brought into prominence the agnostic side of the epistemological theory of self by its frequent insistence on the difference between subject and mind, Caird is compelled by the logic of the situation to throw this distinction into the background on account of his strong repugnance to any philosophical tenet that smacks of agnosticism. He would fain accept the distinction between the self as a noumenal condition of experience and the self as an empirical ego existing and developing in time, provided, and so long as, the noumenal ego is not raised above all the conditions of knowledge and experience as we discover them by an actual analysis. Thus, when pious feeling exaggerates "the division between divine and human, and even fears to admit the possibility of the intelligence of man apprehending in any sense the nature of God," Caird would remind us that in that case "religion would be an impossibility"⁴⁷ It is no wonder, therefore, that he will assume an uncompromisable attitude to a theory of self which tends to suggest the impossibility of knowing it from the human standpoint. Hence his sustained polemic against Kant's statement of the puzzles of self-consciousness. And as his own views can be best appreciated through his criticism of Kant, we should begin with what he says against the alternative theory rather than his own positive opinions.

⁴⁷ Hegel p 140

His Criticism of Kant

Caird's criticism of Kant's idea of self-consciousness is succinctly stated in a well-known passage of his small book on Hegel. Admitting the essential correctness of Kant's contention that the unity of the ego is presupposed in all knowledge, he complains that Kant's account of it is curious, for, "when we look at the matter more closely, it would seem that Kant is here himself guilty of a curious paralogism, in attacking what is our very highest type of knowledge, and rejecting it because it does not conform to his own preconceived ideas"⁴⁶ Though Kant's own analysis proves that "every object of knowledge, as such, involves a relation to a subject; in other words, that it is *not* a simple identity, but involves difference, and unity in difference," yet, his "mind was secretly possessed with the preconception that the one thing *entirely* intelligible is a pure abstract identity which has no division or difference in it" But when we get rid of this preconception it would appear that self-consciousness is no simple unity or identity, "for if so, it must be purely an object or purely a subject, but really it is both in one, all other things are *for it*, but it is *for itself*" Regarded in this light self-consciousness is our highest type of knowledge, or knowable *par excellence*, "inasmuch as in it the object, which is distinguished from the subject, is, at the same time, most perfectly coalescent with it" That is, as knowledge is the relation of an object to a conscious subject, "it is the more complete, the more intimate the relation, and it becomes perfect when the duality becomes transparent, when subject and object are identified, and when the duality is seen to be simply the necessary expression of the unity,—in short, when consciousness passes into self-consciousness"

⁴⁶ Hegel, p. 147.

Self-consciousness is the standing enigma for those who would separate identity and difference.⁴⁹ When on the contrary, it is seen that "the self exists as one self only as it opposes itself as object, to itself as subject, and immediately denies and transcends that opposition," when, that is, it is seen to be "a concrete unity, which has in itself a resolved contradiction," there will be no difficulty in understanding that "its own existence is implicitly the solution of all the division and conflict of things."

This, briefly stated, is Caird's theory of self-consciousness which he develops by a criticism of Kant from the standpoint of Hegel, and which, according to him, is the only theory that can successfully overcome the perplexities relating to the possibility of knowing the source of all knowledge. The self, according to this view, is described as a "dual unity," a "restored unity," an "organic unity"; or again as a "pure transparent identity-in-difference." The truth that all these descriptions are meant to bring out is that self-consciousness is a mediated consciousness, it is a consciousness which presupposes the consciousness of the objects, and so cannot be realised except in relation to the latter. Hence, it is further urged, the development of the consciousness of objects and the development of self-consciousness proceed strictly *pari passu*, and every defect in our knowledge of the world corresponds to a consciousness of disunion in ourselves. It will be out of place to explain with any detail here the further considerations by which Caird is led from the organic nature of the development of self-consciousness to the idea of a "perfect intelligence" or a "spiritual principle" of which the world is the self-manifestation⁵⁰; or, as he puts it in another context, "time and space, the world of objects so related,

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, p. 149.

⁵⁰ *Critical Philosophy*, I. p. 425.

cannot be adequately understood unless we regard it as essentially related to a conscious self, and as a necessary element in its self-consciousness - or, in other words, unless we regard the world in space and time as essentially the manifestation of a spiritual principle,"⁵¹ which, again, "shows its unity with itself just in the process of change"⁵²

Ambiguity in the Term Self-Consciousness.

The question that is all-important for our present purpose is whether the explanation of what may be called mediated self-consciousness does really solve the puzzles of self-consciousness as formulated by those who have admitted them to be inseparable from our necessarily discursive knowledge. That is, granting that mediated self-consciousness is a restored unity, is a return of the self upon itself, do the conditions of this mediated self-consciousness remove the puzzles as they are seen by those who distinguish between this type of self-consciousness and that self which is the ultimate principle of all knowledge and experience. The answer will clearly depend upon the meaning of self. If the self can be shown to be real only in so far as it returns upon itself, then, of course, there is no room for any serious difficulty in accounting for self-consciousness. The self in this sense may well be called a dual unity, or a unity in duality; and it may perhaps also be said with some amount of truth that it is in the return of the self upon itself that "the ego, strictly speaking, comes into existence," and that "only that being is truly to be called an 'I' which calls *itself* so."⁵³ But can we identify this self with the ultimate unity presupposed in experience? As an account of the development of self-consciousness from

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 654.

⁵² *Ibid.*, II. p. 89.

⁵³ *Critical Philosophy* I p. 403

the stage of an "undifferentiated unity" to that of a "dual unity," this idealistic theory may be true. But can it identify the developing self with the subject without committing itself to a view of the self which is pre-Kantian? Evidently, all talks of development and growth are intelligible only in respect of a thing which is in time, and is subject to the categories through which alone any object exists for us. And it follows from this that the self that develops from consciousness to self-consciousness must be under those very conditions of space, time and categories which are the conditions of objectivity. This self, therefore, cannot be the subject in the true sense of the term.

This distinction between the developing self and the subject is, in fact, accentuated by Caird in different contexts. Mind, he tells us, has a twofold aspect, because it is "not merely an object in the known and knowable world, he is also a subject of knowledge, and it is only for such a subject that an object or a world of objects can exist. Hence we may speak of man's knowing himself in two ways: of a knowledge of himself in which he is regarded simply as the self, the thinking subject which is implied in all objects of knowledge and of a knowledge of himself as a human being, distinguished from other human beings from the animals and from nature in general, and standing in definite relations to each of them."⁵⁴ The defect of the "psychological theory of knowledge," it is further declared, consists in this that it "treats the faculty of knowledge merely as an attribute of certain things in the world, by which they are characterised and distinguished from other things, so that, e.g., as weight is the attribute of a stone, thought is the attribute of man." Epistemology, on the contrary, looks upon mind as "presupposed in everything

⁵⁴ *Ibid* p. 11.

known or knowable or in other words in so far as the principles which are involved in the relation of object to a conscious self are the latent presuppositions of all knowledge, the principles through which everything else must be known, and by means of which therefore, every other kind of knowledge must be tried." Hence, it is further pointed out, that as "no object of knowledge is given apart from its relation to the subject," we must avoid the "confusion of the distinction of the subject and the object of knowledge with the distinction of mind and matter as different objects of knowledge."⁵⁵ Now, this line of thought, if properly developed to its consequences, leads necessarily, as we have frequently urged, to an agnostic theory of self, in so far as the self as subject has none of those conditions of objectivity by means of which all objects, including mind itself, can be known. Caird, however, is anxious to save his theory from the agnostic tendency which was prominent in Green's elaboration of the epistemological doctrine of the self. And the result is that he ends by over-emphasising the other extreme of the logical see-saw. That is, starting with the same premises as Green did, yet trying to evade the agnostic conclusion necessarily following from those premises, Caird comes unwittingly to view the subject of knowledge as an object, and so far fails to maintain the epistemological attitude with which he started.

Caird's Device to Avoid the Logical See-saw.

It will no doubt appear as extremely improbable that Caird who opened his famous exposition of the Kantian theory of knowledge with an emphatic rejection of the psychological theory should have come to regard the subject as an object. But, we believe, the greatest thinker cannot help falling into confusions when he attempts to know the

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

ultimate principle of knowledge in the same way as he knows an object; or, what is the same thing from the other side, when he seeks to avoid the agnostic conclusion that follows from the epistemological distinction of subject from mind. In illustration of the confusions into which such a thinker must fall in the long run, we have but to refer to a very significant passage in which Caird makes a desperate attempt to reconcile the epistemological distinction of the self as the ultimate presupposition of all knowledge from every known and knowable object, with his belief that the self is knowable *par excellence*. When we apply the idea of development to a self-conscious being, we cannot, it is maintained, "suppose a difference, such as exists between things as in space and time, to exist in that for which alone time and space are. Yet, on the other hand, in so far as we admit that such a consciousness is gradually developed, we are obliged to regard the subject of it as passing through states in time and standing in relation to objects which externally affect it. Our first solution of the difficulty will naturally be to say that the developing being presupposes the externality which yet it negates, and that it presupposes the successive determination of the subject which yet is a conscious subject only as it cancels succession in itself. But the difficulty returns that, in taking this view, we seem to be making the subject of the consciousness, for which time and space alone are, itself an object in time and space, while yet we regard the process of its existence as one in which both time and space are negated. To put it more directly, a developing consciousness is conceived as passing through a series of stages yet, just so far as its development is *for itself*,—and it cannot be *its* development, strictly speaking, till it is *for itself*.—it neutralises this change." How to get rid of this difficulty? Caird's answer is that "while space and

time and all objects in them exist only for a self-conscious subject and while in so far as I am a conscious self they exist for me, yet that I am a derived self-consciousness, and so far must be regarded as an object, and not as a subject, though it is only as a subject that I am in the proper sense an ego or self,—a being which can say “ I ”⁵⁶

Thus, in his attempt to steer clear of the two extreme positions,—namely (1) the self is one object among others, and (2) the self is not knowable,—Caird, in direct contradiction to his epistemological premises, comes to yield to that transcendental illusion which is inseparable from the psychological attitude, and which he has himself done so much to explode. While rightly insisting that every known and knowable object presupposes a subject for which the object can exist, and which therefore cannot be identified with any object of knowledge except through a confusion, while emphasising the important distinction between the subject of knowledge and mind which is but one of the objects of knowledge standing in definite relations with other objects; while entering an emphatic protest against the widespread illusion to regard the subject as a thing and knowledge as a quality; Caird is compelled to countenance a theory which, when strictly interpreted, cannot be reconciled with his epistemological findings. The conceptions of “ a derived self-consciousness ” and of a subject which may be “ regarded as an object ” cannot be seriously justified without violence to the valuable truth that the subject-object relation is ultimate, and, as such, it is presupposed by every other relation. All distinctions are within knowledge, and so A and B as objects on which we can hold intelligible discourses must both fall within knowledge, irrespective of the nature of the relation obtaining between them. A, for instance, may be either the cause or the

⁵⁶ *Critical Philosophy*, I, p. 648; also II, p. 399

effect the antecedent or the consequent the end or means the substance or attribute in relation to B. But all these multifarious relations which are but the different ways of determining A and B must ultimately fall within the subject-object relation, or, which is the same thing in another language, must fall within knowledge. A subject, therefore, that can be regarded as an object, or a self that is derived from something other than itself, is an entirely inconceivable and self-contradictory notion, whatever may be the ultra-logical grounds on which its claims to a respectful hearing be justified.

Ambiguity in the Term Subject.

On a closer examination, however, it would appear that such inconceivable notions as a derived self-consciousness and an objectified subject are not so much dictated by logical exigencies as by what may be called the gnostic prejudices. If everything which is real must exist for a subject, it will necessarily fall on the objective side. How then to know the subject to be real? We must either say that the subject is only a *focus imaginarius* though it is at the same time the basis of all knowledge, it is the determining principle involved in all knowledge of objects, and hence cannot be itself determined except by giving up the initial position that all objects exist for a subject. The other alternative, which Caird endeavours to defend, is to start with the assumption of the knowability of the subject and then, as nothing can be knowable except by presupposing a subject, to refer to another subject for which the former subject is an object. But, as Bradley has rightly urged, the old difficulty is not solved by this appeal to the new subject, for, even here "the correlated terms are for a subject which itself is not given. The correlation falls in the experience of this new subject, which itself

remains outside that object. And as a matter of fact, even Caird is sometimes forced by the logic of the situation to admit that "the correlativity of the object and subject is a correlativity for the subject,"⁵⁸ and, regarded in this sense, the self "overreaches the distinction between itself and its object."⁵⁹ But, then, the all-important question to put it naively, is—which of the two subjects do you mean to refer to in this context? Does the world of objects stand as a correlative to the new subject for which the object as well as the old subject are mere objects? If not, then, are we to suppose that the correlativity of subject and object exists for the same subject which is one of the co-related terms? It is, we venture to submit impossible to find an unambiguous reply to these questions from Caird's statements. The self, he will tell us, is a subject, a restored unity, an object, a derived self-consciousness, an infinite intelligence, an unconscious unity underlying the correlativity of subject and object, and what not. And it is this ambiguity which helps to conceal the defects of his attempts to reconcile the theory of a knowable ego with the epistemological interpretation of the subject-object relation.

But while the ambiguity persists, it is useless to clear up the situation by means of metaphorical language. There is no doubt a ring of absurdity in the complaint that "it is impossible to see the sun because we cannot throw the rays of a candle upon it," and then point out that "as it is the light which reveals both itself and the darkness, so it is self-consciousness through which we know both itself and all other things."⁶⁰ The force of this

⁵⁷ *Truth and Reality*, p. 193

⁵⁸ *Critical Philosophy*, I, p. 425

⁵⁹ Hegel, p. 182

⁶⁰ Hegel p. 147

remark depends upon the sense in which self-consciousness is used. If it simply means that every object presupposes a subject for which it exists, so that the unity of self which is the ultimate condition of all knowledge of objects cannot be denied, then, no doubt, the remark is not only true but every attempt to assail it is bound to lead ultimately to self-refutation. Caird, however, does not seem to mean only this. The unity, he further tells us, is a unity in difference, or, more precisely, a pure transparent identity-in-difference. In this sense, it is the "ideal unity," or rather, the "last category" which contains and implies all the other categories. That is, self-consciousness, or rather, the self which is the ultimate presupposition of all knowledge of objects is no simple identity, "for if so it must be purely an object or purely a subject, but really it is both in one, all other things are *for* it, but it is *for itself*." If this be the meaning of the self, then, we maintain emphatically that the metaphor quoted above is not true. There is a whole world of difference between the position that the world exists for a self and that the self is neither a mere subject nor a mere object, but both in one.

Unity-in-difference as a Category is not Applicable to the Self.

We must, however, hasten to add that nothing which we have so far said implies a criticism of the category of unity-in-difference. On the contrary, we believe that it is a valuable correction of the bare logic of identity. A thing apart from its relations with other things is incomprehensible and unintelligible, and it is through the relations alone that the things get those mutual determinations which are indispensable for the existence of everything on which we can make intelligible assertions. But this does not show

that the relating or determining principle for which the world of things exists or in relation to which the world has a meaning is itself a unity-in-difference or that it is itself determined by the world of objects. That would be to put the subject side by side with the object which is evidently tantamount to denying that there is a subject at all. And in fact Caird, as we have already remarked, in his anxiety to avoid agnosticism has come perilously near conceiving the subject as an object, and has tried to save his own position from this apparent inconsistency by shifting the role of the subject from the finite to the infinite principle of union for which the finite principle is only an object. This, however, does not solve the real difficulty, it only pushes the real problem further back. Similarly, a number of other inconsistencies in Caird's views on self-consciousness arise from the same source and these are made only less palpable by the ambiguous way in which the term subject is used. Thus, on the one hand, the process of reflexion is said to discover "the categories and the forms of sense beneath ordinary experience, and the unity of the self beneath the categories and the forms of sense"⁶¹, on the other hand, the self is also said to be not so much beneath the categories as itself the highest category of knowledge, and in this sense it is supposed to be "the ultimate meaning or truth" of all other categories⁶². Now if it is admitted that the self is the unity underlying the categories, then it clearly follows that it cannot be itself brought under them, and as nothing can be an object which is incomprehensible through the categories the self, in the absence of the conditions of objectivity, remains incomprehensible. If, on the other hand, the self be the highest category, then, clearly it is not the ulti-

⁶¹ *Critical Philosophy*, II, p. 641.

⁶² Hegel p. 183

mate principle of knowledge: for a category is a mode of interpretation through which the world of objects exists, and, as such, it presupposes a principle beyond itself

Can the Object be a Presupposition of the Subject?

This brings us to another deep-lying inconsistency which runs through every attempt to evade the agnostic conclusion following from the epistemological attitude. The correlativity of subject and object has become almost a commonplace of philosophy since Kant undertook a transcendental deduction of the categories. But the value of this doctrine, like the value of every other commonplace, depends upon a careful interpretation. As nothing can exist which is not realised or realisable within knowledge, and inasmuch as self is the ultimate principle involved in all knowledge, there is an important sense in which the self and the world are in perfect correlativity with each other. Every object in this sense presupposes a subject which is the common centre, as it were, of all the objective zones. When, however, it is added, from the other side, that there can be no subject apart from the object everything depends upon how this is understood. The very first point which has to be borne in mind in this connection is, as we have suggested in relation to Green's position, that the correlativity of subject and object should not be conceived on the analogy of inter-objective correlativity. Two objects, such as father and son, husband and wife, are in correlativity with each other, so that there is a sense in which one cannot exist without its relation to the other. More precisely, as every object receives its determination from the relations in which it stands to other objects, it cannot exist in the absence of the latter. A thing, in other words, owes its being to the relations,—spatial, temporal, causal, etc.—in which it stands to other things, so that to take away all

in contrast with the phenomenon, and, as such, it becomes an object of a different order. But however different may be the order to which a particular object may belong, as an object of thought it must submit to the conditions of objectivity and cannot be taken to be identical with the subject for which alone all objects and all distinctions among objects exist. So when it is said that the subject is beyond the phenomenal world, the truth of the remark is entirely missed if we continue to regard the noumenal subject as a positive something. And from this it follows that no intelligible meaning can be ascribed to such assertions as that the subject cannot exist apart from the object, or that the object is a presupposition of the subject. For such observations have a meaning only on the presupposition that the subject is a determinate something though it may belong to a different order from that under which the things other than the subject fall. But, in that case, as Kant has made it clear once for all, "the logical exposition of thought in general is mistaken for a metaphysical determination of the object." And in so far as the post-Kantian idealists have attempted a metaphysical determination of the subject, the value of Mr. A. Seth's criticism cannot be overestimated. Kant's argument, he remarks, "is overlaid in parts by extraneous considerations, and infected by Kant's relativistic prejudices but in pointing out the merely logical character of the self reached by the analysis of knowledge, he is not only guided by a sounder instinct, but shows also a keener insight than his speculative followers." Then with reference to the passage quoted above it is observed "The words are spoken of the metaphysical psychologists, but it would be impossible to characterise more aptly the fallacy which underlies the Neo-Kantian deification of the abstract unity of thought"⁶³

⁶³ *Hegel's Notion and Personality* p. 38

A Seth on Neo-Kantianism

We are not concerned here with Prof Seth's positive views, but the important observations he has made on the Kantian theory of ego, and on the Neo-Kantian departure from the spirit of the critical philosophy are, we believe, based on a deep insight into the Kantian analysis of knowledge. The transcendental ego of Kant he urges, cannot be identified with the spiritual principle of the post-Kantian idealists, and, in fact, "unless we have other data, and approach the question along a different road, we are still far from anything like spirituality or freedom in the ordinary sense of these words"⁶⁴ "In this respect," it is further remarked, "Kant saw his way more clearly than many of those who make bold to teach him consistency. Kant himself, it is almost superfluous to point out, would have never acquiesced in the deductions which his Neo-Kantian followers have drawn from his premisses." These deductions, in the opinion of Prof Seth, are due to the mistake of transforming a logical subject into a metaphysical existence. The mistake perhaps may be more aptly described, as he himself suggests, as the transformation of the transcendental subject which logical exposition yields into a Universal Spiritual Consciousness by interpreting the subject as an object. The transcendental subject, when strictly taken, is a principle of unity, or a unifying principle, and, as such, no more than a *focus imaginarius* or a limiting concept, whereas the spiritual principle is something very definite, it is a unity-in-difference, or rather a unity which manifests itself in the differences, and is the source of our moral and religious aspirations. Thus the limiting concept of a noumenal subject is metaphysically determined as a definite object

⁶⁴ *Ibid* p 29

of thought This object may not be in space and time, and perhaps it may also be said with some truth that it is not subject to the ordinary categories of causality and substance; yet it is at the same time characterised as spiritual and noumenal in a *positive* sense But if it be granted that every object must exist for a subject with which the former cannot be identified, then, the noumenal object must equally be distinguished from the subject for which it exists. If, on the contrary, this particular object of thought be identified with the subject, there is absolutely no reason why any other object, such as matter and mind, electricity and magnetism, should fall on the objective side only

The fact is, as Green has urged, in the passage already quoted, that the subject-object relation is the "generic element" in our description of the knowable universe, and so the thinking ego is the source of the conceptions in virtue of its presence to objects, "but under which for that very reason it cannot itself be known" And as that to which no conceptions are applicable cannot be an object of thought, the thinking ego eludes the grasp of our discursive knowledge. Yet, it is the basis of all knowledge and knowable universe, and of all distinctions within the knowable universe, be they the distinction of matter and mind or spirit and matter, or phenomenon and noumenon. It may now be easy to see the real meaning of the correlativity of subject and object. The only sense in which this widely accepted doctrine is true is that every knowable thing presupposes a knower, or, more precisely, a unifying principle. But the presupposed principle is not a thing, nor an object of thought, for to make the subject an object of thought would require, as it is commonly said, another subject Hence, all further talks of the subject, such as it is conditioned by the object or it is determined by its

relation to the object or it expresses itself in the world of objects—are unmeaning and unintelligible, as they are inconsistent with the recognition of the ultimate character of the subject-object relation

Caird's Attempt to go Beyond Subject-Object Relation.

It is perhaps necessary to add here that the spiritual principle which Caird in agreement with the absolutists in general has inferred from the correlativity of the subject-object would never have been actually inferred if he had more carefully distinguished this correlativity from what we have called the inter-objective correlativity. But not having always clearly distinguished between these two types of relativity, and having taken the principle of identity-in-difference as the highest principle of thought, he steps beyond the subject-object relation to a "higher unity," or an "unconscious unity" which is supposed to lie "beneath the conscious duality of self and not-self," or, "beyond the opposition of the subjective unity of thought and the objective unity of knowledge." That, here, Caird, contrary to his own teachings, has been led to confuse the subject-object relation with an inter-objective relation, and has unconsciously substituted a thing or object for subject, may be easily seen from his explanation of the idea of spirit. "Thought," it is said, "is always distinction, determination, the marking off of one thing from another", but though in this sense it is true that "a thing which has nothing to distinguish it is unthinkable, but equally unthinkable is a thing which is so separated from all other things as to have no community with them."⁶⁵ "If, therefore, we say that everything—every intelligible object of thought as such—must be differentiated from all others, yet we must equally say that no object of thought can be

⁶⁵ Hegel p 135

absolutely differentiated, in other words, differentiated so as to exclude any identity or unity which transcends the difference." In this sense, "there is a unity which lies beneath all opposition" It is clear from such expressions that Caird is here thinking of things as intelligible objects of thought And consequently the relations and the distinctions he is talking of in this context are inter-objective relations But the difficulty is that he does not restrict these observations to the objects only, and goes on to remark that "neither things nor thoughts can be treated as simply self-identical—as independent or atomic existences, which are related only to themselves. They are essentially parts of a whole, or stages in a process, and as such they carry us beyond themselves, the moment we clearly understand them."⁶⁶

Now, when we speak of thoughts and things as parts of a whole, these parts, as well as the whole must be, according to his own showing, "at least intelligible, since they exist for our intelligence." And it follows from this that the *intelligence* for which the thoughts and the things exist cannot be identified with the *thoughts* which are grasped in distinction from the things. Nor can the whole of which thoughts and things are parts be identified with that intelligence for which it exists as an intelligible entity Caird, however, to the great bewilderment of his readers, speaks of the principle of unity-in-difference indifferently in respect of the subject-object relation as well as inter-objective relations Not only this, but he actually characterises the spiritual unity as one in which "the idea of antagonism is overcome, contradiction reconciled,"⁶⁷ and it is further said to be a unity "which can be realised only through such a conflict." But, then, the question must

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

⁶⁷ *Ibid* p 36

press itself is not this spiritual unity itself at least intelligible," and, as such, existing only "for our intelligence"? To answer the question in the affirmative is to admit that it is an object, and must presuppose, like every other intelligible reality, the subject. A negative answer, on the other hand, would lead ultimately to agnosticism which Caird rejects from the beginning.

Are the Higher Categories Applicable to the Subject.

All these difficulties, we submit, are due to the attempt to apply to the subject the principles which underly our knowledge of the world of objects. Substance, causality, reciprocity quite as much as unity and difference, are categories to which the objects of thought must conform, but, for that very reason, the subject cannot itself be known under them. Caird admits this, but partially. "It was Kant's merit," he says, "that his criticism rested from the first upon the principle, that it is impossible to apply to the subject the categories by which objects are determined as such; . . . and in the second edition of the *Critique*, he made steps toward a view of inner experience, as not merely the consciousness of the self as an object among other objects, but as an outer experience freed from its abstraction, i.e., regarded as the experience of a self"⁶⁸ Having admitted this, however, Caird does not draw the conclusion which we have suggested, namely, that no category should be applied to the subject. The chief defect of psychology, according to him, is to regard man in whom nature comes to itself, or comes to self-consciousness as a phenomenon connected with other phenomena according to the category of causality and reciprocity. But "it is impossible, in truth, to take a conscious self as one of the objects of experience, objects which are conceived as ex-

⁶⁸ *Critical Philosophy* II p 100

ternally determining and determined by each other, without leaving out all its distinctive characters as a conscious being. Even an animal cannot be fully or adequately determined from such a point of view, much less an intelligence. We need higher categories to do justice to life and mind, and if experience means the determination of objects by the principle of external necessity, we cannot have experience of such objects."⁶⁹ Thus, according to Caird, it is impossible to apply to the subject, not any category, but only the categories of external necessity, here we need higher categories. But does this conclusion really follow from Caird's premises? Without challenging the Hegelian gradation of categories, one can perhaps still maintain that the subject for which all objects exist and have their meaning is as little to be identified with life and mind as with matter and energy. Mind may require higher categories for its adequate determination, but the mind which is thus determined, as Caird himself has urged in another context, is not the subject. And a category, howsoever high may be its place in relation to other categories, is only a mode of determining an object of thought, and as such inapplicable to the subject for which all intelligible reality exists. And, in fact, when it is unreservedly admitted that Kant was right in recognising that "the relation of objects to the self cannot be brought under the same categories as those which determine the relation of objects to each other *for* the self,"⁷⁰ it is difficult to see how the case becomes different if, in place of matter and energy, the objects are life and mind.

The fact seems to be that Caird does not invariably and consistently stick to the truth that the subject-object relation is ultimate, though the whole burden of his own analysis of knowledge rests upon its recognition. All that

⁶⁹ *Ibid* p 97

⁷⁰ *Ibid* I p 603

is thinkable or knowable. He rightly insist presupposes the thinking ego. So the world of intelligible reality must presuppose the ego for which it exists, or, in other words, the world is an existence-for-self. But if this be recognised, then the self for which the world has a meaning cannot itself be regarded as forming an element within the world. Yet, the transition from one position to the other is made frequently, as if both the positions were identically the same. Indeed, this transition is almost characteristic of Caird as well as of those who are of his way of thinking. But on a closer examination, it may be seen that from the doctrine that every object must exist for a subject it does not follow that the subject itself must be an object, or what is the same thing in different words, from the truth that the world of objects has no meaning apart from its relation to the subject, it does not follow that the subject must somewhere be in the world. This would be to make the presupposition of the world itself a part of the world. And the position remains essentially unaltered, if we were to substitute for the world in space and time the term universe which includes a number of other worlds than the spatio-temporal world. Because, in that case, even the universe must be supposed to exist for the self, on pain of being reduced to nothing. The self as the subject, as Caird himself tells us, is "presupposed in everything known and knowable," and in so far as the universe is at least knowable, the subject is the presupposition of the universe. However "anomalous" be the position of the subject in such a theory, it is the legitimate conclusion of an unbiassed logical procedure.

Caird on Green.

It is, however, interesting to note that Caird himself appears sometimes to come very near the position we are trying to maintain. Thus for instance in expounding

Green's theory, he tells us approvingly that "if we cannot regard nature as complete in itself apart from a principle of intelligence substantially identical with that which we know in ourselves, then we may fairly argue that man, in so far as such a principle of intelligence manifests itself in him, is not to be reduced to a merely natural existence, a mere part of the natural system. If he were merely a part of it, he could not know it. Or, at least, if we do regard him as a part of nature, we must be using the word 'nature' to express the whole system of related phenomena, *including* the spiritual principle which it implies. And then we must find some other word to express the system of relations *exclusive* of that principle."¹ The legitimate conclusion from such lines of thought is that man, in so far as he knows the universe, cannot be a part of the universe, or, conversely, if he were a part of the universe, he could not know the universe. But the universe *ex hypothesi* includes everything that can be thought of as existing or as real, hence the principle which the universe implies is not to be brought under the categories which are after all the modes of thought through which the universe exists. Caird, however, seeks to avoid this legitimate conclusion, as we have frequently noted, on account of his gnostic prejudices, or aversion to agnosticism. And the result is that though he emphasises that "we must be careful to observe that a being in whom the spiritual principle, which is the principle of unity in the world, manifests itself must not be brought under categories," yet, he hastens to qualify his remark by an unwarrantable restriction to the categories of substance and cause only. This restriction, we have contended, is inconsistent with his own premises, and we need not repeat our contentions. But we can now see the reasons why Caird

¹ *Mind* Vol VIII 1883 p 54~

e of protest when Green with an unprejudiced mind came to countenance a type of modernism in so far as the ultimate principle of ethics as concerned Green, it is complained by some, like Kant, he bids us reason backwards from actual and moral experience to that spiritual principle which lies the possibility at once of knowledge and action, is also like Kant in refusing to say that spiritual nature is in itself." Green, it is right in holding that "the source of the categories be brought under the categories," and this "with great force of argument." But the fact that "he is unwilling to go much further—direction of speculation about the nature of the ultimate principle to which he has referred all positively working out any view of nature and ethics as the manifestation of spirit."⁷²

We have tried to show above, it is not possible that Green has really gone, except on other terms, and in this regard Kant's attitude, we suggest, was more logical than that of his illustrious rival. And Green's insight here is distinctly that of Caird. If the subject-object relation is to be unique, then, it is certainly more proper than Green, that the unifying consciousness itself be one of the objects so related," or that it is a principle of union which is not "one of the relations" that constitute nature, and, with Caird, that the self is "a circle of itself,"⁷³ and, then finding it "absurd to synthesis by which it becomes conscious of itself, at the same time hides it from itself."⁷⁴

SECTION IV

ECONOMICS

THE PRESSURE OF POPULATION IN THE UNITED PROVINCES AND THE PUNJAB

BY

V K NATOO, M.A

I

INTRODUCTION

Few questions before us attract so much attention, as the alleged poverty of our masses, and naturally so, for poverty casts its shadow over almost every phase of our life. Amongst others, one of its main causes often suggested, and sometimes denied, is over-population. It is however a subject, which has to be treated cautiously. In the following pages an attempt is made to study it critically. Its scope is limited to the United Provinces, though the province of the Punjab has been taken up for the sake of comparison. The period of time to which it mainly relates is the decade of 1911—1920. How the various figures were obtained is explained in Appendix A.

II

THE THEORY OF POPULATION

The economic welfare of a people depends, primarily upon two factors, their natural resources, and their industrial efficiency. Under the stimulus of the growth of the population, however, the two factors behave in different ways. The possible supply of natural resources is a fixed quantity, depending upon nature's bounty. If the whole of it has not been already utilised, the actually realised part of the supply of the natural resources will increase with an increase in the size of the population. But when once the limit is reached, and there remains no further supply to draw upon, the increasing pressure exerted by a growing population, will soon call into action the law of diminishing returns.

On the other hand, however, as the population increases, the opportunities for the proper division and co-operation of labour, and the co-operation of labour with capital, also increase, enabling the industrial efficiency of the people to rise and yield increasing returns. The limit when the increasing returns from the industrial efficiency cease, depends upon inventions and improvements in the arts of production. If there is no progress and meanwhile the population continues to increase in size, a time comes when the increasing returns from industrial efficiency cease.

When, therefore, population is very sparse, there is a large supply of natural resources yet to be utilised and the industrial efficiency of labour is also low. As the population increases, for a time, everything is in its favour, the land yields increasing returns, and the industrial efficiency of the people rises fast. In the course

of time when the whole of the possible supply of the natural resources is utilised, the diminishing returns from land will begin to press against the increasing returns from industrial efficiency, with a balance yet in favour of the latter

But, meanwhile, if there is no progress in the arts of production, and the population continues to increase, the two tendencies to increasing and diminishing returns will first balance each other, and then the balance will turn in favour of the diminishing returns

The industrial activities of a people are generally spread over a number of occupations. In some of them the most important factor is land, in others it is not. In the former the law of diminishing returns begins to exert its force much sooner than in the latter. As population increases, it tends to escape from the action of the law of diminishing returns by concentrating more and more upon those industries in which land is a factor of subsidiary importance. If we imagine a country which is wholly self-contained, and has a sufficient food supply, we can get an idea of its prosperity by looking to the proportion of its population engaged in agriculture, an industry typical of those generally yielding diminishing returns. In general the smaller is this proportion, the more prosperous it would be. All the same, if there is no improvement in the arts of production and there is a continued increase in the size of the population, in time, even the latter class of industries will be saturated with labour, and the community will have to face diminishing returns all around.

The gist of the whole is, that given the state of progress in the arts of production, there is an optimum in the size of the population, at which the economic welfare is at its highest. Till the optimum is reached wealth

will increase faster than the population but after the optimum has been passed, the increase in the size of the population must take place at the expense of its standard of living. It is possible that the population might increase so much beyond the optimum that its standard of life falls to a level just sufficient for the physiological minimum necessary for health. Population cannot increase much beyond this level, if it does, it will be taken off by famines, sickness and death.

To the growth of population, therefore, there are two limits, one set by the optimum for production, and the other by the standard of living just sufficient for health. To be complete, an inquiry into the pressure of the population, must take into consideration both these limits. In Chapter III the pressure of population is studied in relation to the standard of living, while in Chapter IV, it is studied in relation to the optimum for production.

As it was extremely difficult to get reliable figures of income for other occupations, the inquiry had to be confined to agriculture only; and this robs it of some of its interest. But in a country in which more than 75 per cent of the population is engaged directly or indirectly in agriculture, there is some justification for studying it in isolation.

III

POPULATION AND THE STANDARD OF LIVING

A rise or fall of population is an important sign, but in itself a clear meaning cannot be attached to it. For a fall might mean either, that already there was over-population with a standard of living below the sufficiency level

which is being remedied, or that there was no over-population in this sense but that the people were moving to a better standard of living. In the same way, an increase of population might mean either, that the standard of living is falling, if the producing powers of the community remain the same, or that the producing powers and the standard of living were both of them rising. It is obvious that to deduce a clear meaning from it, the rise or fall of the density of population must be investigated in the light of their income and the standard of living.

The provinces of the Punjab and the United Provinces are studied separately, each being broken up into units of districts, partly because, it would be incorrect to speak of such big provinces as a whole, and partly to give us varying conditions, so that correlations might be made. It would have been better still, if it were possible to break them up into still smaller units of Tehsils, but unfortunately, separate figures for Tehsils are not available. Only the agricultural production and the agricultural population are taken into account. The districts of Naini Tal, Almora, Garhwal and Dehra Dun in the United Provinces and the district of Simla in the Punjab, had to be excluded, as no detailed statistics were available in their case.

The reasoning upon which the conclusions reached, are based, is given below; but before that a preliminary point should be made clear.


The income per head and the sufficiency level of income, are two distinct but related things. The latter is limited on the one hand by the physiological minimum necessary for health, and on the other, by the people's ideas as to what they can and what they cannot dispense with. On the psychological side however, the sufficiency level depends to some extent upon the total income obtained. When therefore as in the present case we are dealing with

a wide range of incomes the sufficiency level for all of them must be set within pretty wide limits.

When income per head is below the sufficiency level the density of population must tend to fall either through an increased death-rate, or emigration, or both. On the other hand, if the income is above the sufficiency level, the density of the population would tend to rise, either through a reduced death-rate, or a greater immigration, or both. When, however, the income is just at the sufficiency level, the density would tend to remain stationary, for the death-rate and the rate of migration would also tend to remain stationary. If there is any change in density it would be independent of income, and hence at the sufficiency level the correlation between income and changes in density would be zero, or very near it. On either side of the sufficiency level, however, the correlation would be positive, for when income falls below the sufficiency level, the forces set in motion tend to decrease population and bring income back to the sufficiency level, and on the other hand, if the income rises above the sufficiency level, the forces set in motion tend to increase population and drag income back. In short, the population has a tendency to move towards whatever sufficiency level it sets before itself. As, however, the sufficiency level itself has a tendency to move with the income, the positive correlation obtained may not always be very high. It is also tacitly assumed, that population does not tend towards the optimum. But, perhaps, it would move to some extent, and the interference caused by this undercurrent may again prevent us from getting very high correlation. But all the same, the tendency of the population to move towards the sufficiency level should be unmistakably recognisable.

All this is borne out in an interesting way by the figures before us. In the United Provinces the districts


PRESSURE OF POPULATION IN U P. AND PUNJAB



three groups. The first group consists of districts with incomes under Rs 70 per head per annum. The second group consists of all districts with annual incomes of Rs 70 and 90 per head per annum. The third group consists of all districts with incomes above Rs 90 per head per annum. In the first group the coefficient of correlation is +0.43, in the second group it is +0.63, and in the third group it rises to +0.56. In the light of the results shown above, it can be concluded that the first group consists of over-populated districts, with incomes below the carrying capacity level the over population being remedied.


extent during the decade with full of the p
The second group was on the verge of over-p
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is not over-populated, having incomes above
sufficiency level

The map drawn below represents the three group
bles of income are given at the end of the chap




The same sort of thing is seen in the case of the P
The Punjab falls into two groups, the first co
districts with annual incomes of Rs. 90 per h
while the second consists of all the district
es above Rs. 90. In the first group the coeffic
ation is—0.21, while in the second group it is
leave out Lyallpur and Shahpur where immig
controlled

There are not enough districts with very low income to form a third group, though, probably some three districts of the first group are in fact over-populated. But on the whole it may be concluded, that in Punjab, the first group represents districts which are on the verge of over-population, and the second group represents those which are not over-populated, while the third group is over-populated. A map showing the distribution of these districts is drawn below.



The tables of incomes and the list of
 the two groups are given at the
 end



It seems that both in the United Provinces
 the sufficiency level of income may

approximately, between Rs 70 and 90 per head per annum. It would be interesting to compare it with the Jail standard in these provinces, which may be taken to represent the minimum necessary for health. The expenditure on the jail population per head per year, in both the provinces, under the items of diet, hospital, and the bedding and the clothing charges, amounts to about Rs 50. This does not include the cost of vegetables which are supplied free from the jail gardens.

At the first glance, the general standard seems to compare favourably with the Jail standard. But some of the necessary first charges upon the income of the general population must be deducted, as for example, the cost of manure, seed and cattle, the heavy interest paid to money-lenders, rents and taxes, conventional necessities like marriages and other social functions, pseudo-necessities like tobacco or wine, the small amounts extorted by petty officials, and last but not least, litigation. For the essential needs of life these deductions would leave a surplus, scarcely, if at all, larger than that required by the Jail standard. This reveals a very low standard of life, and partly explains the high density of population obtained in the United Provinces. It seems that a higher standard of life would be possible only if the density of population falls. The other way to raise it would of course be better farming by improved methods, which would raise the yield per acre. But both in the United Provinces and the Punjab the tendency of the population to increase with increasing incomes is fairly strong. And it is possible that if the well-meant efforts to increase the standard of agricultural production bear fruit, the rising income would be put to the "population use" rather than to the "standard of living" use. Two things seem necessary to secure a greater economic welfare of the agriculturists.

rise in their psychological standard of living and a fall in the density of agricultural population.

As it is, the conditions are much better in the Punjab than in the United Provinces. In the former about 37 per cent of the districts are either at or below the sufficiency level of incomes, while in the latter the districts at or below the sufficiency level form about 76 per cent of the total.

TABLE I

A Classification of the Districts in the United Provinces

I—Districts with incomes below sufficiency level
(below Rs. 75)

1 Lucknow	4 Unao
2 Rae Bareilly	5 Paraganah
3 Sultanpur	6 Cawnpore

II—Districts with incomes at the sufficiency level
(Rs. 75–100)

1 Allahabad	14 Bareilly
2 Mirzapur	15 Gonda
3 Benares	16 Moradabad
4 Ghazipur	17 Kheri
5 Ballia	18 Mainpuri
6 Azamgarh	19 Shajjahanpur
7 Jhansi	20 Farrukhabad
8 Hamirpur	21 Sitapur
9 Banda	22 Hardoi
10 Cawnpore	23 Fyzabad
11 Fatehpur	24 Barabanki
12 Etah	25 Gorakhpur
13 Etawah	26 Gonda

27 Basti

III—Districts with incomes above the sufficiency level
(above Rs 90)

1 Dehra Dun	6 Meerut
2 Saharanpur	7 Bulandshahr
3 Bijnor	8 Aligarh
4 Pilibhit	9 Muttra
5 Muzaffarnagar	10 Jalaun
11 Bahraich	

TABLE 2

*Changes in the density of population from 1911 to 1921;
and incomes calculated on the basis of the population
in 1911, for the different districts in U P.*

Name	Income	Changes in Density	
	x	y	xy
Dehra Dun	93	— 1	— 93
Saharanpur	151	+ 6	+ 906
Bareilly	86	+ 1	+ 86
Bijnor	116	— 3	— 348
Pilibhit	93	— 3	— 279
Kheri	89	+ 2	+ 178
Muzaffarnagar	154	+ 4	+ 616
Meerut	122	+ 2	+ 244
Bulandshahr	112	+ 1	+ 112
Aligarh	104	0	0
Muttra	112	+ 1	+ 112
Agra	66	— 8	— 462
Mainpuri	82	+ 3	+ 246
Etah	87	+ 1	+ 87
Budaun	83	+ 4	+ 332

Name	Income	Changes in Density	
	x	y	xy
Moradabad	84	+ 2	+ 168
Shahjahanpur	71	- 7	- 497
Farrukhabad	82	+ 1	+ 82
Etawah	73	+ 5	+ 365
Cawnpore	82	+ 6	+ 492
Fatehpur	79	+ 4	+ 316
Allahabad	70	+ 2	+ 140
Lucknow	64	- 3	- 192
Unao	60	- 4	- 240
Rae Bareilly	68	- 1	- 68
Sitapur	77	+ 2	+ 154
Hardoi	75	+ 1	+ 75
Fyzabad	76	- 7	- 532
Sultanpur	64	- 12	- 768
Partabgarh	61	- 1	- 61
Barabanki	77	- 1	- 77
Jhansi	89	0	0
Jalaun	106	+ 8	+ 848
Hamirpur	83	+ 1	+ 83
Banda	77	- 1	- 77
Mirzapur	72	- 5	- 360
Gorakhpur	70	+ 5	+ 350
Basti	75	+ 9	+ 675
Gonda	85	- 5	- 425
Bahraich	94	+ 1	+ 94
Benares	80	+ 10	+ 800
Jaunpore	55	- 27	- 1485
Ghazipur	83	+ 4	+ 332
Ballia	84	+ 10	+ 840
Azamgarh	73	+ 8	+ 584

TABLE 3

Coefficients of correlation for the three groups in United Provinces

I Group (incomes under Rs 70)

$n = 7$	$\frac{\Sigma xy}{n} - xy$	=	+	23'1745
$nx = +438$	σx	=	+	4'04
$ny = -55$	σy	=	+	8'6
$\Sigma xy = -3276$	σxy	=	+	34'744
$x = +62.57$				
$y = -7.85$				
$xy = -491.1745$	r	=	+	667
$\frac{\Sigma xy}{n} = -468$				

II Group (incomes from Rs 70 to Rs. 90)

$n = 27$	$\frac{\Sigma xy}{n}$	=	+	163'6
$nx = +2144$				
$ny = +55$	$\frac{\Sigma xy}{n} - xy$	=	+	1 624
$\Sigma xy = +4417$				
$x = +79.4$	σx	=	+	5.71
$y = +2.04$	σy	=	+	4.5
$xy = +161.976$	σxy	=	+	25.695
$r = +.063$				

III Group (incomes above Rs 90)

$n = 11$	$\frac{\Sigma xy}{n}$	=	+	36.3985
$nx = +1257$	$\sigma x = +20.2$			
$ny = +16$	$\sigma y = +3.2$			
$\Sigma xy = +2212$	$\sigma xy = +64.64$			
$x = +114.27$				
$y = +1.45$				
$xy = +166.6915$	$r = +.56$			
$\frac{\Sigma xy}{n} = +201.09$				

TABLE 4

A Classification of the Punjab Districts

I Group (incomes under Rs. 90)

1. Gujrat	6. Gurgaon
2. Muzaffargarh	7. Jhelum
3. Hoshiarpur	8. Dera Ghazi Khan
4. Attock	9. Rawalpindi
5. Mianwali	10. Kangra

II Group (incomes above Rs. 90)

1. Hissar	10. Lyallpur
2. Rohtak	11. Shahpur
3. Karnal	12. Montgomery
4. Ambala	13. Lahore
5. Jullundar	14. Amritsar
6. Ludhiana	15. Gurdaspur
7. Ferozepur	16. Sialkot
8. Multan	17(a) Gujranwala
9. Jhang	(b) Sheikhpora.

•TABLE 5

Incomes on the basis of the population in 1911, and changes in density of population from 1911 to 1921 in the Punjab.

Name	Income	Changes in Density
Hissar	140	- 11
Rohtak	98	- 20
Gurgaon	87	- 17
Karnal	110	+ 2
Ambala	103	- 16
Kangra	60	- 2
Hoshiarpur	83	0
Jullundar	116	0
Ludhiana	137	+ 24
Ferozepur	146	+ 18
Multan	131	+ 12
Jhang	124	0
Lyallpur	131	+ 5
Montgomery	156	+ 27
Lahore	149	+ 11
Amritsar	171	+ 41
Gurdaspur	115	+ 15
Sialkot	124	+ 13
Gujrat	75	- 31
Gujranwala	144	+ 27
Shahpur	182	+ 9
Jhelum	75	- 14
Rawalpindi	60	- 4
Attock	81	- 11
Mianwali	78	0
Dera Ghazi Khan	69	- 26
Muzaffargarh	84	- 2

IV

THE OPTIMUM POPULATION

It was seen in the preceding chapter that the level of incomes and the general standard of living are low both in the United Provinces and the Punjab though, on the whole, in the Punjab the conditions are much better. It remains to be seen yet whether they are low because of under-population, or over-population, for they may as well be due to the one as the other. The meaning of the two terms, in this chapter, is however, different from that in the last. By under-population is meant a size of population below the optimum for production and by over-population, a size which is above the optimum. Three tests may be laid down, deductively, for this purpose


- (i) Where the density of population is below the optimum, a rise in it will be followed by a rise in income, and a fall followed by a fall in income, that is, the correlation will be positive in this case
- (ii) Where the density of population is above the optimum a rise in density will be followed by a fall in income, and a fall in density will be followed by a rise in income, that is, the correlation will be negative in this case
- (iii) If, however, the density of population is within the zone of the optimum, the changes in income will be independent of the changes in density and hence the correlation will be 0 or very near it.

It is, however, very difficult to put these tests in operation. One conceivable way of testing the pressure of population, in this sense, would be to take two successive decades and see the relation between changes in density


and the changes in income from one decade to another. But there are many difficulties in the way of making a successful test. In the first place, there might have been a change, either for better or for worse, in the methods of production, and this would render the conditions in one decade incomparable with those in another, for the optimum itself might have changed. Another difficulty is that the figures of yield per acre are prepared in the first decade by the Revenue Department, and in another by the Agriculture Department; and a difference between the two shows not so much a change in fertility of the soil as a change in the accuracy of the figures. When we are dealing with conditions in one decade only, we can safely assume that, for purposes of comparison, at any rate, the inaccuracies will balance each other but we cannot make the same supposition in the case of two decades. It is highly doubtful, therefore, if the test can lead us anywhere near the truth.

It is obvious that a better test is needed. In order to eliminate the disturbance caused by the changes in the art of production, we must consider the conditions in one decade only. A correlation between the simple figures of density and the income will not give us satisfactory results. For what is a low density apparently may in fact be very high density, when the fertility of the soil in that district is taken into consideration. What we want for this purpose are corrected figures showing density of population relative to the fertility of the soil. Index numbers showing the relative fertility of the soil must be prepared to calculate the relative density. It is difficult to prepare index numbers which are free from all objections. As far as possible all factors influenced by human efforts must be excluded, as for instance, double cropping, selection of the various crops to be grown, etc. The index numbers here used were based upon the unweighted average of the yield

acre for all the important crops for which
 in the Agricultural Statistics Reports
 are numbers, the figures of the relative densi-
 ty were prepared in two ways. In the first



PRESSURE OF POPULATION IN U. P AND PUNJAB



mbers were multiplied by the figures of the
 f the cultivated to the total area in each dis
 figures of density were divided by these figur
 the relative densities In the second case
 e figures of the cultivable to the total area
 e place of figures of the cultivated area In
 the latter plan is more useful for that repre
 ties both utilised and unutilised Two se

figures were thus obtained showing the relative densities in the districts of the United Provinces, in 1911-1920. A correlation was made between these densities and the incomes in the different districts.

The correlation is negative in both cases, the coefficients of correlation being in the first case, - 675; and in the second case - 723.

It is however, interesting to observe that, judging by the present standard of agricultural production in United Provinces, these seven districts which give a positive correlation have densities below the optimum, while the rest of the districts have densities above the optimum. This indicates clearly that, the only way of increasing incomes is a fall in the density of the agricultural population, so as to bring it nearer the optimum. It should be repeated again, that the efforts at improving the farming methods alone will very likely fail to secure greater economic welfare, for a rise in income will be absorbed by a rise in the density of population which will most probably follow. It is hard to resist the conclusion that the real solution of the agricultural prosperity lies outside agriculture, in the other industries which must be made more attractive so as to absorb a large part of the population at present engaged in agriculture. This will help to raise psychological standard of living, as well as diminish the density of agricultural population, which appear to be the only remedies which will bring us greater prosperity and material happiness.

As regards the optimum population itself, it is necessary to add a few words. When speaking of an industry, given the market it has to serve, there is an optimum of labour power that is required for it. But it is the optimum labour power required not an optimum number of people. And it is best that an addition to the labour power

should come through a better quality of the labourers rather than larger numbers of them. The efficiency of the labourers depends mainly upon two things, their personal ability and the labour-saving machinery at their disposal. Thus in the seven districts which appear to have less than the present optimum there is a fine opportunity of reaching the limit of the optimum through addition of labour-saving machinery instead of an increase in numbers. That would be the best way of removing the complaint, for example, in Jhansi district, recorded by Mr. Blunt in his Census Report of United Provinces for 1911, "Manus Nahin Rahain"

TABLE 6

Income per head on the basis of the population of 1921, and the index numbers of relative density of population based upon .

(1) the percentage of the cultivated to the total area, and

(2) the percentage of the cultivable to the total area, in the districts of the United Provinces

Name	Income per head	Relative Density	
		(1)	(2)
Saharanpur	127	45	37
Bareilly	84	66	55
Bijnor	126	46	31
Pilibhit	100	53	30
Kheri	85	62	37
Muzaffarnagar	139	44	33
Meerut	118	55	46
Bulandshahr	109	54	43
Aligarh	104	50	39
Muttra	110	45	36
Agra	76	55	45

Name	Income per head	Iterative Density	
		(1)	(2)
Mainpuri	78	70	56
Etah	86	64	46
Budaun	80	56	45
Moradabad	80	57	45
Shahjahanpur	80	59	43
Farrukabad	81	73	52
Etawah	81	81	58
Cawnpore	72	73	55
Fatehpur	73	70	50
Allahabad	66	52	58
Lucknow	67	79	56
Unao	65	76	53
Rae Bareilly	65	94	65
Sitapur	74	57	43
Hardoi	72	60	45
Fyzabad	83	93	71
Sultanpur	80	83	54
Partabgarh	60	100	75
Barabanki	78	80	60
Jhansi	89	55	21
Jalaun	78	49	40
Hamirpur	80	46	28
Banda	80	36	31
Mirzapur	91	65	30
Gorakhpur	66	108	89
Basti	68	105	84
Gonda	91	76	57
Bahraich	93	45	46
Benares	72	98	81
Jaunpore	77	85	65
Ghazipur	79	76	50
Ballia	74	86	67
Azamgarh	67	99	76

SUMMARY

The work so far may be summarised briefly as follows. In Chapter III it was seen that, both in the Punjab and the United Provinces, there was a fairly well-marked sufficiency level that can be placed approximately, between Rs 70 to Rs 90 per head per annum. The districts that were below this, generally diminished in their population, while those above it, increased. This sufficiency level, when all the necessary first charges were deducted, would not be much above the Jail standard. It is disquieting, but true, that the population is gravitating to a standard of life, but little, if at all, higher than that of the Jails.

In Chapter IV, it was seen that in the case of the United Provinces, except for seven districts, the rest had densities above the optimum.

Judging by both the standards, it appears that in the United Provinces at any rate, man is "too thick" upon the land and the only effective remedy would be a greater industrial development, which will bring about a better adjustment of the numbers of people in the various occupations.

Even the present optimum would go down if labour-saving machinery were introduced, and as conditions are, the best opportunity for the introduction of this machinery lies in the seven districts in the United Provinces which appear to be below the optimum.

 APPENDIX A

Neglecting the minor crops, the gross area cultivated under the major crops of rice, wheat, barley, jowar, bajra, maize, gram, other food grains including pulses, oilseeds, sugarcane, cotton, opium, tea, tobacco, fodder crops, and fruits and vegetables, were considered and the percentage under each of these was calculated. This percentage under each crop was divided into two groups of irrigated and unirrigated land. These figures were multiplied by the respective average yields per acre. The area under other food grains and oilseeds was calculated as under Arhar and Til respectively in the United Provinces and Peas and Rapeseed in the Punjab.

The total crop included in each case were multiplied by the market prices in each district in the United Provinces. In the Punjab, a set of provincial average prices was used for all the districts. In the case of the crops, the yield per acre of which was not given in the Agricultural Statistics Reports, the yield per acre and general prices were fixed on direct inquiry and the same figures were used for all the districts. In these cases, therefore, the districts differed from each other only in respect of the variations in the percentage of the total crops they formed.

The totals in each district represented the crop-value per 100 gross cultivated acres. These were converted into crop values per 100 net cultivated acres by allowing for the double-cropped area, and these were converted into crop values per 100 average acres in each district by allowing for the proportion of the cultivated to the total area. The figures in each case represent averages for the whole decade of 1911 to 1920.

The figures of density were collected from the Census Reports. Only the population engaged in agriculture in each district was taken. The figures of income were obtained by first calculating the density of agricultural population per 100 acres, and dividing the figures of crop values by these.

Some of the agriculturists follow subsidiary occupations in addition to agriculture, but these are probably, off-set by the people in other occupations following agriculture as a subsidiary occupation. So on the whole the figures of income are fairly reliable, at any rate for comparing one district with another.

The coefficients of correlation between these crop values and the density of agricultural population in each district is very high; in the case of the United Provinces it is + 887, and in the case of the Punjab it is + 907. This proves that, on the whole, the figures of the crop values and the figures of income derived from them, can be relied upon.

SECTION V
SANSKRIT

KṚṢṆA AND THE MAHĀBHĀRATA WAR*

BY

S. L. KATRE, M.A.

INTRODUCTORY

The main theme of the Mahābhārata is the victory of the Pāṇdavas over the Kauravas. That victory, however, was not cheaply won. The winners in order to achieve their end had to play numerous frauds and to display several downfalls of character; and yet their success was rendered dubious more than a score of times. And while the entire Kaurava forces were destroyed with the exception of three warriors (viz., Kṛpā, Aśvatthāman and Kṛtavarma), only eight (viz., the five Pāṇdavas, Kṛṣṇa, Sātyaki and Yuyutsu¹) survived in the victorious party. Thus the entire forces on both sides, numbering eighteen *akṣauhini*s, were destroyed during the course of the eighteen days' war, and the only mark of the Pāṇdavas' victory was their own survival and the destruction of the Dhārtarāṣṭras. As Kṛṣṇa is represented to be mainly responsible for the so-called victory of the Pāṇdavas, it is interesting to trace out the part he played in the Mahābhārata war.

* The references, unless otherwise stated, are throughout to the Mahābhārata (Kumbhakonam Edition)

¹ He was a natural son of Dhṛtarāṣṭra. He left the Kauravas and joined the Pāṇdavas only a few minutes before the war began. (VI 43 97 ff.)

KṚṢṆA'S IRE WAR ACTIVITIES

GATHERING FORCES FOR THE PĀṆḌAVAS

Marriage was settled² between Abhimanyu and Uttarā when the Pāṇḍavas made their public appearance³ at Uplaplāvya on the completion⁴ of the thirteenth year of their exile which, in accordance with the terms⁵ of their well known gambling they had to pass in disguise. Kṛṣṇa, who had visited the Pāṇḍavas four times⁶ during the first twelve years of their exile, came⁷ to Uplaplāvya along with Abhimanyu (the bridegroom),⁸ Subhadrā, Balarāma, Sātyaki and other Yādavas to celebrate the marriage. After the marriage he addressed⁹ a meeting of the kings assembled there requesting them to suggest just, honourable and prospective measures for the Pāṇḍavas to recover their kingdom from the Kauravas and advising them to unite for the Pāṇḍavas in case war became necessary.

Conflicting suggestions were made by Balarāma¹⁰ and Sātyaki¹¹. Finally, Drupada approved,¹² to the satisfaction of other kings, of Sātyaki's suggestion to adopt strict

² IV. 77.

³ IV. 74.

⁴ The popular view is expressed here. As to what Duryodhana's view was on this point shall be noted below.

⁵ II. 98. 10 ff.

⁶ III. 12 ff. (with Bhojas, Viṣṇus, Andhaka, etc., in the Kāmyaka forest); III. 119 ff. (with Balarāma, Sātyaki and other Vṛṣnis at Prabhāsa), III. 185 ff. (with Satyawatā in the Kāmyaka forest), and III. 264 (in the Kāmyaka forest).

⁷ IV. 78.

⁸ Kṛṣṇa had taken Subhadrā and Abhimanyu to Dvārakā after his first meeting with the Pāṇḍavas in exile (III. 22).

⁹ V. 1. 10 ff.

¹⁰ V. 2. He advocated to the Pāṇḍavas the mild and humble course of propitiating the Kauravas and peacefully moving them, if possible, to restore their share to the Pāṇḍavas. Balarāma's partiality for the Kauravas is remarkable throughout.

¹¹ V. 3. He advocated the course of strict action.

¹² V. 4.

and active measures undertook to send ambassadors to friendly kings¹³ for securing their alliance and offered his priest to be sent to Dhṛtarāṣṭra with the Pāṇḍavas' demand for their share in the kingdom. Strangely enough Kṛṣṇa, having roused Drupada and others to action in the Pāṇḍavas' favour, assumed an air of indifference and said¹⁴ that although Drupada's wise decision for action must at all costs be immediately given effect to, the Yādavas could do nothing for the time being due to their identical blood-relations¹⁵ with both the Kauravas and the Pāṇḍavas, and that if ambassadors were sent, they should be sent first to others and lastly to the Yādavas. By saying so, Kṛṣṇa seems to have professed that although he was anxious to secure his friends' welfare he had no intention to be unjust to their enemies.

KṚṢṆA'S FORMAL ALLIANCE WITH THE PĀṆḌAVAS.

While after Kṛṣṇa's departure¹⁶ a host of kings were being gathered at Upaplāvya on behalf of the Pāṇḍavas, Arjuna personally went¹⁷ to Dvārakā formally to win Kṛṣṇa's alliance and reached there simultaneously with Duryodhana who too had come there for the same purpose. Kṛṣṇa, however, made alternative offers, and Arjuna, asked

¹³ Ugrā, Hārḍikya and other Yādava kings are included in the list of these kings.

¹⁴ V. 5.

¹⁵ V. 5 4 ff. "किं तु सम्बन्धकं तुल्यसम्माकं कुक्ष्यादुदु । यथेष्टं वर्तमानेषु पाण्डवेषु च तेषु च ॥" etc. References to this तुल्य सम्बन्धक are made also by Duryodhana (V. 7 13), by Balarama (V. 7. 29 and 158 28-29), by Arjuna (V. 82. 1) and by others. No passage in the Mahābhārata, however, sheds light on the Yādavas' alleged direct blood-relation with the Kauravas, although the commentator Nīlakantha explains it as referring to Kṛṣṇa's son Sāmba marrying Duryodhana's daughter referred to in the Harivaṃśa and the Brahma, Viṣṇu, Bhāgavata and other Purāṇas, but nowhere in the Mahābhārata.

¹⁶ V. 5 12 ff.

¹⁷ V. 7 2 ff.

to choose first to settle or to die (cf. 18.11) although he had vowed¹⁹ not to take active part in the fight while Duryodhana triumphantly accepted the other offer of a thousand millions of Kṛṣṇa's valiant warriors called *Nāyāṣṭhas* alias *Gopas*²⁰ alias *Gopālas*. Kṛṣṇa accepted²⁰ the office of Arjuna's charioteer and came with him to Upaplāvya.

KṚṢṆA'S PEACE MISSION

Drupada's priest failed²¹ in his mission and Duryodhana could not be moved to accept the Pāṇḍavas' claims by Dhṛtarāṣṭra, Bhīṣma, Droṇa, Vidura, Cāndhārī and others. Yudhishthira, very anxious to avoid the impending conflict involving the destruction of his own race, sought, as usual Kṛṣṇa's advice, and Kṛṣṇa though fully pessimistic about his success undertook to go personally to the Kaurava court on a peace-mission.²² Naturally enough, Kṛṣṇa had one more political end in view,²³ viz.,

¹⁹ V. 7. 20, etc. This alleged vow of Kṛṣṇa, too, seems to have been meant to give him the appearance of an impartial relation and displays one of his numerous political tactics.

²⁰ From VII. 91.11, VIII. 8.17, 18.2, 48.15, 62.73, 101.5, etc., it appears that these valiant warriors were led in the war by Kṛṣṇa's friend (who had joined Duryodhana), fought bravely with Arjuna and were killed by him in huge numbers. Their name 'Gopas' or 'Gopālas' and their description in VIII. 2.41 (गोकुले नित्यसंवृद्धा युद्धे परमकोपनाः । गोपाला, कृत्तवीर्यास्ते, etc.,) are instances of Kṛṣṇa's alleged association with cowherds, which are so rare in the Mahābhārata.

²¹ V. 7. 39-40. Sañjaya, however, had informed Dhṛtarāṣṭra of Kṛṣṇa's having accepted to drive Arjuna's chariot in the war (then under contemplation) during his first meeting with the exiled Pāṇḍavas in the Kāmyaka forest, i.e., as long as thirteen years ago' (Iṣṭe III. 48.19).

²² V. 20-21.

²³ V. 71.9 ff.

²⁴ Kṛṣṇa said he would try to secure peace, if possible, only if the Pāṇḍavas' demands were fully acceded to and not otherwise.

²⁵ V. 72.29 etc.

to win to the Pāṇḍavas' side as many as possible of the kings in the Kaurava court by praising Yudhiṣṭhira and censuring Duryodhana before them. This fact is quite in harmony with Kṛṣṇa's character as an ambitious politician.

Kṛṣṇa accordingly started²⁵ with Sātyaki, reached²⁶ Hāstinapura, disregarded the grand reception²⁷ arranged by Dhṛtarāṣṭra, rejected²⁸ Duryodhana's invitation for dinner, put up²⁹ with Vidura and in due time entered³⁰ the Kaurava court. Several sages³¹ are said to have come there to witness Kṛṣṇa's peace-efforts. Kṛṣṇa then related³² his mission to Dhṛtarāṣṭra and put forth his arguments for peace which may be thus summarised: "Peace is not impossible. In fact it entirely depends on Dhṛtarāṣṭra and Kṛṣṇa; and if Dhṛtarāṣṭra were to move his sons and their evil counsels, Kṛṣṇa would certainly influence the Pāṇḍavas to observe peace. The Pāṇḍavas, whose cause is just, naturally expect revered Dhṛtarāṣṭra to be true to the terms of the stake and to be kind enough to restore their share to them. By granting them their dues, Dhṛtarāṣṭra would only add immensely to his own party's strength on account of his new alliance with the uniquely valiant Pāṇḍavas and their friends. If, on the other hand, their demand is not acceded to, then disaster, and not *Dharma*, is sure to follow

²⁵ V 82.22 ff.

²⁶ V 89.1

²⁷ V 85 ff. Vidura suspected Dhṛtarāṣṭra of thereby trying to bribe Kṛṣṇa and thus to divide him from the Pāṇḍavas. It is also said (V 153) that Duryodhana expected a division between Kṛṣṇa and the Pāṇḍavas due to Kṛṣṇa's failure in the peace-mission.

²⁸ V 91.12 ff.

²⁹ V. 91.36.

³⁰ V 94.

³¹ Nārada, Jāmadagnya Rāma, Kanva, etc., V 83.24 ff and 94.53 ff.

³² V 95 1--62

Yudhisthira's unique position and has been sufficiently tested during such occasions as द्रुपद वनारण्य. Now, the Pāṇḍavas offer themselves either to attend on Dhṛtarāṣṭra or to fight with his party. And it entirely rests with him to choose either after due consideration.

Kṛṣṇa's speech won the expected applause³⁵ from all including Dhṛtarāṣṭra himself. The sages Jāmadagnya Rāma Kaṇva and Nārada are said³⁶ to have pressed Dhṛtarāṣṭra and Duryodhana to make peace with the Pāṇḍavas after disclosing the supremely divine character of Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna. Dhṛtarāṣṭra, however, regretfully expressed³⁷ his impotency to move Duryodhana and asked Kṛṣṇa to appeal to Duryodhana himself. Kṛṣṇa accordingly made to Duryodhana a similar appeal which was strongly seconded³⁸ by Bhīṣma Vidura, Dhṛtarāṣṭra and Droṇa who brought home to Duryodhana the disastrous results that invariably followed hostility with Kṛṣṇa. Duryodhana, however, refused³⁹ to yield showing his strong conviction about the justness of his own cause and emphatically denying the alleged responsibility for the Pāṇḍavas' past sufferings which, he said, were due to their own actions.

Nothing untoward happened so far. But, on hearing Duryodhana's obstinate reply Kṛṣṇa adopted⁴⁰ a course of action which, as the peace-missionary, though not as the Pāṇḍavas' benefactor, he ought to have avoided. He

³⁵ V. 95-63

³⁶ V. 96-123

³⁷ V. 124-1ff

³⁸ V. 125-126.

³⁹ V. 127-1ff

⁴⁰ V. 128. Kṛṣṇa's aim in doing this might have been to divide the kings in the Kaurava court from Duryodhana as referred to in V. 72, 29ff. In that, too, he was not successful; for, although his words won general applause none of the kings in the court is said to have deserted Duryodhana and sided with the Pāṇḍavas.

began to enumerate³⁹ Duryodhana's alleged offences against the Pāṇḍavas whereupon Duryodhana left the court-hall in protest. Kṛṣṇa deplored the incompetence of the members of the court to control Duryodhana and pressed them to surrender Duryodhana, Karna, Śakuni and Duśśāsana as prisoners to the Pāṇḍavas. Duryodhana is thereupon said⁴⁰ to have conspired with his friends to confine Kṛṣṇa himself before the court were able to confine him and his party. Sātyaki smelt the conspiracy and informed Kṛṣṇa about it. References to Kṛṣṇa's powers and achievements were made by Sātyaki, Vidura and others and Duryodhana was censured by all for attempting the ignoble and the impossible. Kṛṣṇa in order to display his powers to Duryodhana is said⁴¹ to have exhibited his *Viśvarūpa* which highly impressed Droṇa, Bhīṣma, Vidura, Sañjaya, Dhṛtarāṣṭra⁴² and the sages. Kṛṣṇa then left the court and, having informed⁴³ Kuntī of the court occurrences, returned to Upaplāvya. Before leaving Hāstinapura, however, he made an unsuccessful attempt⁴⁴ to move Karna to desert the Kauravas and join the Pāṇḍavas, and thereby gave a further instance of his politically ambitious character evinced in so many places in the Mahābhārata.

There is, however, reason to say that Kṛṣṇa was not serious in securing peace.

³⁹ V. 128.

⁴⁰ V. 130. Even before Kṛṣṇa's arrival at Hāstinapura, Duryodhana, to the indignation of Bhīṣma and Dhṛtarāṣṭra, is said to have expressed his intention of confining Kṛṣṇa during his mission (*vide* V. 88-13ff.).

⁴¹ V. 131-4ff.

⁴² V. 131. 19ff. Blind Dhṛtarāṣṭra was granted by Kṛṣṇa divine eyesight for viewing the *Viśvarūpa*. As he did not want to see anybody else after viewing Kṛṣṇa in his supreme form, Kṛṣṇa, at his request, made him blind again.

⁴³ V. 132ff. Kuntī lived at Hāstinapura during the Pāṇḍavas' exile.

⁴⁴ V. 137-143 (*cf.* also VI. 43-91-94).

KṚṢṆA'S WAR PREPARATIONS

On his return Kṛṣṇa strongly advocated⁴⁵ to Yudhiṣṭhira the adoption of the fourth policy of दण्ड (punishment) saying that now war was the only remedy. With much difficulty he succeeded in preparing Yudhiṣṭhira's mind for war. With Kṛṣṇa's approval,⁴⁶ Dhṛṣṭadyumna was appointed as the सेनापति, Arjuna as the सेनापतिपति and Kṛṣṇa as the guide of the सेनापतिपति. The whole force of the Pāṇḍavas, numbering seven *akṣauhīnīs* and said⁴⁷ to have been gathered by them through Kṛṣṇa's favour, then marched towards Kurukṣetra where Kṛṣṇa and others, after arranging their camp, began to blow⁴⁸ their Pāñcajanya and other conches. There again furious messages were exchanged⁴⁹ through Ulūka between Duryodhana on one side and Kṛṣṇa and the Pāṇḍavas on the other.

THE BHAGAVADGĪTĀ EPISODE, ETC.

At the outset, on observing the hostile forces and on reflecting on the propriety of killing his own elders, preceptors, friends, etc., among them, Arjuna was⁵⁰ extremely dejected and he refused to fight in order to save himself from the sin of कुलक्षय. Kṛṣṇa reproved⁵¹ him for showing weakness of mind and, by means of the philosophical arguments embodied in the *Bhagavadgītā* and the exhibition of his supreme Divinity (*Vīśvanātha* etc.), brought home to him that in reality none can be killed and that it is primarily necessary for one to do one's duty without

⁴⁵ V. 150. 18ff.

⁴⁶ V. 151. 157.

⁴⁷ V. 79. 9, etc.

⁴⁸ V. 151. 69ff.

⁴⁹ V. 160—162.

⁵⁰ VI. 25. 28ff.

⁵¹ VI. 25—42.

reference to the consequences Arjuna, quite satisfied,⁵² rose up to do the Kṣatriya's duty of fighting and killing the enemy Kṛṣṇa then made⁵³ one more unsuccessful attempt to move Karṇa, who had vowed⁵⁴ not to fight until Bhīṣma's death, to fight for the Pāṇḍavas at least so long as Bhīṣma was not killed⁵⁵ with liberty to rejoin the Kauravas afterwards Kṛṣṇa further gave⁵⁶ his approval for Yuyutsu's joining the Pāṇḍavas a few minutes before the fighting commenced

KṚṢṆA IN THE WAR

The war bore abundant testimony to Kṛṣṇa's extraordinary skill in politics, in the science of warfare and in several other matters. He strained his every nerve, physically as well as spiritually, to bring forth the Pāṇḍavas' victory The following is a brief account of his activities in the war

KṚṢṆA'S SPIRITUAL ATTEMPT FOR THE PĀṆḌAVA'S VICTORY.

He is said to have made some spiritual attempts for ensuring the Pāṇḍavas' safety and victory At the very outset, he made Arjuna address a *stotra* to Goddess Durgā.⁵⁷ He further made⁵⁸ him offer a nocturnal oblation to God Śiva with a view to ensuring his success in killing

⁵² VI. 42. 73ff.

⁵³ VI 43 91—94

⁵⁴ V. 168 29ff.

⁵⁵ Kṛṣṇa perhaps wanted Karṇa to help or guide the Pāṇḍavas in killing Bhīṣma

⁵⁶ VI 43. 99.

⁵⁷ VI 23 The goddess was pleased, appeared personally before Arjuna and granted him victory after identifying him with नारायणसहायवान् नरः Arjuna's pre-Bhagavadgītā dejection occurred after this incident.

⁵⁸ VII 79. Kṛṣṇa's devotion to God Śiva is alluded to in several passages in the Mahābhārata

Jayadratha, as resolved, the next day before sunset. Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna are said⁵⁹ to have adored God Śiva before they left their camp on the day of Karna's death.

He appreciated⁶⁰ Yudhiṣṭhira's act of approaching Bhīṣma, Drona, etc., for making obeisances to them before the commencement of the war. Further, while on his way to Jayadratha's camp, Kṛṣṇa advised⁶¹ Arjuna to make obeisances to Drona, with whom he was then encountered, with a view to gaining his favourable blessings.

KṚṢṆA'S EFFICIENCY IN CHARIOTEERING

At least to the outward appearance, Kṛṣṇa was mainly Arjuna's charioteer in the war. He displayed his unique efficiency in charioteering several times during the war. *vide* VI 59, 60 ff. and VI 106, 49 ff (when he drove the chariot quite undeterred by Bhīṣma's terrifying shower of arrows); VII 91, 32 ff (when he slipped off Drona who was trying to obstruct Arjuna's progress towards Jayadratha), VII 99-100 (when, in the full swing of battle during their progress towards Jayadratha, Kṛṣṇa, observing the horses to be quite exhausted, hastily unharnessed them, refreshed them by enabling them to drink water from the pool created by Arjuna's arrows, reharnessed them to the chariot and drove forth, leaving behind in despair and astonishment the numerous enemies that were trying to overpower the two.⁶²), VIII. 51-52 (when Kṛṣṇa, notwithstanding the resistance offered by the Saṁśaptakas, drove towards Aśvatthāman), VIII 97. 30 (when Kṛṣṇa, in order to save Arjuna from Karna's arrow accompanied by the serpent

⁵⁹ VIII. 21. 13.

⁶⁰ VI 43 23ff.

⁶¹ VII. 91. 2ff. Perhaps Kṛṣṇa thought that thereby Drona would give up obstruction and let Arjuna proceed towards Jayadratha.

⁶² Here Kṛṣṇa reached the cl' in charioteering

Asvasena, who had been rescued⁶³ by Indra from the Khāṇḍava fire, pressed the wheel of the chariot five fingers deep in the ground), etc., etc. References are made to his unique skill⁶⁴ in charioteering by Karna, Duryodhana, Salya, etc., at VIII. 22 ff., 71, etc.

Twice, however, his chariot is said to have been paralysed by the enemies for some time. *vide* VII. 103. 36 ff (during its progress towards Jayadratha) and VIII. 48. 12—18 (when the Saṁsaptakas surrounded it and, by holding it, tried to overpower Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna). Each time the rescue was effected by the heart-rending blows of the Pāñcajanya and Devadatta conches of Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna respectively.

KṚṢṆA'S ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR

Kṛṣṇa could not for long abide strictly by his vow not to actively participate in the war. He, enraged at Arjuna's comparative slackness in fighting with Bhīṣma, twice himself attacked Bhīṣma, once⁶⁵ with his discus called Sunābha and the other time⁶⁶ with a mere whip in his hand. Each time Bhīṣma triumphantly⁶⁷ offered himself to be killed by Kṛṣṇa (identified with Supreme Divinity), and Arjuna with much difficulty succeeded in bringing Kṛṣṇa back to the chariot with promises of sincere fight. Once, when Bhagadatta threw his Vaiṣṇava missile on Arjuna, Kṛṣṇa, aware of Arjuna's incompetence to survive

⁶³ I. 253. 9.

⁶⁴ Perhaps this skill in charioteering was not peculiar to Kṛṣṇa himself, but to other members of his family as well. Subhadrā, Kṛṣṇa's sister, is said to have informed Arjuna about her unique efficiency in charioteering and to have driven the chariot herself when Arjuna eloped with her from Dvārakā and routed Viprthu's forces on the Raivataka mountain (*vide* I. 243. 17ff and 244. 7-8).

⁶⁵ VI. 59. 91ff.

⁶⁶ VI. 106. 55ff.

⁶⁷ Bhīṣma's excessive spiritual devotion for Kṛṣṇa is conspicuous throughout in the Mahābhārata.

its strokes stepped forward⁶⁸ and took its charge on his own breast where it became the *Va. jayanti* garland. Many a time he expressed his willingness to kill the enemies himself e.g. VI 107 28ff. (when to Yudhiṣṭhira he offered himself to slay Bhīṣma), VI 59 52ff (when he informed Sātyaki of his intention to slay Bhīṣma, Droṇa, etc.), VII 71 when he informed Dāruka of his resolve to slay, if necessary, Duryodhana, Karna etc. for saving Arjuna), etc.

KṚṢṆA'S PHYSICAL INJURIES, ETC., IN THE WAR

As charioteer to the most valiant of the Pāṇḍavas, physical injuries were quite inevitable to Kṛṣṇa in the war. Numerous wounds were inflicted on him by Bhīṣma (VI 52 50ff, 59 64, 81 40ff), Aśvatthāman (VI 73 6, VII 201 82, VIII 52 30ff, 53 4ff, 67 8ff, 83, 85ff, IX 13 6ff), Suśarman (VI 104 2, VIII 48 7), Bhagadatta (VII 29 17), Sudakṣiṇa (VII 92 65), Śrutāyudha (VII 92 52ff),⁶⁹ Ambastha (VII 93 65ff),⁷⁰ Droṇa (VII 101 25), Kṛpa (VIII 146 101), Jayadratha (VII 146 102), Vṛṣasena (VII 146, 102, VIII 89 18ff, 90 1), Ulūka (VII 172, 38), Satyakadeva (VIII 18 15ff), Karna (VIII, 21 23, 96, 14 ff), Daṇḍadhāra (VIII, 54 10), Daṇḍa (VIII 54 17) and others.

There were also some moments when Kṛṣṇa was temporarily overwhelmed by the enemies. The *Samśaptakas*

⁶⁸ VII 19 17—21. Kṛṣṇa further described his *चतुर्मुखित्व* to Arjuna with a view to giving him an idea of the powers of the missile, which, he said, had emanated from his fourth form (*vide* VII, 29, 32—43).

⁶⁹ He threw his mace on Kṛṣṇa, although his father Varuṇa had forbidden him from throwing it on a non-fighter. The mace, which had no effect on Kṛṣṇa, returned to Śrutāyudha and killed him.

⁷⁰ Ambastha struck Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna with his mace after Kṛṣṇa had brought back to senses Arjuna who had fainted from Śrutāyus' missiles and after Arjuna had slain Śrutāyus (VII, 93, 16ff).

once (VII. 18. 25ff) seriously overwhelmed him with their shower of arrows which was later dispelled by Arjuna with his *Vāyavya* missile. At another time (VIII. 48. 12 ff) they again overwhelmed him with their arrows, paralysed and ascended his chariot and even caught hold of Kṛṣṇa who, however, felled them all down with a mere shake of his arms and terrified them by blowing his Pāñcajanya. Once (VII 30 15) Śakuni stupefied Kṛṣṇa with his missiles. Kṛṣṇa along with Arjuna was twice (VIII. 52. 38 ff and 53. 18 ff) rendered unconscious and besmeared with blood by Aśvatthāman's charges⁷¹ and the two were for some time supposed to have been killed. Once (VIII 18. 15ff), wounded by Satyadeva's *tomara*, Kṛṣṇa slipped down his whip. Further (VIII 96 29), Karna's arrows are said to have broken open Kṛṣṇa's golden armour.

KṚṢṆA ENCOURAGING FRAUDS

Many a time Kṛṣṇa encouraged or even forced⁷² the Pāṇḍavas to play frauds on the enemies. He, at Yudhisṭhira's proposal, accompanied⁷³ the Pāṇḍavas to the Kaurava camp to learn from Bhīṣma himself the way of killing him and successfully persuaded Arjuna to kill Bhīṣma, as suggested by Bhīṣma himself, from behind Śikhaṇḍin. It was due to Kṛṣṇa's urgent suggestion⁷⁴ that Arjuna from

⁷¹ Sañjaya says it was quite a unique achievement of Aśvatthāman (VIII. 52. 41ff).

⁷² "Forced" because the Pāṇḍavas were generally unwilling to do so and yielded after much persuasion by Kṛṣṇa *vide* VI. 107. 89ff (Arjuna doubting the propriety of killing Bhīṣma fraudulently), VII 191 13ff (Arjuna plainly refusing to approve of Yudhisṭhira's false declaration of Aśvatthāman's death as a measure to kill Drona), VII 197 27ff (Arjuna deploring the fraud in Drona's murder and vehemently rebuking Yudhisṭhira for it), VIII 97. 63ff (Arjuna showing his unwillingness to slay Karna lying in a swoon on his chariot), etc., etc.

⁷³ VI 107 52ff.

⁷⁴ VII. 142 86. Bhūriśravas easily discerned Kṛṣṇa's instructions to be behind Arjuna's fraudulent act. He said, while reproving Arjuna that such an act was quite unexpected of Arjuna

behind cut off Bhurisravas' hand raised for killing Satyaki. Kṛṣṇa successfully moved⁵ Yudhiṣṭhira to falsely declare Aśvatthāman's death to Droṇa who thereupon gave up⁷⁶ fighting and was unduly murdered by Dhr̥ṣṭadyumna. Twice,⁷⁷ he urged Arjuna to kill Karna placed in critical difficulties, once when he lay fainted on his chariot and the other time when he was trying to draw up his chariot's wheel submerging in the ground. On seeing Duryodhana concealing himself in a lake, Kṛṣṇa advised⁷⁸ Yudhiṣṭhira to kill him fraudulently (मायया). From this as well as from the taunts he gave⁷⁹ to Yudhiṣṭhira for having challenged Duryodhana to fight with any one of the five brothers and from his reference⁸⁰ to Bhīma's inferiority to Duryodhana in mace-fighting, Kṛṣṇa seems to have wanted Duryodhana to be killed by the combined force of the Pāṇdavas which situation was averted perhaps by Balarāma's timely arrival⁸¹ on the scene. Further, on observing Duryodhana excelling Bhīma in the single mace-combat, Kṛṣṇa by giving⁸² hints through Arjuna, made Bhīma kill Duryodhana by striking, against the prescribed rules, below his thighs. Kṛṣṇa justified⁸³ all such frauds and unfair dealings, which,

but was an every-day affair with Kṛṣṇa and other Vṛṣṇis (*vide* VII. 143 14—17)

⁷⁵ VII. 191ff

⁷⁶ Droṇa sat down weaponless, meditated upon Viṣṇu and by means of *yoga* became ज्योतिष् (light). Only Sañjaya, Arjuna, Kṛpa, Kṛṣṇa and Yudhiṣṭhira are said to have seen the ज्योतिष् emanating from Droṇa before his head was cut off by Dhr̥ṣṭadyumna (*vide* VII. 193 52ff).

⁷⁷ VIII. 97. 63ff and 98 (when Karna was actually killed by Arjuna).

⁷⁸ IX. 31. 6ff.

⁷⁹ IX. 33.

⁸⁰ IX. 33, and 59. 3ff.

⁸¹ IX. 34. 2.

⁸² IX. 59. 3—19.

⁸³ VII. 191 46 IX. 62 etc

curiously enough also included⁸⁴ Bhīma's kicking Duryodhana after his fall.

KṚṢṆA'S TACTFUL GUIDANCE OF THE PĀNḌAVAS.

By tactfully handling the situations by means of his suggestions, approvals, etc., Kṛṣṇa saved the Pāṇḍavas from calamities a number of times. Thus he advised⁸⁵ Yudhiṣṭhira, when encountered with Droṇa, to escape and thus saved him from being taken captive by Droṇa for Duryodhana. It is said⁸⁶ that when Kṛṣṇa found it difficult to reach strongly guarded Jayadratha, he, with a view to attracting Jayadratha near Arjuna, created darkness giving others an impression of sunset. Thereupon the enemies including Jayadratha, thinking Arjuna to be doomed,⁸⁷ triumphantly came forward; and Kṛṣṇa, at once dispelling the darkness to show the sun, urged Arjuna to hastily slay Jayadratha. Further when Arjuna cut off Jayadratha's head, Kṛṣṇa related to Arjuna the dangers from its immediate fall on the earth due to Jayadratha's father's curse⁸⁸ and Arjuna, at Kṛṣṇa's urgent suggestion, tossed the head in the air until it reached the hands of Jayadratha's father, who, taken by surprise, slipped it down and fell a victim to his own curse. Further Kṛṣṇa disallowed⁸⁹ Arjuna and sent Ghaṭotkaca to face Karna and fall a victim⁹⁰ to his वासवी शक्ति. He thus set at nought

⁸⁴ IX. 61. 47ff. Arjuna, however, dissented with Kṛṣṇa's view.

⁸⁵ VII. 163. 46ff.

⁸⁶ VII. 147ff. Kṛṣṇa had intimated to Arjuna his intention to play the trick.

⁸⁷ Arjuna had vowed to commit suicide in case he did not kill Jayadratha that day *before sunset* (VII. 73. 57ff).

⁸⁸ VII. 148. The curse was that whoever caused Jayadratha's head to fall on the ground would die instantly.

⁸⁹ VII. 174.

⁹⁰ VII. 180. It is really interesting to find Kṛṣṇa exulting in Ghaṭotkaca's death not merely because his own plan was successful

the Kauravas plans⁹¹ and made Arjuna competent to kill Karna. Further he wisely checked⁹² Yudhisthira who was furiously setting out to kill Ghaṭotkaca's killer. When, after Drona's death, Aśvatthāman charged⁹³ his *Nārāyaṇa* missile on the Pāṇḍavas, Kṛṣṇa, by advising them all⁹⁴ to leave off their weapons and get down from their chariots, saved them from disaster. to Aśvatthāman's sheer disappointment.⁹⁵ Again, he with a view to saving Arjuna from Karna's *Bhārgava* missile, fatiguing Karna and refreshing Arjuna, removed,⁹⁶ at Arjuna's suggestion, his chariot to Yudhiṣṭhira's camp for some time. Further, when, after the war, Aśvatthāman charged his *Brahmaśiraś* missile for the Pāṇḍavas' destruction, Kṛṣṇa tactfully handled⁹⁷ the situation and saved the Pāṇḍavas. Once, by urging Bhīma to intervene, Kṛṣṇa saved⁹⁸ Dhr̥ṣṭadyumna from Sātyaki when the two were furiously fighting with each other while discussing Dhr̥ṣṭadyumna's fraud in killing Drona. Finally, after Duryodhana's death, Kṛṣṇa made⁹⁹ Arjuna first get down from the chariot and then he

but because "Ghaṭotkaca, as a ब्राह्मणाद्वशी, यज्ञद्वेषी, राज्ञस्य, धर्मस्य लोसा, पापपत्मा, etc., deserved death at all hands and would, in case of his survival, have been killed by Kṛṣṇa himself" (*vide* VII. 181-182)

⁹¹ VII 183-184.

⁹² VII 184.

⁹³ VII 200

⁹⁴ VII. 200-201. All but Bhīma followed Kṛṣṇa's advice. The missile began to blaze on Bhīma's head, but Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna hastened to the spot and forcibly took Bhīma down from his chariot. The *Nārāyaṇa* missile was then pacified (VII. 201).

⁹⁵ VII. 202.

⁹⁶ VIII 67ff

⁹⁷ *Vide* X 12-16. Kṛṣṇa ultimately cursed Aśvatthāman to lead a hellish life

⁹⁸ VII. 99.

⁹⁹ IX 63

himself got down, whereupon the chariot was burnt. He thus saved¹⁰⁰ Arjuna from being burnt with the chariot.

KṚṢṆA'S ENCOURAGEMENT, ETC

It was a usual practice with Kṛṣṇa in the war to urge the Pāṇḍavas and their allies to slay particular opponents. He goaded Arjuna to slay Bhīṣma, etc., (VI. 22, 59, 106), Bhagadatta (VII. 29), Jayadratha¹⁰¹ (VII. 147), Kṛtavarma¹⁰² (VII. 92), Duryodhana (VII. 102 and IX. 26), Aśvatthāman¹⁰³ (VIII. 52), Māgadha Daṇḍadhāra (VIII. 54), Karna¹⁰⁴ (VIII. 57, 86, 96, 97, 98) and the Saṁśaptakas. He further urged¹⁰⁵ Yudhiṣṭhira himself to slay Śalya, who, Kṛṣṇa said, was more valiant than Arjuna, Bhīma and others and could be slain only by Yudhiṣṭhira¹⁰⁶.

His calls for help saved many an ally from death at enemies' hands. Thus the rescues by Arjuna of Bhīma from Karna (VII. 139), of Sātyaki from Bhūriśravas (VII. 142), of Dhr̥ṣṭadyumna from Aśvatthāman (VIII. 58), etc.,

¹⁰⁰ Kṛṣṇa said to Arjuna that the enemies' missiles had in fact set fire to the chariot days ago and that it was due to Kṛṣṇa's own presence on it that it was not reduced to ashes previously.

¹⁰¹ When Arjuna made his resolve to kill Jayadratha the next day before sunset, Kṛṣṇa gave his approval by blowing his Pāñcājanya (*vide* VII. 73-57ff). Further (VII. 75), however, Kṛṣṇa brought home to Arjuna the difficulties lying in the way of his killing Jayadratha, said that his was a rash resolve, almost impossible to be acted upon, and even offered to discover means (*नीति*) of relieving Arjuna of his resolve (VII. 75-3ff). This apparent inconsistency of Kṛṣṇa was perhaps meant to make Arjuna more alert and cautious.

¹⁰² Kṛṣṇa asked Arjuna to slay Kṛtavarma giving up all regard for his relationship.

¹⁰³ Kṛtavarma, Duryodhana and Aśvatthāman could not be slain by Arjuna, despite Kṛṣṇa's urgings.

¹⁰⁴ *Vide* Kṛṣṇa's taunts to Karna for taking recourse to धर्म at the critical moment.

¹⁰⁵ IX. 6-29ff.

¹⁰⁶ Is this praise of Yudhiṣṭhira's valour not extravagant? Perhaps Kṛṣṇa had behind it the aim of giving rest to Bhīma and Arjuna.

and by Ghatotkaca and Bhīma from Alavudha (VII 178) were effected by Kṛṣṇa's timely urgings.

KṚṢṆA'S CONSOLATIONS, ETC.

Kṛṣṇa also helped the Pāṇḍavas in several other ways. Thus he consoled¹⁰⁷ Arjuna after Abhimanyu's death and roused him to action. Again he had to pacify¹⁰⁸ Yudhiṣṭhira extremely dejected at Ghaṭotkaca's death. It was only Kṛṣṇa's intervention¹⁰⁹ that saved Bhīma from Balarāma's fury at his fraudulent murder of Durvodhana. He had again to console¹¹⁰ Yudhiṣṭhira, etc., after the *Sauptika* tragedy¹¹¹ by Aśvatthāman. Even before the *Sauptika* tragedy, Kṛṣṇa, at Yudhiṣṭhira's request,¹¹² had to go to Hāstinapura to pacify Gāndhārī¹¹³. Further¹¹⁴ when the

¹⁰⁷ VII 72-71—79. Further, at Arjuna's request, Kṛṣṇa also consoled Subhadrā (*vide* VII 77-10ff—वीरसुदोषपत्नी त्वं वीरजा वीरबा-
न्धवा । मा शुचस्त्वनयं भद्रं गतः स परमं गतिम् (etc., Draupadī and Uttarā). This passage, however, is inconsistent with XII.1-16ff (where Yudhiṣṭhira to Nārada says—'किं नु वक्ष्याति वार्यायो वीरधर्मे सधुस्मदनम् । द्वारका-
वासिनी कृष्णमित् । प्रतिगत इरिम् ॥' etc.). At the time of the war Subhadrā's residence at Dvārakā seems to be more natural and consequently the latter passage appears to be genuine rather than the former.

¹⁰⁸ VII. 184

¹⁰⁹ IX 61. Balarāma, however, was not satisfied with Kṛṣṇa's justification (which he regarded as धर्मच्छल) of Bhīma's acts and, having again blamed, Bhīma and blessed Durvodhana, he left for Dvārakā, to the Pāṇḍavas' extreme regret.

¹¹⁰ X. 17-18.

¹¹¹ X. 8. Dhṛṣṭadyumna, Draupadī's sons, etc., were killed by Aśvatthāman during the night-attack.

¹¹² IX. 63

¹¹³ It is said that Yudhiṣṭhira was very anxious to have पतिव्रता Gāndhārī pacified by Kṛṣṇa before the Pāṇḍavas met her lest she should destroy them all by the strength of her unique austerities. Kṛṣṇa went there, succeeded in temporarily pacifying Gāndhārī and Dhṛtarāṣṭra and hastily returned, with Dhṛtarāṣṭra's permission, to save the Pāṇḍavas from Aśvatthāman's proposed night-attack (*vide* IX. 64).

¹¹⁴ XI. 11.

Pāṇḍavas met Dhṛtarāṣṭra who along with Gāndhārī was going to the battlefield after the *Sarptika* tragedy. Kṛṣṇa, discerning Dhṛtarāṣṭra's intention to kill Bhīma, placed before him an iron image of Bhīma which he, taking it to be Bhīma himself, crushed to pieces. When subsequently Dhṛtarāṣṭra began to repent, Kṛṣṇa informed him of the reality, consoled¹¹⁵ him and reconciled¹¹⁶ him with the Pāṇḍavas. Kṛṣṇa's reassurances were always a great boon to the Pāṇḍavas, e.g., VII 82-83 (when he reassured anxious Yudhiṣṭhira regarding Arjuna's competence to kill Jayadratha and promised himself to do everything necessary to ensure Arjuna's victory), VIII 93 (when he reassured Arjuna himself regarding his victory over Karna in the ensuing fight), X 15 (when he promised¹¹⁷ to revive in due course of time Uttarā's issue burnt by Aśvatthāman's *Brahmaśīras* missile), etc., etc. Finally¹¹⁸ he took Yudhiṣṭhira, who was extremely dejected at the destruction of the Kuru race, to Bhīṣma on his death-bed to receive instructions on *Dharma* and other matters with a view to calming his mind.

Kṛṣṇa's spiritual guidance once averted a curiously serious situation of the Pāṇḍavas. When Yudhiṣṭhira, who had been vanquished¹¹⁹ and humiliated by Karna only some hours ago, saw¹²⁰ Arjuna having returned to the camp without killing Karna, he suspected¹²¹ him to have escaped from Karna's fear and tauntingly asked¹²² him to hand over the bow Gāṇḍīva to Kṛṣṇa who, he said, would surely

¹¹⁵ XI 11 30, 12

¹¹⁶ XI. 12.

¹¹⁷ *Vide* X 15 30ff for Kṛṣṇa's unsuccessful tactics to make Aśvatthāman spare one issue of the Pāṇḍavas

¹¹⁸ XII. 1ff and 49ff.

¹¹⁹ VIII 44. 77ff.

¹²⁰ VIII. 70.

¹²¹ VIII. 71. 1ff

¹²² VIII 71 33ff

slay Karna instantly. Thereupon Arjuna furiously drew¹²³ his sword to slay Yudhiṣṭhira and informed Kṛṣṇa that he was doing so as he had vowed to slay the man who asked him to give off the bow Cāndīva to anybody else. Kṛṣṇa rebuked Arjuna for trying the ignoble, explained to him the course of *Dharma* and suggested means¹²⁴ to get rid of the difficulty. But for Kṛṣṇa's timely intervention the situation might have proved an irrevocable tragedy.

KṚṢṆA'S TRIUMPH IN THE PĀṆḌAVA'S VICTORY

Naturally enough, Kṛṣṇa was the first man to be pleased with the Pāṇḍavas' achievements and he never lost any occasion to congratulate them on their success. [cude VI 120, 65ff (on Bhīma's fall), VII, 149, 150 (on Jayadratha's death) 181 (on Karna's loss of बासवी शक्ति), 192 (on Dhr̥ṣṭadyumna's rescue by Sātyaki from Drona), VIII 55 (on the Saṁsaptakas' destruction), 98, 100, 101 (on Karna's death), IX 63 (on the Pāṇḍavas' final victory after Duryodhana's fall), etc.]

CONCLUSIONS

AN APPRECIATION—KṚṢṆA A UNIQUE STATESMAN

Such is the part Kṛṣṇa played in the Mahābhārata War. We may freely reject exaggerations¹²⁵ and the ac-

¹²³ VIII. 72.

¹²⁴ Kṛṣṇa suggested गुरुनिष्ठा as a substitute for गुरुवध. Arjuna, however, got extremely pained for having humiliated Yudhiṣṭhira as suggested by Kṛṣṇa and wanted to commit suicide. Kṛṣṇa again suggested that आत्मगुणप्रशंसा is just like आत्मवध and pressed Arjuna for self-praise. Kṛṣṇa thereafter apologised to Yudhiṣṭhira who, pained at Arjuna's humiliating words, had risen to repair to the penance-forest, saying 'मच्छदादवमानोऽयं कृतस्त्वव महीपते,' etc. Yudhiṣṭhira was satisfied and Kṛṣṇa reconciled him with Arjuna.

¹²⁵ E.g., Kṛṣṇa giving one अर्बुद (one thousand million) warriors to Duryodhana etc.

counts¹²⁶ calling for a belief in Kṛṣṇa's supernatural powers or take them in the figurative sense. Still Kṛṣṇa's achievements appear none the less glorious. Possibly, in Kṛṣṇa's absence the Pāṇḍavas could not have gathered their forces of seven *akṣauhīṇīs*. Then there was every possibility of their having given up war for want of self-confidence or because they were unwilling to slay hostile relations, etc. Then again but for Kṛṣṇa's tactful handling of respective situations it would not have been possible for them to vanquish or slay Bhīṣma, Bhūriśravas, Jayadratha, Droṇa, Karna, Duryodhana and others. Rather there was every possibility of the Pāṇḍavas' falling victims to the fatal missiles (e.g., the Vāsavī Śakti, the Bhārgava, Nārāyaṇa, and Brahmaśiras missiles, etc.) of the enemies or of their being taken captive by the Kauravas. Thus all the main achievements of the Pāṇḍavas leading to their final victory in the war were due principally to Kṛṣṇa's tactful guidance. Numerous references¹²⁷ are made to Kṛṣṇa's guidance as the main strength of the Pāṇḍavas in the war and the account of Kṛṣṇa's war activities fully justifies them. In fact, Kṛṣṇa's war activities (like several others in the Mahābhārata) reveal him as a supreme statesman most beneficial to the friend and most formidable to the foe.

¹²⁶ E.g., Kṛṣṇa exhibiting his *Viśvarūpa* to the Kauravas and to Arjuna, creating darkness before Jayadratha's death, transforming Bhagadatta's *Vaiṣṇava* missile into the *Vaijayantī* garland, keeping cool the fire set by the enemies' missiles to Arjuna's chariot for several days by his mere presence on it, etc., etc.

¹²⁷ E.g., by Dhrtarāṣṭrā (V. 22, 52, 53, 57, 65, VI. 49, VII. 10ff, etc.), by Sañjaya (V. 25, 29, 50, VII. 183, etc.), by Yudhisthira (V. 28; VIII. 200; VIII. 71, 74, 101; IX. 61, etc.), by Arjuna (V. 48; VI. 21; VII. 76; VIII. 78, etc.), by Bhīṣma (V. 62, 169; VI. 65, 81, 98, etc.), by Droṇa (VII. 33, etc.), by Sālyā (VIII. 32, 33, 39, etc.), by Vyāsa (VII. 203, etc.), by the Pāṇcālas (IX. 18, etc.), even by Karna (VII. 2, VIII. 83, etc.), by Duryodhana (VII. 183) and by others. *Vide* also Kṛṣṇa himself (VII. 79, 181, 182, 183, etc.).

KṚṢṆA GUILTY OF THE FRONDS IN THE WAR

Although the political aspect of Kṛṣṇa's entire war activities is undoubtedly supreme, the moral aspect of many of them is decidedly gloomy. Thus the frauds he taught in killing Bhīṣma, Pāṇḍravas, Droṇa, Karṇa and Duryodhana can by no means be morally justified,¹²⁸ and they can do no justice to the supremely divine character generally attributed to him in the Mahābhārata. The justifications¹²⁹ offered by Kṛṣṇa himself may well satisfy a Kṛṣṇa but not a Gāndhī. Hence Kṛṣṇa's war activities (as the several other incidents in the Mahābhārata) represent him as a *human* politician par excellence, in spite of the author's tendency¹³⁰ to identify him with God of gods.

KṚṢṆA'S FAILURES, ETC.

Kṛṣṇa's human character can be corroborated from several other facts as well. Although he was generally successful in his tactics, yet sometimes he also failed. For instance, his peace-mission, if it was seriously undertaken, was a double failure. Neither could he move Duryodhana to accede to the Pāṇḍavas' demands.

¹²⁸ Kṛṣṇa was vehemently upbraided for these frauds by Bhuriśravas (VII. 143-150) "इदं च यद्विमुक्तं वाष्पांशयैः कृतं त्वया। वासुदेवमृतं नूनं नैतस्वयमुपगच्छते ॥ वा हि नाम प्रमत्ताय परेषां यत्, युज्यते ईदृशं । व्यमने दद्याद्यो न कृष्णान्मदो भवेत् ॥ शान्त्याः सैद्धिष्टकर्मणाः प्रकृत्यैव च गर्हिताः । वृत्तायन्वकाः कथं पार्थ प्रमत्ता भवता कृताः" etc.), by Duryodhana (IX. 62, 23ff. "नित्येभ्योर्बहुभिर्न ते लज्जा न न शृणा" etc.), by Aśvatthāman (X. 9, 28ff. "विगस्तु कृष्णं वाष्पांशयै" etc.) and by others.

¹²⁹ E.g., IX. 62, etc. It is remarkable that after the mutual upbraiding of Kṛṣṇa and Duryodhana the Gāndharyas showered flowers on Duryodhana and not on Kṛṣṇa.

¹³⁰ This tendency sometimes appears absurd in the light of the context. Thus, for instance, Kṛṣṇa, after being upbraided by dying Bhuriśravas, is said to have granted him supreme *lokas*, notwithstanding the fact that immediately thereafter he was further tormented and put to death by Satyaki' (VII. 143-150ff.)

nor could he win as he expected to do any of Duryodhana's allies to the Pāṇḍavas' side. Again his two attempts to persuade Karna to join the Pāṇḍavas were failures. Again he failed to maintain his alleged vow not to actively participate in the war and, alarmed at his friends' distress, attacked Bhīṣma to give a proof of his human character. Again many of his urgings to Arjuna to slay particular opponents¹³¹ unlike his other urgings, did not bear the usual fruit. Again he did not succeed in satisfying Balarāma by means of his arguments justifying Bhīma's fraudulent murder of Duryodhana. Further Kṛṣṇa, with his best efforts, could not move Aśvatthāman to withdraw his *Brahmaśiras* missile from Uttarā's issue. Further he could not reduce the enormously heavy costs that the Pāṇḍavas had to pay lamentably for achieving their final victory. He is said to have divinely foreseen¹³² Aśvatthāman's intended night-attack; and the Pāṇḍavas' own safety from it seems to be attributed to him. In that case, however, there is no reason why Kṛṣṇa did not foresee and avert the destructions of Abhimanyu,¹³³ Draupadī's sons¹³⁴ and others. Obviously these are failures, quite natural to a human statesman but quite unharmonious with Supreme God. His swoons and physical injuries mentioned above, too, reveal his human character.

¹³¹ E.g., Aśvatthāman (VIII 52), Kṛtavarma (VII 92), Duryodhana (VII. 102, IX. 26, etc.), etc.

¹³² IX. 64

¹³³ Kṛṣṇa's own sister's son, often mentioned as कृष्णस्य प्रियः and educated by Kṛṣṇa and Pradyumna in the science of warfare at Dvārakā

¹³⁴ Kṛṣṇa's attachment to them is mentioned at III 185 and 236 where Kṛṣṇa is said to have taken them from Drupada's city to Dvārakā and reared and educated them there as affectionately as Abhimanyu Aniruddha etc

KṚṢṆA HUMAN AND NOT DIVINE

Thus it seems that at least originally¹³⁵ Kṛṣṇa was regarded as a human character. When later on he was identified with Supreme God, the later editors of the Mahābhārata probably saw these frauds, failures, etc., as difficulties in the way of the identification and consequently invented several apologetic myths¹³⁶ with a view to doing away with the difficulties. The Purāṇic accounts went further still and they made failure practically impossible with Kṛṣṇa.

KṚṢṆA'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR.

A question now arises "Who was responsible for this destructive war?" As far as the bulk of proof and direct assertions¹³⁷ are concerned, the entire responsibility goes with Duryodhana, as it was his refusal to accede to the Pāṇḍavas' demands that forced them to wage war with him. However it looks rather odd that an extraordinary¹³⁸ monarch of Duryodhana's type, under whom the whole country prospered immensely

¹³⁵ Originally, even the *Bhagavadgītā* seems to have been a simple political episode, viz., Kṛṣṇa, a statesman, rousing dejected Arjuna, the hero of the war, to action. The philosophy, which is accepted at all hands to be based on the Upanisads, seems to have been added later on when Kṛṣṇa came to be regarded as God of gods. As a parallel instance, reference may be made to the development of the simple ritualistic Naciketas story in the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa*, III. 11. 8, into the *Kāthopaniṣad* where the original story appears merely as an introduction to the philosophical bulk [vide S. O. Vidyāratna's Introduction to *Kāthopaniṣad* (Sacred Books of the Hindus Series, Vol. XXII, p. 119ff)]

¹³⁶ E.g., "Kṛṣṇa, though powerful, did not like to make Brahman's ordination false," "Kṛṣṇa encouraged the fraud in order to enable Bhīma to make true his resolve to break Duryodhana's thighs, or to make true Maitreya's curse (III. 10.) to Duryodhana," etc., etc.

¹³⁷ VI. 49, etc.

¹³⁸ Vide V. 27, etc.; also *Kirātārjunīya*, Canto 1, where Duryodhana's excellent management of the state is shown to be a source of acute anxiety to the Pāṇḍavas in exile!

and if one ever had a cause for complaint should not agree to grant a just claim even of his adversaries and a sympathetic study of the entire passages tends to show that perhaps there is also another side of the case which has been neglected or purposely obscured by the pro-Pāṇḍava or pro-Kṛṣṇa editors of the Mahābhārata. As the Pāṇḍavas took the initiative in the war and Duryodhana only accepted their challenge the question of Duryodhana's responsibility can be decided by settling the justness¹³⁹ or otherwise of his cause.

The Pāṇḍavas had lost in the well-known gambling and by the conditions¹⁴⁰ thereof they had to spend twelve years in exile and the thirteenth year in disguise. If they were not discovered till the end of the thirteenth year they were entitled to receive back their share from the Kauravas, otherwise, if any of them was discovered during the year they were again required to spend further thirteen years in the same way. Perhaps when Duryodhana refused to restore their share to the Pāṇḍavas showing his unchallengeable conviction regarding the justness of his own cause with the words "Dharma is with me," he seems to have meant that the Pāṇḍavas had failed to fulfil strictly the conditions of the gambling and were discovered before the completion of the thirteenth year. This view can be supported by certain passages in the Mahābhārata which are naturally very few.

When during their campaign^{140a} against Virāṭa the

¹³⁹ Only the post-Dyūta incidents are taken into consideration in the following review. It is possible to argue that the Kauravas were not justified in depriving the Pāṇḍavas of their share by means of the alleged fraudulent gambling. But then it is also possible to assert that even Pāṇḍu himself, not to speak of the Pāṇḍavas, was not legally entitled to any share in the kingdom which wholly belonged to Dhītarāṣṭra alone. Both these points are ignored as going too far beyond the province of the paper.

¹⁴⁰ II. 98-104f.

^{140a} The campaign was undertaken by the Kauravas mainly with the object of discovering the Pāṇḍavas. On hearing (V. 29

Kauravas came to know that the Pandavas were still in Virāt which was defending Virāt's son Janak's son. Bhīma expressed¹⁴¹ his extreme triumph in having been able to discover one of the Pāṇḍavas before their completion of the year of disguise and thereby to retain their share for further thirteen years. Bhīṣma tried¹⁴² to defend the Pāṇḍavas by giving some astronomical details but he relied too much on "Yudhiṣṭhira's usual way of right". That Duryodhana's view was right is proved by the fact that Yudhiṣṭhira, who was anxiously watching for the completion of the year had to postpone¹⁴³ the day of their public appearance by some days even after Arjuna's return from the battle field. Hence it is not unlikely that the Pāṇḍavas had really lost their cause and were due to spend further thirteen years similarly in exile and disguise.

This likely fact can be corroborated by some other evidence also. Balarāma's advice¹⁴⁴ to the Pāṇḍavas to *propitiate* the Kauravas and then peacefully to move them to restore their share to them probably shows that the Pāṇḍavas could not rightfully claim their share but could only beg it. This implies that the Pāṇḍavas had failed to fulfil strictly the conditions of the gambling. Again, Saṁjaya¹⁴⁵ advised the Pāṇḍavas to live further in exile or even as beggars in the dominions of the Andhaka and the Vṛṣas rather than wage war in case the Kauravas rejected the restoration of

26th) Kīcaka to have been slain mysteriously, Dronādharm shire dily suspected (V. 32-22th) Bhīma to have made that achievement and consequently he undertook the campaign to publicly verify his impression of the Pāṇḍavas' residence in Virāt's city during the thirteenth year.

¹⁴¹ IV. 47. 30

¹⁴² IV. 52

¹⁴³ IV. 73.

¹⁴⁴ V. 2

¹⁴⁵ V. 27. Saṁjaya's high regard for Kṛṣṇa and the Pāṇḍavas is conspicuous throughout in the Mahābhārata and hence his evidence is all the more important.

their share to them. This fact also shows that, even in Sañjaya's view, the Pāṇḍavas had lost their rightful claim over their share. Further, Vidura advocating to Dhṛtarāṣṭra reconciliation with the Pāṇḍavas, constantly harped¹⁴⁶ on the necessity of pardon (क्षमा), referred to Dhṛtarāṣṭra's past generosity and asked him to wipe off Duryodhana's past stain in द्रौपदीकर्मण by restoring their share to them. This as well as Dhṛtarāṣṭra's reply (सर्वं त्वमायतीयुक्तं भाषते राजसंमदम् । न चोत्सहे सुतं त्यक्तुं यतो धर्मस्ततो जयः V 59. 9) to Vidura shows that justice was on the Kauravas' side that the Pāṇḍavas had lost their cause by their own actions and that legally they could have appealed only to the Kauravas' generosity, and not to justice, for the fulfilment of their desires.

It will thus appear that probably Duryodhana was right in denying the justness of the Pāṇḍavas' claims and that, morally speaking, the Pāṇḍavas could not have pressed their demands too far. They, however, did not like to go back to the forest and tried to force Duryodhana to accede to their demands with threats of destruction that was alleged generally to follow hostility with Kṛṣṇa. As Duryodhana thought it below his dignity to yield to such threats, he possibly aware¹⁴⁷ of the consequences, accepted the Pāṇḍavas' challenge for war. Thus, from point of view of right and justice, Duryodhana's action cannot possibly be condemned. The utmost that can be said against him is that he ought not to have shown Shylock's obstinacy and that he ought to have generously restored their share to them. But then, as the Pāṇḍavas were representing their own cause to be just and were frightening him to grant their demands, such a generosity of Duryodhana might have been explained otherwise and would have brought infamy on his चरित्रत्व. Consequently

¹⁴⁶ V 33 55ff

¹⁴⁷ Vide V 68 ~ IX 6 8 et

it possible to give the strength of the movements in a few passages, that the responsibility of the war goes mainly with the Pāṇḍavas rather than with Duryodhana.

However, as the Pāṇḍavas had resigned¹⁴⁸ themselves to Kṛṣṇa's guidance, their responsibility cannot but be transferred wholly to Kṛṣṇa. There is as will be presently shown, every justification for this transference of the responsibility.

At the outset, it is noteworthy that the Pāṇḍavas themselves were very anxious¹⁴⁹ to avoid the destructive war and that Kṛṣṇa always rebuked¹⁵⁰ them for showing weakness of mind and encouraged them for war by rousing their fury with references to the Kauravas' alleged offences. From the very beginning he used to assert¹⁵¹ that reconciliation with the Kauravas was impossible and that the Pāṇḍavas must vanquish the Kauravas at all costs. He thus seems to have been cherishing extremely angry feelings against the Kauravas and to have been bent on their destruction. Consequently he never desired for peace; and when he undertook the peace-mission, his real aim seems to have been nothing but to divide Duryodhana from his allies and to profess his desire for peace. He plainly said¹⁵² that he was quite pessimistic regarding the result of his mission but that he had undertaken it with a view to avoiding future blame for himself. When he started on the mission, Yudhiṣṭhira, Arjuna, Nakula and even Bhīma¹⁵³ requested him to effect peace at all costs. Even then Kṛṣṇa instead of assuring them that he would do his best roused their fury

¹⁴⁸ V. 28, etc.

¹⁴⁹ *Ide* V. 71-73ff; 77, 79, etc.

¹⁵⁰ *Ide* V. 74-76, etc.

¹⁵¹ V. 29, etc.

¹⁵² V. 93, etc.

¹⁵³ V. 73ff.

against the Kauravas and prepared them to fight. Further when he returned from the futile mission, he did his utmost to prejudice the Pāṇḍavas not only against Duryodhana, Karna, etc., but also against Bhīṣma¹⁵⁴ Droṇa, etc. In fact, Sañjaya says¹⁵⁵ that it was Kṛṣṇa who had caused the destructive war after his futile peace-embassy.

There is distinct evidence to show that peace-making was quite possible for Kṛṣṇa and that many persons¹⁵⁶ had been expecting Kṛṣṇa to make that achievement. This shows that Kṛṣṇa was not serious in his peace-mission which, he confessed, he had undertaken only with a view to avoiding future blame for himself. Gāndhārī plainly said that Kṛṣṇa had been purposely insincere and that he could have saved the disastrous conflict. She is said¹⁵⁷ to have cursed Kṛṣṇa for this insincerity or deliberate indifference saying that as he had made the two parties kill each other, so he, too, would slay his own people in huge numbers and would himself die a miserable death after thirty-six years. Although Kṛṣṇa tried to deny¹⁵⁸ her allegations, her curse is said¹⁵⁹ to have taken effect. All this shows that Kṛṣṇa was highly responsible for the immense destruction in the war.

As to what Kṛṣṇa's own purpose was by causing this

¹⁵⁴ V. 154. Kṛṣṇa depreciated Duryodhana and said that neither Bhīṣma nor Droṇa advised Duryodhana to make peace with the Pāṇḍavas—a statement that goes, probably purposely, against the recorded speeches of Bhīṣma, Droṇa, etc., during Kṛṣṇa's peace-mission.

¹⁵⁵ VII. 114. 53.

¹⁵⁶ *Vide* Arjuna (V. 77-78), Gāndhārī (XI. 25. 34ff), sage Udaṅka (XIV. 53) and others. Kṛṣṇa admitted his own competence to effect peace but said that the achievement required divine efforts which he would not make (V. 78).

¹⁵⁷ XI. 25

¹⁵⁸ XI. 26

¹⁵⁹ XVI. 3

restative it is difficult to say. He is not yet the Kauravas seem to have had friendly relations to the beginning of the Pāṇḍava-¹⁵⁵ struggle. It was rather due to his influence¹⁵⁶ that Dhṛtadyaṁ had given to the Pāṇḍavas a share in the kingdom. Later the relations seem to have grown bitter perhaps mainly due to the Kauravas' alleged offences against the Pāṇḍavas. However, there seems to be one more cause vitally connected with Kṛṣṇa and it seems to have made Kṛṣṇa head on the Kauravas' destruction. It was that Karna during the course of his *Duryodhana* on behalf of Duryodhana had vanquished the Vṛṣṇas and subdued the western country.¹⁵⁷ Kṛṣṇa thereupon seems to have realised the danger to his supremacy from the Kauravas and seems, as in the case of Jarāsaṁdha to have decided¹⁵⁸ upon their destruction by all possible means. He therefore was anxious to avail of this occasion to have the Kauravas destroyed by the Pāṇḍavas and did everything fair and foul to give effect to his wishes.

Kṛṣṇa is said¹⁵⁹ to be Viṣṇu incarnate born, at the Creator's request, on the earth for relieving her of her burden. Although the idea of Kṛṣṇa's giving relief to the earth by the destruction of sinners carries sanctity with it, it is possible for a vigilant eye to trace in it Kṛṣṇa's responsibility for the huge destruction in the Mahābhārata War.

¹⁵⁵ I 227

¹⁵⁶ III 255-17 वृष्णिभिः सह संगम्य पश्चिमामपि निर्जयन्" etc. That "संगम्य" implies hostility and not friendship follows from the context.

¹⁵⁷ *Udd* Duryodhana, V 68, 7 (भगवान्वैष्णवीपुत्रो नाकांश्चेन्नहनिष्यत् । प्रवदन्तुने सव्यं नाह गच्छेद्य केगवम् ॥) and IX 68-28, (जगत्सतः प्रभावं च कृष्णम्यामिततेजस । तेन न व्याधितग्राहं न धर्मात्स्वनुद्धितात् ।)

¹⁵⁸ I 65-39ff and all the Purāṇas. It is interesting to see that the *ब्रह्महर्षण* epithet even is attributed to Duryodhana in VI 8

THE TAITTIRĪYA VĀRTIKA OF SUREŚVARA: A STUDY :

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THE AUTHOR

The author of these Vārtikas on the Bhāṣya of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya on Taittirīya Upaniṣad, is one of Śaṅkara's own pupils, named Sureśvara or Sureśa, respectfully called Sureśvarācārya. So much is a well-known fact on which there are no two opinions.

The last verse of the present work given below clearly shows this

सुसुक्ष्मसाध्याहस्य भवनाममृतो यतेः ।

शिष्यरचकार तद्भक्त्या सुरेशाख्यो महार्थवित् ॥

There are many other passages in which the author pays respect to his teacher (*vide* Brh Vall , 541 and the verses 2 and 3 in the very beginning) The story of Sureśvara's being a pupil of Śaṅkara is told in the *Śaṅkaradiṇijñāya* of Mādhava. Therein it is said that Śaṅkara had a great controversy with Maṇḍana a Mīmāṃsaka and a pupil of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. Maṇḍana was defeated in the controversy and he became a pupil of Śaṅkara and adopted Sannyāsa-Āśrama (*vide* *Śaṅkaradiṇijñāya*, Canto 8). The

* This is the Introduction to a translation of the *Taittirīya-bhāṣya-vārtika* which I have prepared. The translation will be published later on

same Maṇḍana is known to the name of Suresvara in the 13th Canto, when there was a sort of contest between the two pupils of Śaṅkara, viz. Suresvara or Maṇḍana and Padmapāda or Sauandana, to write a commentary on Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya on the Vedānta-Sūtras. The majority of the pupils were against Suresvara who was previously a Mīmāṃsaka and became a samnyasin only when he was defeated. Therefore Śaṅkara though in favour of Suresvara, did not allow him to write a commentary on his Sūtra-Bhāṣya. He was however asked to submit an original thesis on Vedānta. In compliance with this he wrote his famous book *Naishkarmyasiddhi*. The teacher was very much pleased to read that book and afterwards asked him to write commentaries on his Bhāṣya on the two famous Upaniṣads, viz. *Taittirīya* and *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*. This traditional story is generally accepted, for there is no substantial evidence to disprove it. Yet there are opinions against this which will be given further.

The identity of the author is not involved with only the two names mentioned above. We find as many as five names used in the place of one or other, the three others being Viśvarūpa, Umbeka and Bhavabhūti. The name Viśvarūpa is given to Maṇḍana by the author of the *Dīpāṇḍī* (vide Canto 8, Verse 32), and in another place he is called by the name Umbeka (उम्बेक इत्यभिहितस्य हि तस्य दीर्घस्येति दाम्बवजन-रभिधीयमाना *Saṅ-dīp*, 7 115). But the name Umbeka is also given to Bhavabhūti, the dramatist, the author of the *Mālatīmādhara* and other works. In a very old Manuscript of the *Mālatīmādhara*, the work is attributed to Umbekāchārya the pupil of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and also to Bhavabhūti in another place, thus making the two persons identical.¹ This is supported by the statement of Chitsukhāchārya (*Tattvapradīpikā*, *Nirmaya Sagar*,

¹ See S. P. Pandit. *Gaudaraha* Introduction p. cxxv.

p 265) which runs thus '“नहि पुराह एव सन्नाटकनाटिकादिप्रबन्धविरचन-
मात्रेणानासो भवति भवभूतिः । उक्तञ्चैतदुन्वेकेन ‘यदाप्तोऽपि कस्मैचिदुपदिशति
न स्वयाननुभूतार्थविषयं वाक्यं प्रयोक्तव्यं यथाऽङ्गुल्यग्रे हस्तियूथशतमास्ते ।”
The commentator Pratyagrūpa Bhagvān says, ‘भवभूतिरुन्वेकः’
Thus it comes to mean that the same personality who was
called Bhavabhūti and Umbeka was also called Maṇḍana
and Viśvarūpa and again the same man took the name
Sureśvara MM Dr Ganganatha Jha seems inclined to
accept this position when he gives the following remark
in his Introduction to the *Bhāvanāvivēka* of Maṇḍana
Miśra “ So far as the recorded statements are concerned
the identity proposed will not be inconsistent with any of
them Nor will there be any anachronism, because Bhava-
bhūti, if the *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* is to be relied upon, was a
contemporary of Lalitāditya of Kāshmir and of Yaśo-
varman of Kanauj.”

Pandit Gopīnāth Kavirāj also supports that Maṇḍana
and Umbeka are the names of the same person (Introduc-
tion to *Tantravārtika—Translation*). He says, “ And there
is reason to believe, as Mādhavāchārya says, in the *Saṅkara-
digvijaya*, that Umbeka was only another name of Maṇḍana
Miśra” (P. xix) And on the strength of this identity,
he supposes that there was a commentary on the *Tantra-
vārtika* by Bhaṭṭa Umbeka (taken as the same as
Maṇḍana), as observed by Kṛṣṇadeva To this he adds
that the author of the *Sāstriadīpikā* refers to Maṇḍana as a
commentator on the *Tantravārtika*. This latter state-
ment seems to be incorrect For, if Mr Kavirāj refers to
the lines उक्तं ह्येतदाचार्यैः—धारावर्थव्यतिरेकेणविवृतं चैतन्मण्डनेन—कथ्य-
मानाद्रूपभेदाद्द्विधा धारावर्थसङ्गतिः । अन्यत्त्वादानुकूलात्मा भावना किं प्रदुष्यति’,
the verse in the name of Maṇḍana belongs to his *Bhāvanā-
vivēka* (vide p 80, *Sarasvatī Bhavan* text) and not to
his commentary on the *Tantravārtika* No other reference to
Maṇḍana is to be found in that *adhikaraṇa*. However,
this is a separate question

SUREŚVARA AND VIŚVARŪPA

It is generally accepted that Viśvarūpa is another name of Sureśvara the disciple of Śaṅkarāchārya. The writer of the *Śaṅkara-digvijaya* has clearly given this name to the author of the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* and the two *Vārtikas*. The verses 54 and 68 of the *Digvijaya*, Canto 13, run thus.

नैष्कर्म्यसिद्ध्यर्थनिबन्धमेकं

कृत्वाप्तपूज्याय विवेच्य चाप्तवा ।

विश्वात्ममुक्त्वाथ पुनर्बभाषे

स विश्वरूपो गुरुमात्मदेवम् ॥ (54)

इत्थं स उक्तो भगवत्पदेन श्रीविश्वरूपो विदुषां वरिष्ठः ।

चकार भाष्यद्वयवार्तिकं द्वे ह्यज्ञा गुरुणा ह्यविचारणीया ॥ (68)

Viśvarūpa has also written *Bālakrīḍā*, a commentary (perhaps the oldest) on Yājñavalkya's *Smṛti*. Scholars are of opinion that this Viśvarūpa is none else than the disciple of Śaṅkara named Sureśvara. Dr. Jolly in his article on Viśvarūpa (*Journal of Indian History*, Vol. III, p. 6), has made the following remarks: "The two existing commentaries² call Viśvarūpa by the name of Sureśvara. Mādhavāchārya, on the other hand, substitutes Viśvarūpāchārya for Sureśvara and so does the *Śaṅkara-digvijaya*. Besides, the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, a work ascribed to Sureśvarāchārya is similar in style and method to the *Bālakrīḍā* which confirms the identity of Viśvarūpa with Sureśvarāchārya."

There is other evidence also to show the identity of Sureśvara and Viśvarūpa. As Mr. P. V. Kane has it (J.B.B.R.A.S., 1925, pp. 205-207), in *Parāśaramādhyama* (Bombay Sanskrit Series, Vol. 1, Part I, p. 57) a verse³

² On *Bālakrīḍā*.

³ इदञ्च वाक्यं नित्यकर्मविषयत्वेन वार्तिके विश्वरूपाचार्य उदाहरणम् । आत्रेय फलार्थ इत्यादि ह्यापस्तम्बस्मृत्युक्तेर्देवः । फलवत्त्वं समाचष्टे नित्यानामपि कर्मणाम् ।
(Ānandāśrama Text of the *Vārtikas* आत्रेयनिमित्ते (c))

from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Bhāṣya-Vātika* (1. 1 97) of Sureśvara is ascribed to Viśvarūpa, and in the *Purūsārtha-prabodha* of Brahmānanda Bhāratī, the *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*, a work of Sureśvara, is ascribed⁴ to Viśvarūpa. Mr Kane writing about the commentary of Viśvarūpa on Vājñavalkya, says that the style of Viśvarūpa is simple and forcible and resembles that of Śaṅkara and that he quotes from the Vedic *Samhitās* and often supports his position by quotations from the *Rgveda*, from the *Brāhmaṇas* and from the *Upaniśads*. These characteristics may support the view that he was a pupil of Śaṅkara. In the light of this evidence we should be naturally inclined to accept that Sureśvara had really another name Viśvarūpa. In the *History of Dharma Shāstra Literature*, Mr Kane has given other statements also which identify Sureśvara and Viśvarūpa (pp 261—63). However so far we do not possess any internal decisive evidence to establish the identity of the commentator of Vājñavalkya and the pupil of Śaṅkarāchārya once for all. But at least we can say that there is sufficient ground for such an identity.

UMBĒKA AND BHAVABHŪTI

It was perhaps for the first time that Umbeka, the pupil of Kumārila was identified with Bhavabhūti, the dramatist, when Mr. S P Pandit found a manuscript of the *Mālatīmādhava*, in which the work was ascribed to the pupil⁵ of Bhaṭṭa Kumārila, to “Umvekāchārya⁶ who attained to his learning through the favour of ‘Śrī

* इत्येवं नैष्कर्म्यसिद्धौ ग्रहांशैर्ब्रह्मवित्तमैः ।

श्रीसद्भिर्विश्वरूपाख्यैराचार्यैः करुणार्णवैः ॥

⁵ इति श्रीभट्टकुमारलिशिष्यकृते मालतीमाधवे तृतीयोऽङ्कः ।

⁶ इति श्रीकुमारलिस्वामिप्रसादप्रासवाचैभवश्रीमदुम्बेकाचार्यविरचिते मालतीमाधवे षष्ठोऽङ्कः ।

Kumārila Svāmī's *Ācārya Bhaṭṭa* Śrīmaten re-
 evidence has been given to the fact that the belief
 The statements of Chitsukhāchārya and Pratyaksvarūpa
 Bhagvān have been already given. At one more place
 (p. 235—*Nirṇay Saṁgraha*) the commentator of the *Chitsukhī*
 mentions the name of Umbeka as the commentator on the
Ślokarārtika. Therefore his statement 'भवभूतिरुद्देकः' cannot
 be of one who lacks information. That Umbeka wrote
 a commentary on the *Ślokarārtika* is also proved from
 the evidence of Anandapūrṇa in the *Udghoṣāgama* referred
 to by M. R. Telanga in his Introduction to the
Mahāvīdyāvidambana; and the words 'Umbekah kūrīkām
 reṭṭi' also seem to express the same thing. Mr. Pandit
 in his Introduction to the *Gaṇḍarāḥa* has pointed
 out that what Bhavabhūti says about himself and
 his family does not seem to be inconsistent with the tradi-
 tion that Kumārila Bhaṭṭa was one of his teachers (p.
 ccvii). He refers to his ancestors as चरणगुरुवः पञ्चपावनाः,
 पञ्चाग्रयः, धृतव्रता and मोक्षपीयूषिनः which shows that his
 family possessed the tradition of Vedic learning which
 includes Mīmāṃsā also. The identification of Bhavabhūti
 with Umbeka, the Mīmāṃsaka and pupil of Kumārila has
 been accepted by MM. Kuppuswami Shastri (*vide* Second
 Oriental Conference pp. 410-11). Mr. Kane raises the
 difficulty (J. B. B. R. A. S., Vol. III, p. 292) that he does not
 utter a word about his proficiency in Mīmāṃsā. This has
 been taken by Mr. Pandit (Intro. *Gaṇḍ*, p. ccviii) as a
 point to support the identification. Bhavabhūti, at least,
 calls himself पदवाक्यप्रमाणाज्ञः in the *Uttararāmcharita*
 which is explained by Vīrarāghava as 'व्याकरणन्यायमीमांसा-
 परिज्ञातेत्यर्थः'. It is known from the commentary that
 Bhavabhūti was only a title of which two explana-
 tions are given, viz.—(i) that a certain king being pleased

⁷ इति श्रीमद्भवभूतिविरचिते मालवीमाधवे षष्ठोऽङ्कः ।

with him gave this title,⁸ or it was Śiva who gave him भूति (extraordinary powers) and therefore he was called भवभूति (भवाद्भूतिरस्य) This was also pointed out by Mr V N Shastri in the *Indian Antiquary*, 1925, p 55 So it seems that so long as we do not get anything contradictory to it, we may accept that Umbeka is another name of Bhavabhūti

MANDANA AND UMBEKA

It is by relying on tradition that some scholars began to think that Umbeka was the name of Maṇḍana. Otherwise there is no other evidence to prove that. There is no doubt about it that Umbeka wrote a commentary on Kumārila's *Śloka-vārtika*. First we have the evidence of the *Yuktisnehaprapāṇā* of Rāmakṛṣṇa, a commentator on the *Śhāstradīpikā* of Pārthasārathī Miśra. Under the very first verse we have “नास्माकं शब्द एव देवता नाकसवामिन्द्रादीनां देवतात्वाङ्गीकारादिति । अतएव वार्तिककारैः ‘विशुद्धज्ञानदेहायेत्यादिना (the first verse of the *Śl Vārt*) ग्रन्थादौ महादेवो नमस्कृतः । इत्यञ्च मट्टोम्बेकेन ग्रन्थारम्भेऽभिमतदेवतानमस्कारं करोति वार्तिककारः ।” Pratyakṣavarūpa Bhagavān in *Nayanaprasādinī* on the *Chit-sukhī* (p. 235, Nir Sag Ed) quotes a verse⁹ from the *Śloka-vārtika* and gives the explanation given by Umbeka (Umbeka). Thirdly Anandapūrṇa, the author of the *Vidyā-sāgarī* on Śrīharsa's *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍa-khūḍya* (p 75) quotes two verses¹⁰ from the *Śloka-vārtika*, and gives the explanation of Uveka (Umbeka). Umbeka might have written his commentary on the *Tantravārtika* also but we have no other proof for that except the statement of Kṛṣṇadeva

⁸ “एतत्कृत-‘साम्बा पुनानु भवभूतिविक्रमूर्तिः’ इति श्लोकश्रवणसन्तुष्टो राजा भवभूतिरित्येनं व्यापयामासेति कथात्रानुसन्धेया । ... किंवास्मै कवये ईश्वर एव भित्तिरूपेणागत्य भूतिं दत्तावानिति वदन्ति ।”

⁹ The verse runs as सम्बन्धो व्याप्तिरिष्टात्र etc.

¹⁰ संवृतेर्ननु सत्यत्वं . मुषा चेत्सत्यता कथम् and सत्यत्वं न च सामान्यं..... वृत्तसिंहो (*Sl Vā* p 218)

That Maṇḍana is a commentator on the *Ācārśāstrīka* on the basis of the words 'विवृतं चैतन्मण्डनेन' of the *Śāstrī adīpikā* has been shown to be incorrect. And there are strong reasons to prove that Maṇḍana is not Umbeka. In the South Indian reading of the verse उम्बेकः कारिकां वेत्ति etc. as Prof. Kuppuswami Sastri points out we have मण्डनस्तूयं वेत्ति which differentiates ¹¹ from Maṇḍana. Still more conclusive proof is that Umbeka in his commentary on the *Bhāvanāśīveka*, points out different readings, which is not possible if the commentator and the author are identical. Even the writing a commentary on his own work will have to be taken as done doubly here if we take the commentator to be the same as the author. This also occurred to Dr. Gangadhar Jha when he remarked, "But this condition is fulfilled by the *Bhāvanāśīveka* itself and the writing of a separate commentary upon both the metrical and prose portions of the original by the author himself would appear to be a departure from the ordinary ways of the writer." It will not be out of place to note that Maṇḍana is called Miśra while Umbeka is called Bhaṭṭa. Mr. T. R. Chintānami (*Journal of Oriental Research*, 1929, pp. 42, 43-47) takes it to be proved that Umveka (Bhavabhūti) and Maṇḍana were two different persons and gives them different dates, viz. 655-720 and 650-700 respectively. Mr. P. V. Kane also, differentiates between Maṇḍana and Umbeka and the dates given to them by him for their literary activities are 680-710 A.D. and 700-730 A.D. respectively.

¹¹ तदुक्तं—'तिरोदधाति कर्तारं प्रधानं तन्निबन्धनम्' इति । प्रधानं कर्तारं तिरोदधाति कर्तुः प्राधान्यादित्यर्थः । अथवा तिरोदधाति कर्तारमिति प्रतिज्ञायते । तत्र हेतुः प्रधानं तन्निबन्धनमिति । यस्मात् प्रधानं करणान्निबन्धनं न साक्षात्कर्तृनिबन्धनं तेन कर्ता करणेन फलातिरोधीयते । प्राधान्यं तन्निबन्धनादिनि नु समाचीनः पाठः ।
Bhāvanāśīveka (commentary) p. 77

MANDANA AND SUREŚVARA

The most vexed question is that of the identity of Mandana and Sureśvara. It is a very old tradition and is generally accepted by Pandits that Mandana who was first a Mimāṃsaka became a Vedāntin after being defeated in the controversy with Śaṅkara which was held on the condition of conversion. Dr Ganganatha Jha in his Introduction to the *Bhāvanāviveka* and Pandit G. N. Kavirāja in his Introduction to Dr Jha's Translation of the *Tantravārtika* did not question this tradition. It was Prof. S. Kuppaswami Shastri who first made the following remarks in the Third Oriental Conference: "In my critical introduction to my edition of the *Brahmasiddhi* to be issued shortly, it will be proved beyond any reasonable doubt that Mandana-Sureśvara equation in the history of Advaita is a myth . . . and that Maṇḍana is not, but Sureśvara undoubtedly is, a disciple of Śaṅkara. (see *Report*, p 480). The present writer is not in possession of the *Brahmasiddhi*, which does not seem to have yet been published. Therefore Mr Kuppaswami Shastri's points cannot be given here. Mr. P. V. Kane in his article on the predecessors of Vijñāneśvara (J B B R.A.S., 1925, p 207) accepted that both Bhavabhūti and Maṇḍana Miśra were probably the pupils of Kumārila and that the first also was called Umbeka and the latter Sureśvara or Viśvarūpa. In his later note (J B B R.A.S., 1927, p 293), after discussing some chronological points, he says, "If the traditional date of Śaṅkara (viz., 788—820 A.D.) is correct then the literary activity of Sureśvara, the pupil of Śaṅkara will ordinarily lie between 810—830 A.D. This shows that between Maṇḍana and Sureśvara there will be a gap of about hundred years. Unless and until it is proved that the traditional date of Śaṅkara is entirely wrong we must hold it as established that Mandana

and Sureśvara are different persons altogether. He also points out that had Sureśvara been a pupil of Kumārila in previous days, he could not have referred to him as Mīmāṃsakanmanya (see verses 9 and 10 of the present work¹²). The first verse occurs in the *Ślokarārtika* of Kumārila (p. 371, Benares edition). Prof. M. Hiriyanna in his article named 'Sureśvara and Mandana Miśra' (J R A S., 1923, pp. 259—263) gave some doctrinal differences to show that Maṇḍana and Sureśvara are different personalities. There are three points on which he laid stress: That Maṇḍana holds jīva to be the āśraya of avidyā while Sureśvara maintains that Brahman is the āśraya, that according to Sureśvara, nothing but Brahman persists when liberation takes place but according to Maṇḍana avidyā-nivṛtti as a form of abhāva remains till eternity and that in Maṇḍana's opinion meditation was necessary after the knowledge of the *Upaniṣads* to give the final knowledge, while Sureśvara, as a disciple of Śaṅkara, emphatically denies it. It is difficult to understand how these differences go to prove that the different views necessarily belong to two different persons. When we are told that Maṇḍana in his later life became a disciple of Śaṅkara, it is nothing strange if there be a difference between the views he held before and those he came to accept afterwards. A similar argument is given in Mr. Hiriyanna's Introduction to the *Naiṣkārmyasiddhi* where he says that a view which the commentator has ascribed to Maṇḍana has been criticized by Sureśvara. The same reply can be given in this case also. Sureśvara could legitimately criticise any view which was against Śāṅkara-Vedānta, even if it was his own view before. Two more

¹² मोक्षार्थं न प्रवर्तेत तत्र काम्यनिषिद्धयोः । नित्यैवेति क्लेशं कुर्यात् प्रत्यवाय-
जिहासया ॥ इति सीमासकम्पन्यैः कर्मोक्तं मोक्षसाधनम् । प्रत्याख्यायात्मविज्ञानं
तत्र न्यायेन निर्णयः ॥

evidences have been given by Mr. Hiriyanna to prove that Maṇḍana was not Sureśvara. One of them is of a certain book called *Guru-vaṃśa-lārya* in which it is written that Śaṅkara met Maṇḍana first and then Sureśvara. The book not being before us we cannot say anything about its authority. The second statement¹³ is that of Vidyāranyamuni, the author of *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-vā. tika-sāra*. He states the opinion¹⁴ of the author of the *Brahma-siddhi* (p. 573. Benares Edition) to support a particular interpretation of 'Neti neti'. The commentator on the *Vā. tika-sāra* says that it is the view of Maṇḍana (अत्र मण्डनमिश्र-सम्प्रतिमाह). This can also be explained. The author may be giving the opinion of the same man from a different work of his. But the statement of the commentary, if relied upon, has some weight. For, instead of telling us that the writer was citing from another work he gives the name of Maṇḍana Miśra. Mr. T. R. Chintāmaṇi, for no expressed reasons, has given two different dates to Maṇḍana and Sureśvara thereby making them different (*Journal of Oriental Research*, Madras, 1929, p. 47).

Thus we see that although scholars have begun to raise doubt regarding the identity of Maṇḍana and Sureśvara, there is no substantial evidence to show that clearly Mr. Kane's argument depends on chronology. He relies on the traditional date of Śaṅkara which must be placed back by at least a century. The question of respect for Kumārila has no significance. The word which Sureśvara uses for the supporters or the author of the verse is Mīmāṃsakaṃmanya which literally means one who professes to be a Mīmāṃsaka. This is no disrespect in the proper sense when after the conversion Sureśvara realised

¹³ See the note 'Sureśvara and Maṇḍana' (J. R. A. S., 1924, pp. 96-97).

¹⁴ 'इति प्राह ऋषिसिद्धिश्चरो वेदस्यैव'।

that those who held such view in the Mimamsāśāstra. The conclusion drawn from the statement of the *Vārtika* sūtra may count for something if it is supported by other solid evidence. But we have none at present.

HIS DATE

The date of Sureśvara is closely connected with that of Śaṅkarāchārya, and, if he was the same man as Maṇḍana, with Kumārila Bhaṭṭa too. The traditional date of Śaṅkara presents several difficulties and therefore requires revision. Vāchaspati Miśra whose date has been fixed at 841 A.D. quotes from the *Panchapādikā*, a work of Padmapāda, a disciple of Śaṅkara, and he also criticised Bhāskara who wrote against Śaṅkara. Thus sufficient time should be allowed between Śaṅkara and Vāchaspati. There is another evidence regarding the date of Sureśvara and Śaṅkarāchārya, given by T. R. Chintāmani (*Journal of Oriental Research*, 1929, pp. 43-44), which seems to be stronger. Vidyānanda Jaina quotes one of Sureśvara's verses from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-bhāṣya-vārtika*. This Vidyānanda, the author of the *Aṣṭasāhasī* has been mentioned by Jinasena, the author of the *Bṛhadbhāṣya-purāṇa* which was written in 705 Śaka or 783 A.D. Therefore Sureśvara must be dated in the beginning of the eighth and in the end of the seventh century, and Śaṅkara will have to be placed somewhere in the middle of the seventh century A.D. The arguments given by K. T. Telanga from the internal evidence of the Bhāṣya on Sūtras, in his Introduction to the *Mudrārākṣasa* and those advanced by Mr. Pandit in his Introduction to the *Gauḍaraho*, ultimately lead to the same date. The date of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa can be determined from the date of Bhavabhūti who, we know, was a disciple of Kumārila along with Maṇḍana. His date is fixed as from 350 to 720. Now the date of Sureśvara which is determined

by the above considerations will not conflict with the date of Maṇḍana determined from the date of Bhavabhūti. Thus this chronology will not go against the tradition which maintains that Maṇḍana and Sureśvara are the names of the same person.

No more is known about the earlier life of Sureśvara. The same tradition which identifies him as Maṇḍana, places the great controversy of Maṇḍana and Śāṅkara at Māhismatī and according to other version at Rudrapura in the south. We also know with some certainty that Sureśvara was given the charge of Kāmakotīpīṭha of Kāñchī (Conjeevaram) when Śāṅkara left that place, and the former remained there for life.

HIS WORKS.

From the *Śaṅkaradigvijaya*, we know that the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* was Sureśvara's first attempt. It was his independent work which gives the whole Vedāntic doctrine in a very lucid style. Next he wrote the two *Vārtikas* on the *Śāṅkara Bhāṣyas* on the *Taittirīya* and *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣads*. But these are not the only works of his. Two more of his *Vārtikas* are existent. One of them is a *Vārtika* on Śāṅkara's *Dakṣiṇāmūrtistotra* which is named *Mānasollāsa* by the author and contains 365 verses. The other is a very small *Vārtika* of only 64 verses. This is called *Pañchīkaraṇa-Vārtika*. Both of these were published by the Mysore Government. The second was also published in the Kāshī Sanskrit Series. Pandit Gopinath Kavirāja in his Introduction to the *Tantravārtika Translation* (p. xiii) has referred to Sureśvara's *Vārtika* on Śāṅkara's *Upadeśa-Sāhasrī*. Therefore, there is one more *Vārtika* written by him. There is also a book named *Ścārājyasiddhi* commented upon by Bhāskarānanda Sarasvatī. This is also attributed to Sureśvaracharya. The book is a Vedānta

work is not a text but a commentary on the text of the *Īr* text. It is a very forcible and clear commentary. It is a commentary on the text of the disciple of Śaṅkarāchārya. One more book viz., *Istasiddhi* is ascribed to Sureśvara. But Mr. T. R. Chintamani (his article referred to above) ascribes the work to Vimuktātman.

As Maheśvar Sureśvara is known to be the author of *Vidhicintaka*, *Bhāṣanāṣṭaka*, *Vibhāṣanāṣṭaka*, *Mīmāṃsā-nukraṇapāṭhā*, *Sphoṭasiddhi* and *Pratīyasiddhi*. The first four books have been published and *Pratīyasiddhi* was also to be published from Madras. Nothing can be said about the *Sphoṭasiddhi*.

THE PRESENT WORK

The present work is written to supplement and explain—for this is the function of a *Tīrtika*—the *Bhāṣya* of Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya on the *Taittirīyopaniṣad*. This *Upaṇiṣad* is one of the famous *Upaniṣads* and specially important for the doctrine of the five Kośas, which is not given in any other *Upaniṣad*. In this, both the codes of Advaita Philosophy, viz. practical as well as theoretical, are given. That is why the great spiritual teacher asked his disciple Sureśvara whom he knew to be the fittest man to write on this *Upaniṣad* along with that on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*. In this work the author has closely followed Śaṅkara. There is very little of criticism of other views with which the other *Tīrtika* is so full. Sureśvara clears the words of the *Bhāṣya* where they are less intelligible and sometimes elaborates them with his own comments. His task was only to explain Śaṅkara. Therefore his own views different from Śaṅkara or different from the other branches of Śaṅkara-Vedānta are not easily traceable. The main difference between the two main schools of Śaṅkara's philosophy viz. those of the *Vīramana* and the *Bhāmātī* lies in

the different interpretation of the words of the great teacher. Such a difference is not possible in the direct pupils of Śaṅkara but it develops slowly. By reading only this particular work of Sureśvara it is not possible to collect those fine differences in the small details of *advaita*. It is believed that the Bhāmatī school was developed from Sureśvara through Sarvaśāstramuni who is supposed to be the pupil of Sureśvara. The other school has its origin in the *Pratīkha-pūṭikā* and the *Vīcarāṇa*. It is only after a thorough scrutiny of the matter found in all the books of Sureśvara and those of the other school that any definite conclusions may be drawn as regards the subtle differences to be found in these works. This book is mainly devoted to the interpretation of the *Upaniṣad*. In this book also at one or two places we find long discussions, mainly on the topics of the Mīmāṃsā. They will be pointed out further. The views of opponents are also criticised without naming them. Some of those views perhaps belong to the pre-Śaṅkara Vedāntins. Such discussions and criticisms, are, however, very little in the work, the work mainly following the text of the *Bhāṣya*. At least at one place Sureśvara differs from his teacher, where he (Sureśvara) expresses his opinion very modestly (*Cf. Brahmapallī, 541*).

PRINCIPAL CONTENTS

The *Taittirīyopaniṣad* contains three *vallīs*, viz., *Śikṣā-vallī*, *Brahma-vallī* or *Brahmānanda-vallī* and *Bhṛgu-vallī* and so does the *Vārtika*. The *Śikṣā-vallī* is a sort of introduction which prepares a candidate to grasp the main teaching of the *Upaniṣad*. With the very first introduction of the *Upaniṣad* by Śaṅkara, in the words कर्मोपादान-हेतुपरिहाराय ब्रह्मविद्या प्रस्तूयते which is explained by Sureśvara in two verses very carefully (*vide* Verses 7 and 8), a very impor-

tant que t i u e s t c s f)
 Kumārila which means that liberation is attained by
 action alone and one desirous of liberation must perform
 the नित्य and नैमित्तिक actions. This view is related by
 Śaṅkara and Sūreśvara both in the following manner:
 (1) The compulsory daily performances cannot destroy the
 stored up actions they destroy or rather avert only the sin
 which would be produced by not doing them and even if it is
 supposed that they do destroy past actions they cannot
 destroy good ones, for there is no antagonism with them.
 (2) Liberation cannot be the result of action, for in that
 case it will be अविद्य. If it be held that by the combination
 of knowledge with action the latter will produce a non-
 destructible fruit, that too is not possible. Whatever is begun
 must end. If again अघ्नस (negation through destruction)
 is advanced as a contrary instance the reply is that it is,
 after all, negation. Hence a dissimilar example. Even nega-
 tion does not exist and is not really the effect of anything for
 it can have no relation with साव्यदाय (existent things).
 Then follow Śikṣā, the rules to be observed in reading a
 text, then the meditation over Saṁhitas, then prayer for
 intelligence and health then prayers for wealth, fame and
 pupils. Śaṅkara justifies the prayer for wealth on the
 ground that wealth is necessary for good actions which are
 in turn necessary for destroying sins which again is neces-
 sary to get knowledge. In the fifth chapter the meditation
 over Brahman in the form of the *vyāhṛtis* is described. In
 the sixth, Brahman is described as *manomaya*, etc., and the
 way to get at it is pointed out to be *Suṣumnā*. The next
 chapter describes Brahman in the terms of fivefold things
 (पाङ्क्त) the meditation over which is also a way to reach

“ मोक्षार्थी न प्रवर्तत तत्र काव्यनिषिद्धयोः । नित्यनैमित्तिके कुर्यात् प्रत्यवाय-
 निहासया ॥ इति मीमांसकमन्त्रैः कर्मोक्तं मोक्षसाधनम् । ग्रन्थाख्यायात्मविज्ञानं
 तत्र न्यायेन निर्णय ॥

Prajapat In the eighth chapter the meditation over Brahman as syllable 'Om' is given. Then follow the duties of a meditator. At the end of the tenth chapter Sureśvara says that these actions (viz., meditation, etc.) must be performed so long as the knowledge of Ātman is not produced, for these are the means for that. But when the knowledge is acquired, the whole of कर्मकाण्ड, i.e. the rules for performing actions is useless.

Brahmāranda-vallī —In the beginning of this *Vallī*, it is remarked by the Bhāṣyakāra and the Vārtika-kāra that the *Śikṣā-vallī* dealt with the meditation of Brahman under limitation, the present *Vallī* is begun for the knowledge of Brahman free from limitations. For the latter alone can result in liberation and the former has prosperity (अभ्युदय) as its fruit. Sureśvara remarks here that liberation is not produced. Hence it does not follow action, but knowledge. The desire for liberation (from misery) is natural and one must make effort only if he knows the method. The attainment of Brahman is not like that of a thing separate. It is like the attainment of a tenth person who was really not missing but was ignored in counting, which was wrong. Brahman is not separate from us by time or space. Without such an interpretation the word *brahman* (not limited by time, space or things) will not be applicable.

Apoha-Vāda and Kṣaṇabhaṅga-Vāda —In connection of the interpretation of the words सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म Sureśvara refutes the theory of *Apoha*. These words though expressing the sense, opposite to untruth, ignorance and finiteness, cannot mean 'nothing.' The primary sense of a word is not the negation of things other than those expressed by itself. Really such a sense can be only taken from a sentence, i.e. *Apoha* is not a पदार्थ but a वाक्यार्थ (cf. Vārt. 63 and further). The sentence in question cannot also refer to momentary existence, for such a thing is against

in a series of events there is no destruction of any thing in it. (अतएव न विनाशः ॥ १३॥) Therefore the sentence cannot point to anything of elementary existence.

Ātman - not the agent of knowledge (consciousness) but identical with it - If Ātman is the agent of ज्ञान it will not be सत्य and अनन्त. The modifications in Buddhi which are illumined by the consciousness or Ātman are wrongly attributed to Ātman. Thus it is said that knowledge takes place. Otherwise it is identical with Ātman.

Creation not real - In the *Upanishad* we have the description of creation which begins as तस्माद्वा एतस्मादाद्यमन आकाशः सम्भूतः, etc. While explaining this Sureśvara holds that creation in the true sense is not possible. Brahman is identical with everything (सर्वानन्त), it is changeless, one and neither cause nor effect. In such a condition creation is not possible. There is nothing which can be the cause of creation, everything except Brahman is effect and Brahman too is not the cause. If creation is supposed to be the nature of Brahman there should be always creation. This too is not possible when there is no space (देश) and time (काल) (*Vārt* 142), and if time and space are created they must have other time and space. Thus there is the difficulty called *regressus ad infinitum*. Creation is possible in none of the three times, for Brahman does not belong to any. It is not in the past for it is the cause of all time (the past included). It is not to be in the future for it is not an effect of anything. Creation is not possible even in the present for Brahman (the so-called Creator) is without a second and it is कृतस्थ, changeless. Creation can be of either सन् (existent) or of असन् (non-existent). Both are not possible. What is existent cannot be created and what is non-existent that too cannot be created for it has no relation with any cause. The six modifications of existence are changeless. If not, there will be अनवस्था if the birth of birth is accepted. Again, time, action (धर्म and अधर्म)

and r G 1 must be the cause (निमित्त) of creation for all these are the effect of ignorance (up to 147)

Thus creation is only an illusion and not a reality. This illusion takes rise from Ātman affected by ignorance. All further details are given from *Vārt* 158 onward. From *Vārtika* 166 to 172 a very beautiful description of human birth is given which is based on 'अन्नाद्युत्पत्तिः'; and further the birth of विराट्, बिद्ध and क्षेत्रज्ञ is described (up to 175). Then the nature of अविद्या is described (176—79). Then comes a description of the process of rebirth and the birth of सूक्ष्म and सूक्ष्मशरीर. In this connection the usual troubles in the womb are described in a forceful language and the three ages beginning with childhood are exposed in their dark side in order to create वैराग्य (non-attachment). The description of the modifications which take place in the body is closed with a horrible picture of death. A moral is added to this story in the following words :

माता पिता गुरुसुता स्वजनो ममेति मायोपमे जगति कस्य भवेत्प्रतिज्ञा ।

एक्ये यदा व्रजति कर्मपुरःसरोऽयं विश्रामवृत्तसदृशः खलु जीवलोकः ॥

सार्धं सार्धं वासवृत्तं समेतः प्रातः प्रातस्तेन तेन प्रयान्ति ।

त्यक्त्वाऽन्योन्यं तन्व वृत्तं विहङ्गा यद्वत्तद्विज्ञातयोऽज्ञातयश्च ॥ (*Vārt* 219-20)

While writing these descriptions the philosopher has become almost a poet. At the end it is said that all these modifications (विकाराः) belong to the बिद्धशरीर but due to ignorance the Jīva considers them as his own.

In the chapters two to four the *Vārtika* merely explains the words of the *Bhāṣya* and there is nothing special. These chapters contain the descriptions of the Annamaya Prāṇamaya and Manomaya Kośas. With the description of the Ānandamaya Kośa, an important question is discussed by Śaṅkara and Sureśvara both. Śaṅkara maintains against others whom Sureśvara refers as अपरे पण्डितमन्याः, that Ānandamaya is not Para-Brahman but कार्यब्रह्म. Sureś

varā says that the text *Ānandamaya* is described by calling it *Vibhānamaya* and the other aspect, viz., enjoyer or experiencer is described by calling it *Ānandamaya*. Śaṅkara gives five points in support of his view

- (1) *Ānandamaya* is कर्म because it is spoken in that context. *Annamaya*, etc. are all effects. Therefore *Ānandamaya* is also Kārva.
- (2) The word मयद् expresses a विकार (a modification). If the other meaning of मयद् viz., abundance is taken it will be inconsistent with अक्षमय etc.
- (3) Thirdly, we find the words आनन्दमयमात्मानमुपसंक्रामति in the text. These words will be unintelligible if आनन्दमय is taken to be Para-Brahman. For in that case there will be no room to pass on. Sureśvara observes that संक्रमण (passing) may mean two things, either surpassing (अत्यय) or reaching (प्राप्ति); both are impossible in the case of Para, which is Ātman itself. None can reach the self or surpass it.
- (4) *Ānandamaya* is supposed to possess head, etc., which is not possible in the Para which is devoid of all characteristics.
- (5) Further, there is a mantra about Para which raises a doubt about its existence (असन्नेव स भवति.) etc. Such a doubt is not possible in the case of one who possesses the head and other limbs. The question as to why Bhṛgu did not proceed further from *Ānandamaya* if it was not the end is answered by Sureśvara in two ways. In the *Ānandavallī* Brahman was de-

scribed and the five Kosas given are only the means to reach it. So the means only are given. One who has performed *tapas* with regard to these means must know the end from the Vākya itself. There being nothing to be done, it is left undescribed. Or the word *Ānanda* which is used in 'आनन्दो ब्रह्मेति व्यजानात्', does not mean *Ānandamaya* but *Ānanda* without characteristics which is *Brahman* without doubt.

In the sixth chapter, the discourse being over some questions are raised. Does one without knowledge reach 'that region' (*Brahman*) after death? If one not learned does not reach, what is the proof that a learned man reaches and whether it (the other region, *Brahma-loka*) exists or not? The last question, viz., of existence is first discussed. All effect has a real cause. The world consisting of *Ākāśa*, etc., is effect. Therefore it must have a real cause. It cannot be unreal. For what is not real is no cause. Here the question of entrance (*प्रवेश*) is discussed by the *Bhāṣya* and the *Vārtika* both. All possible ways of entrance are denied in the case of *Ātman*. It is significant that the example of the reflection of the sun in the water is also included here (*Cf. Bhāṣya* जलसूर्यकादिप्रतिबिम्बवत्प्रवेशः स्यादिति चेत्, न, अपरिच्छिन्नत्वादमूर्तत्वाच्च and *Vārtika* 388). This would mean that Śaṅkara and Sureśvara do not favour the view which is called *प्रतिबिम्बवाद*. In the conclusion it is said that the entrance is only supposed in order to emphasise the identity of *Brahman* with the *Jīva* who was spoken of as entered into the cave of intellect. The passage 'सत्यञ्चानृतञ्च सत्यमभवत्' is utilized to deduce three kinds of existence, viz., व्यावहारिक, प्रातिभासिक and पारमार्थिक. Here Sureśvara says that all conception of false existence (which consists of cause and effect) is possible only if *Ātman* is accepted as

really exist it. Secondly, the existence of Brahman is not dependent on the existence of *te-² e(रम्)* even in the absence of external objects. This is a second proof of the existence of Brahman. Thirdly, the combination of *Prāya* etc. cannot work without the existence of one who is not a combination.

Here Śaṅkara says that the arguments supporting the existence are over and now the question उताविद्वान्, etc. is introduced. But Śaṅkara goes on adding the following arguments of fear, etc., to the same point viz., अस्तित्व (cf. भयाभयहेतुत्वाद्विद्वन्विदुषोरिति तद्वक्ष्य नद्वस्वाश्रयणेन ह्यभयं भवति नास्तद्वस्वाश्रयणेन भयनिवृत्तिरुपपद्यते Phayen). And further when Śaṅkara introduces the sentence 'स य एवं विद्', etc., he says that by कार्य (effect) रसस्वाध, प्राणन, प्रभवप्रतिष्ठा and भयदर्शन the question about the existence has been answered and now the question of attainment in the case of the learned is answered. But Śaṅkara with all modesty at his command says that this question also has been answered by 'यदाहि,' etc. Thus all the three questions are answered here.

The question of भेद, अभेद and भेदाभेद.—Here a very important question has been raised by Sankara and has been also discussed by Sureśvara. It is about the identity or otherwise of one who knows and passes with the Para-Brahman. There can be three positions. The knower is different from Brahman or is identical with it—or is both different and identical. If difference (भेद) is accepted it will be against the Śrutis which declare identity, e.g., 'तत्सुद्रा तदेवानुप्रविशत्', and 'अथ योऽन्यां देवतामुपास्तेऽन्योऽसात्त्योऽहमस्मिदि न स वेद'. The opponent would say, if they are accepted as identical passing (संक्रमण) is not possible. The same thing cannot be subject and object both. The sentence ब्रह्मविद् ब्रह्मैव भवति shows that they are the same, for one thing cannot turn into a quite different thing. Still, a question remains. The use of भवति will be useless in that case. A remedy to all this

give in the full way. The attainment in this case is like the attainment of the tenth man, who not counting himself thinks that there are only nine. This attaining is not like the arrival at a village. For in that case the instruction will be regarding the way and not regarding the destination itself as is the case here. The attainment of fearless condition is not possible in *Dvaita* for duality is the cause of fear. Further duality is experienced through ignorance like a second moon by a *taimīrka* (half-blind). Duality is experienced in waking and dreaming state but is not experienced in deep sleep (सुषुप्ति) and meditation (समाधि). Therefore it is false. The authority of सुषुप्ति is not to be questioned for it is the natural state not dependent on anything external.

If the dualist says that fear is caused not by Īśvara alone but with अधर्म (demerit) the answer is that in that case too fear cannot be removed for अधर्म is an unvariable concomitant of जीवत्व (the condition of being a Jīva). Therefore it is better to accept ignorance as the cause of duality and fear both. The भेदाभेद view is not criticised for it is obviously self-contradictory.

The Meaning of Saikrānti.—The *saikrānti* spoken of here is not an actual action. It is only a mental action. Thus alone the difficulty of subject and object being in the same is removed, i.e., Ātman knows itself in different ways. Moreover the differences of subject and object are due to ignorance. They are removed with it. Suresvara says that *saikrānti* also means the removal of the connection with the *guhā*. The eighth chapter ends here.

In the next chapter, it is pointed out in the very beginning that Brahman is not the object of knowledge (प्रत्यय), and name (अभिधान) is not applicable to it. Hence the verse यतो वाचो निर्वर्तन्ते etc. In *Naishkamyaśiddhi* also the author says that the grounds of application of name are not present in Brahman therefore it is not expressed in

विश्वे But the *viśve* as they wake up the individual as if from sleep without, of course expressing *Ātman* as such. Suresvara says that such a phenomenon is possible because ignorance is weak and knowledge is one's own self. The example of the sleeping man, who wakes up on calling of his name without understanding anything is also given in *Varāhaupadhyāya-sūtra*. It is remarked here that when शब्द which is the destroyer of ignorance, there comes the consciousness 'I am Brahman' and this too vanishes itself like medicine after removing the disease, and *Ātman* alone remains.

भावना and नियोग—Suresvara introduces here a very important discussion on Bhavana. When the above described stage is reached says he there is no need of anything further, neither Bhavana is required nor any other means of knowledge. This question has not been raised by Śāṅkara in the Bhasya. Therefore it is all the more important. The Mīmāṃsakas hold that ultimate purpose of the whole Vedic literature is to order to perform action and to explain and describe such an action and give details which are necessary for the performance of such an action. Now so far as the *Brāhmaṇya* portion of the *Veda* is concerned the Vedāntin has nothing to contend. But it is unacceptable to Śāṅkara and his disciples to keep the *Upaniṣads* in the same category. The *Upaniṣads*, according to the Śāṅkara-Vedāntins deal with a new subject altogether. In the sphere of *Mīmāṃsā*, such sentences as 'thou art that' (तत्त्वमसि) and 'I am Brahman' (अहं ब्रह्मास्मि) are taken as dependent on certain injunctions. Such an injunction, again may be either for meditation (*Upaniṣad*) or for knowledge (*Jñāna*). The first is the view of the Bhaṭṭa

११ पश्यीयुः क्रियाजातिरुदयः शब्ददेहेतवः ।

नात्मन्यन्यतोऽस्मीति तेनात्मा नाभिर्भावते (N 3108)

school and also of Brahmādatta an old Vedāntin who differs from Śaṅkara. *Upaśama* is also given the names *Bhāvanā* and *Prasaṅkhyāna*. The Bhāvanāvādins hold that words (of *Śruti*) do not give the final knowledge. It is the result of a long practice on the lines of the ideas expressed in the *Śruti*. This view has been criticised by Sureśvara in the following manner. Brahman cannot be the object of *Bhāvanā* because it is अग्रसिद्ध (unknown). It is not expressed even by the sentences. A thing even unreal may be meditated upon only if it is somehow known or even if it is expressible in words. Brahman is neither. Therefore it cannot be the object of *Bhāvanā*. Secondly *Bhāvanā*, when it does not grasp the object as such cannot produce a real knowledge of the object (here Brahman). For example, the *Bhāvanā* of silver (which is false) cannot produce the knowledge of *Śukti* (mother o' pearl) in any way.

The other view of the Mīmāṃsakas is that of नियोग (injunction). Anything given in the Vedas must be a part of some injunction. This view is attributed to the Prabhākaras. The most extreme position is that the sentences in the *Upaniṣads* describe the agent and gods etc. (कर्तृदेवतादि) which are a part of the actions enjoined in the कर्मकाण्ड. The milder view is that even if the *Upaniṣads* are taken to be wholly independent of *Bṛāhmaṇa* portion, they themselves contain injunctions such as 'आत्मा वा अरे दृष्टव्यः' and all other statements should be taken as *artharūpas* dependent on such injunctions. The view of नियोग too has been criticised by Sureśvara. He says that Brahman or Ātman is the basis of all knowledge including one derived from injunctions. Such a basic knowledge or consciousness (viz., of self) cannot require anything like injunction for its own existence. It is wrong to suppose that all 'Vākyas' are 'Vidhi-vākyas.' for, in that case the knowledge of things as such will not be

It is the *Ātman* (in *iti*) that is not to be set a man to do a certain thing. Further, *ज्ञान* (knowledge) is not an action like other actions. It depends not on the man but on the thing to be known. There cannot be a *Vidhi* about a certain thing which is out of the control of man. If a thing is not knowable one cannot know it simply because there is a *विधि* for it. It is clearly stated in the Śrutis themselves that *darśana* (seeing) of *Ātman* is not possible (*न दृष्टेर्द्रष्टारं पश्येः*) and it is not the object of knowledge (*न विज्ञातेविज्ञातारं विजानीयाः*). Therefore it is a mistake to suppose that the function of the *nabū-
rūkyas* is to subserve the injunctions. The *nabū-
rūkyas* (like *तत्त्वमसि* and *अहं ब्रह्मास्मि*) stand independently and give the final knowledge immediately.

Now, the Mīmāṃsakas hold that the knowledge of things as such is conveyed by the *śloka*s which express their meaning as dependent on injunction. The अनुवाद which is not a part of a *विधि* is unauthoritative (*आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादानर्थक्यमतदर्शनात्* and *विधिषा त्वेकवाक्यत्वास्तुत्यर्थेन विधीनां स्युः*). Śureśvara says that there is no need of injunction at all where the question of knowledge is concerned. An injunction does not say anything about the thing. No separate injunction is needed to induce men to know *Ātman* for the general injunction to read Veda (*ऋग्वेदाद्यैतद्व्येतद्व्यः*) will serve the purpose. Those who will read Vedas will automatically know *Ātman* from the *śloka*s. If it is urged that the fruit of knowledge is not possible without there being some injunction, the answer is that there is no fruit of knowledge. It is the fruit itself. It comes from the महावाक्य as satisfaction from bread eaten.

Further, there is a view that it is not the शब्दज्ञान for which injunction is supposed but for the final knowledge which comes after शब्दज्ञान. This view has been attributed to Mandana by Ānandagiri and others.

1 / 1 t Ver e 70 (p 185) This is alluded to in the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* 1 67 as follows

अपरे तु ब्रुवते वेदान्तवाक्यजनितमहं ब्रह्मेति विज्ञानं संसर्गात्मकत्वादात्मवस्तुयाथात्म्याव-
गाह्येव न भवति । किं तर्हि एतदेव गङ्गास्रोतोवत् सततमभ्यस्यतोऽन्यदेवावाक्यार्थात्मकं
विज्ञानान्तरमुत्पद्यते । तदेवाशेषाज्ञानतिमिरोत्सारीति “विज्ञाय प्रज्ञां कुर्वीत ब्राह्मणः”
इति श्रुतेरिति ।

To this Sureśvara says that such a knowledge is mere supposition for Ātmañāna comes directly from शब्द in the following manner. The method of agreement and difference (अन्वय and व्यतिरेक), applied to the three states of waking, dreaming and deep sleep reveals that whatever changes is false and whatever does not change is real. Thus falsehood being removed, the one reality remains and then from the words ‘thou art that,’ etc, the notion ‘I am Brahman’ comes. Thus, what is अवाक्यार्थ being known from the वाक्य itself, it is useless to suppose another knowledge which is the result of *Bhāranū*, etc. Even, to destroy ignorance there is no need of another knowledge for which there be an injunction. Ignorance does not exist in ज्ञान (knowledge) ज्ञाता (knower) or साक्षिन्; and knowledge in Ātman is natural which destroys ignorance. The difference between a विधिवाक्य and an अभिधावाक्य is known by direct perception; therefore it is useless to say that all *vākya*s are injunctions. Liberation is not an action which the agent may perform directed by an injunction. It is a fact. Hence no injunction regarding it. The Śrutis like अस्थूल etc, and even the injunctive ones bar the knowledge of Brahman and therefore, the injunctions regarding it also. If Ātman is seen it becomes the object of प्रत्यक्ष (perception) which it is not. Seeing is not possible when there is no duality (तत्केन कं पश्येत्). However, if it is held that the knower itself is knowledge and means of knowledge, the thing being one, the different words used are meaningless.

The authority of Anuvādas, on purely Mīmāṃsaka

grounds.—If the Anuvāda- are not accepted as authoritative for their own meaning, they will be meaningless and the purpose they serve will not be served at all. For example in पयसा ब्रूहेति the word *milk* will not carry its meaning and thus the substance 'Milk' will not be connected with the action (also see note under Verse 687 in my forthcoming translation). It cannot be advanced that the statements which are without दान and उपादान (the action of receiving and rejecting) are unauthoritative for in that case the notion 'I am Brahman' will also be a false notion. An अनुवाद either expresses the same meaning as a particular injunction does or it expresses a different one. Obviously it must be accepted as authority in both the cases. If an अनुवाद does not carry its own meaning it is given in vain and even we cannot know that a particular sentence is अनुवाद and that it is dependent on a particular injunction, unless we first know its meaning which obviously we accept as authoritative before the knowledge of its dependence on an injunction. To say the least, if a word does not give its own meaning it is impossible to construe the meaning in a sentence.

If for the sake of argument it is accepted that the Vedānta sentences have got injunctions also, says the author, it will be difficult to determine whether the injunctions should follow the simple statements (अभिवाञ्छति), or the latter should follow the former. Neither of the positions is acceptable. Simple statements if they depend on injunctions will give only supposed notion like अदो वान ज्ञोको गीतमविनः and if injunction follows simple statements, there will be no injunction at all, for it will not be प्रमाण itself and अभिवाञ्छति will not express an injunctive meaning.

There cannot be an injunction even for निर्विघ्नासन after knowledge, for knowledge does not require anything

more to remove ignorance. Thus as soon as one knows the Ānanda (of) Brahman he becomes fearless. He is not pained by the thought of the sins of omission and commission for then he does not think himself to be the agent. The good and evil become, as if one with him and there cannot pain. The weakness due to ignorance being removed he becomes strong (बलवान्).

Here end the *Vārtikas* on *Brahmānanda-Vallī*. Sureśvara has criticised with great care the view of those who hold that the final knowledge is the result of *Bhāvanā*. But, we know that Śaṅkara accepts the practices known as *śravaṇa* and '*nididdhyanā*' after '*śravaṇa*' (hearing). It is very difficult to find out the difference between निदिध्यासन and भावना. It is accepted by both the schools that real knowledge does not come merely by hearing the words of the *Śruti*. The Śaṅkara school holds that मनन and निदिध्यासन are necessary while the Mīmāṃsakas and some Vedāntins hold that भावना is necessary. The latter does not seem to be different from निदिध्यासन. If these two things are the same it becomes extremely difficult to know the real ground of difference, beyond mere words.

Bhṛgu-Vallī (a summary) — The end has been described in the *Brahma-Vallī*, which is Brahman and its knowledge. Now the means is explained in this *Vallī*.

By means of a story of teacher and pupil, it is indicated that one desirous of such a knowledge should go to the teacher and should ask him to teach him (the pupil) about Brahman. The teacher Varuṇa points out Anna, Prāṇa, the powers of sight, hearing and speech and mind; and then gives a definition of Brahman 'From where all beings spring,' etc. (यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते) etc.

Anna (food), etc., are the means through which one can know Brahman by the application of अन्वय and व्यतिरेक (the methods of agreement and difference). This investigation is called *tapas* which Bhṛgu practised and then

e t e l a t u t r a t t h r l u s
 (minds) and so on. In the end he reaches *amūḥa* and
 stays, for, further there is nothing to be known or the rest
 is known without being told.

Further, the *Upaniṣad* gives the method of meditation
 and general behaviour prescribed for such *Upāsakas*. In
 the end the *Upāsaka* comes to know that he himself is
 identical with Brahman and he himself is food and eater
 and also the relation of the two (अन्न, अन्नाद and श्लोऽकृत्).
 This is the final stage and, nothing more remaining to
 teach, the *Upaniṣad* ends.

No controversial points are discussed in this *Vallī* and
 the author has added practically no new matter.

Style—Prof. Hiriyanna in his introduction to the
Naiṣkarmyasiddhi has pointed out that Suresvara uses at
 some places non-Pāṇinian grammar. A number of irregular
Sandhis and even metres containing more syllables than
 usual are found in this *Vārtika* also (८/ सर्वे अधीतिश्रवणार्थिनः
 1-82 which ought to be सर्वेऽधीति. For metres of nine syllables
 in a *Pāda* see the verses 680 and 685 of *Brah. Vallī* as
 examples. But such minor irregularities are bound to occur
 in the works of such eminent writers merely because of
 their free use of the language and mainly because the works
 deal with Philosophy. These irregularities do not deduct
 anything from the merit of the author.